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PROTECTED CLASS RATIONAL BASIS
REVIEW*
KATIE R. EYER**
It is commonplace today to associate rational basis review
exclusively with groups that are not formally afforded heightened
scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s equal protection precedents:
groups like gays and lesbians, people with disabilities, and
undocumented immigrants. Thus, discussions of the benefits of
nurturing a jurisprudence of meaningful rational basis review
typically focus exclusively on such “unprotected” groups. In
contrast, rational basis review is rarely thought of as providing
important protections for groups such as racial minorities and
women, who have secured “protected class” status and therefore are
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subject to regular heightened review of group-burdening
classifications.
Drawing on extensive original archival research, this Article
challenges this common conception. Race and sex discrimination
litigators have often historically relied on rational basis arguments
as a complement to heightened scrutiny. And during eras when
robust rational basis review was prevalent—such as the 1970s—
these claims have often succeeded. Today, as a result of, inter alia,
the LGBT rights cases (which have expanded judicial conceptions
of the scope of rational basis review), we stand at a moment of
increased possibility for meaningful rational basis review. Rational
basis arguments thus ought to form a part of how we conceptualize
the contemporary possibilities for race and gender justice claims.
Such an approach has the potential to revitalize what has long been
a stalled constitutional jurisprudence around sex and race
discrimination. As many scholars have acknowledged, it is
extraordinarily rare for courts today to find that a government actor
engaged in intentional discrimination against women or racial
minorities—the contemporary standard for triggering heightened
scrutiny. But as the history unearthed herein demonstrates, courts
(especially lower courts) have, at times, been willing to find that
racially and gender-impactful laws violate rational basis review.
Moreover, such review has often had the capacity to undermine
widely shared assumptions regarding the rationality of entrenched
structures of race and gender oppression. As such, protected class
rational basis review may present one of the few realistic
alternatives for reviving a meaningful project of race- and genderbased constitutional change today.
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INTRODUCTION1
In 1976, in the case of Washington v. Davis,2 the Supreme Court
famously held that a racially discriminatory purpose—not discriminatory
effects alone—must be shown to prove race discrimination under the
equal protection clause.3 Absent from the Court’s opinion—and thus
largely forgotten today—is the fact that the plaintiffs in Davis explicitly
rejected this framing of the case.4 Thus, plaintiffs’ counsel in Davis
eschewed any argument that the standards applicable to racial
classifications should be applied, and instead agreed with the defendant
that the Court’s lowest standard of scrutiny, rational basis review, was
applicable.5 But, the plaintiffs’ counsel contended, “the only rational
basis for the use of a test is that it does the employer some good . . . , and
it has not been proved here.”6 Thus, he argued, the test that the plaintiffs
challenged should be deemed unconstitutional under rational basis
review—regardless of whether it could be considered racially
discriminatory.7
The plaintiffs’ counsel in Davis—eminent civil rights lawyer
Richard Sobol—was not alone in embracing rational basis arguments for
racial justice in the 1970s.8 Rather, prominent groups such as the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”), the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”), and the National Education Association (“NEA”) all
deployed rational basis arguments in order to challenge laws with

1. This paper is the second in a series of papers examining lessons from the denouement
of the early sex and illegitimacy cases for the contemporary moment that we find ourselves in
vis-à-vis the LGBT rights cases and equal protection doctrine. See Katie R. Eyer,
Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
527 (2014) [hereinafter Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads]; Katie Eyer, The Canon of Rational
Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Eyer, The Canon].
2. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
3. Id. at 239–40.
4. See id. at 238 & n.8; see also infra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (describing the
plaintiffs’ counsel’s oral argument in Davis, which declined to focus on race discrimination,
and instead argued that the government classification at issue failed rational basis review).
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 55–56.
8. See, e.g., Louisiana to Out-of-State Lawyers: Get Out, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1968,
at 17–18 (describing Sobol’s early accomplishments as a civil rights lawyer).
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racially discriminatory effects—often with surprising levels of success.9
Thus, across a host of cases during this time frame—including educationand employment-related testing regimes, felon employment bans,
educational tracking systems, and welfare requirements10—racial justice
advocates succeeded in persuading the courts that the government
action at issue failed to satisfy even the minimum standards of equal
protection scrutiny.11 So too, sex equality advocates often pushed
successfully for the invalidation of government actions having a
disparate impact on women under the rubric of rational basis review—
most notably successfully challenging discriminatory pregnancy policies
and welfare policies adversely impacting poor African American
women.12 Thus, as this Article unearths, there was once a prominent,
and successful, tradition of “protected class rational basis review”13
practiced by equality-based social movements.

9. See generally infra Part II (detailing this history extensively).
10. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., infra note 94 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the courts found
for racial justice litigants on rational basis review).
12. See generally infra Part III (detailing this history extensively). The use of rational
basis arguments by sex equality advocates is more complicated to characterize as protected
class rational basis review as many courts generally treated sex discrimination claims during
this era as triggering only rational basis review. See infra Part I. However, gender equality
advocates often used this to their advantage, persuading courts that they need not demarcate
the outer boundaries of what is “sex discrimination,” given the failure of the relevant
classifications even under prevailing standards of rational basis review. See generally infra Part
III (describing in detail the ways that rational basis review allowed courts to sidestep
complicated questions regarding the outer boundaries of what could be considered sex
discrimination).
13. This Article uses the term “protected class rational basis review” simply to refer to
the use of rational basis review to achieve the objectives of those who are within the protected
classes, such as racial minorities or women. Often, today, this will involve using rational basis
review to target racially or gender-impactful laws in contexts where courts are unwilling to
deem the law intentionally discriminatory (and thus to apply heightened scrutiny). Note that
this Article does not necessarily mean by the use of this term to connote a form of heightened
rational basis review that is only available to protected classes (triggered, for example by a
showing of racial or gender disparities). Rather, most of the cases described herein—both
historical and modern—have simply relied on the existing ambiguity in rational basis review
doctrine (created by the longstanding instability and inconsistency in the doctrine) to read
that doctrine as allowing the application of meaningful back-end review. See infra Parts III–V.
See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (discussing the varied history of social
movements’ successful use of rational basis review, and that it has often involved such a messy
back-end approach); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1972) (suggesting the possibility that the Supreme Court had, across the board,
adopted a more meaningful approach to rational basis review).
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Today, this tradition of “protected class rational basis review” is
largely forgotten.14 Aspiring lawyers are taught to associate the claims of
“protected classes”—such as women and racial minorities—with
heightened scrutiny.15 Rational basis review is generally thought to apply
to everything else—the claims of those groups that have not yet
achieved protected status as well as the review of general economic
legislation.16 Under this framework, the claims of protected classes are
generally understood as being coextensive with—and limited to—the
circumstances in which plaintiffs can make a showing of race or sex
discrimination sufficient to trigger heightened review.17 As such, cases
that have limited the circumstances in which such discrimination will be
found—such as Washington v. Davis18 and Geduldig v. Aiello19—are
often understood as demarcating the outer boundaries of contemporary
race and gender justice claims.
This Article revisits the history of protected class rational basis
review, and suggests that it is time to rethink the common contemporary
14. Racial justice plaintiffs have continued to at times rely on rational basis arguments,
sometimes successfully, into the modern era. See, e.g., infra notes 434, 438 and accompanying
text (citing cases that have invalidated or questioned measures with a racial impact on rational
basis review). But the common modern approach to teaching and understanding equal
protection doctrine is to associate the claims of racial justice plaintiffs exclusively with
heightened scrutiny. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
15. This Article uses the term “heightened scrutiny” throughout to refer to intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Although arguably more meaningful forms of rational basis review
(often referred to by scholars as “rational basis with bite”) could be characterized as a form of
heightened scrutiny (perhaps a sub-intermediate tier), I think that such a characterization is
neither helpful to those pursuing equality goals (for reasons discussed in Part IV), nor
descriptively accurate. In fact, both the Court and the lower courts have used a wide array of
approaches to rational basis review—some more meaningful in the scrutiny they afford, some
less so—typically without suggesting that they are applying different or “heightened”
standards of review. For examples of pedagogical materials that associate the claims of
women and minorities with heightened scrutiny, see WILLIAM D. ARAIZA & M. ISABEL
MEDINA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND PRACTICE 937, 970, 1042–43, 1133,
1143, 1190–210 (4th ed. 2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN
CONTEXT 925–26, 989–90 (1st ed. 2008); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601–02, 715 (18th ed. 2013); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, & PROBLEMS 760 (2d ed. 2011).
16. See sources cited supra note 15.
17. See sources cited supra note 15; see also SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 643
(implying strongly that laws having only racially disparate impact are not unconstitutional
under Washington v. Davis); WEAVER, supra note 15, at 798 (stating that “[i]n Washington v.
Davis, the Court confirmed that purposeful discrimination was a threshold requirement for a
viable equal protection claim”—rather than simply a requirement for triggering heightened
scrutiny).
18. 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (holding that disparate impact alone does not trigger
strict scrutiny).
19. 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (stating that pregnancy discrimination is not per se sex
discrimination).
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way of understanding the relationship of protected classes to the equal
protection clause.20 In an era when the courts’21 minimum standards of
equal protection scrutiny are once again increasingly meaningful,22 there
is no reason why heightened scrutiny alone should form the basis of our
conception of the constitutional protections afforded “protected class”
minority groups.23 Rather, such an exclusive focus unnecessarily
circumscribes possible claims for race or gender justice by treating the
need to trigger heightened scrutiny—and thus satisfy the difficult
standards of proving race or sex “discrimination”—as a precondition to
race and gender justice claims.24 But this is simply not the case; as the
20. Although the discussion herein is focused on equal protection, some of the successful
rational basis arguments raised by protected group members historically have been situated
under the due process clause instead. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 93–94. In both
circumstances, the existence of a meaningful tradition of invalidating government action
where it is arbitrary or irrational marks the key opening for permitting such arguments. See
sources cited infra notes 93–94; cf. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1957)
(holding denial of permission to sit for the bar on the basis of history of membership in the
Communist party, among other things, to be irrational under the due process clause—later
relied on in both equal protection and due process “protected class rational basis” arguments
in the 1970s).
21. I use the term “courts” advisedly here, rather than “the Court,” because the
phenomenon identified herein is not limited to the Supreme Court, and indeed seems likely to
have its greatest potential in the lower and state courts. See generally infra Part IV (discussing
the potential of “protected class rational basis review,” especially in the state and lower
courts).
22. In the Supreme Court, this trend has primarily been confined to the LGBT rights
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). But cf. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–65 (2000) (per curiam)
(applying meaningful rationality review in the modern era outside of the LGBT rights
context). But in the lower courts, the focus of the discussion here, it has spread much farther.
See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
23. Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3172–83 (2015) (making a similar observation in the context of a proposal to adopt a
“proportionality” approach to U.S. constitutional law). This Article focuses on the potential
of the present moment for those within the protected classes, i.e., racial minorities and
women. In other work, I have also explored the potential benefits of the current moment for
those who remain outside the heightened tiers (such as people with disabilities,
undocumented immigrants, and others). See generally Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra
note 1 (describing the ways that the contemporary LGBT rights cases open up space for other
groups outside of the heightened tiers to make rational basis arguments).
24. Under the “tiers of scrutiny,” approach that the Court has embraced since the late
1960s, laws targeting “protected classes” (race, sex, illegitimacy, alienage) receive heightened
scrutiny—but only if they can meet the gatekeeping requirements of cases such as Davis and
Geduldig. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 173–80
(2016). Thus, laws that facially classify on the basis of protected class status or that can be
shown to be intentionally discriminatory receive heightened scrutiny (with high likelihood of
being invalidated), but those that only have a disparate impact do not receive such heightened
scrutiny. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 542 (7th ed. 2013).
However, all laws remain subject to what some of the justices have referred to internally as
“minimum scrutiny[,]” i.e., rational basis review. See, e.g., Memorandum from Justice William
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minimum scrutiny that the courts afford, rational basis review is always
available—even where litigants fail to persuade a court to find
intentional race or gender discrimination.25 And, as the history of
protected class rational basis review demonstrates, such review can lead
to the invalidation of racially and gender-impactful laws. As such, while
heightened scrutiny arguments will, and perhaps should, continue to
form the basis for many race and gender justice claims, these arguments
ought not be conceptualized as representing the outer limits of the
possible.26
Whether revitalizing the tradition of protected class rational basis
review would generate more favorable results for racial and gender
minorities remains to be seen. Rational basis review has long been
thought of as an extraordinarily deferential, almost meaningless, form of
review—which might suggest its limited utility for any social justice
H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. re: Mass Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, No. 74-1044, at 5
(May 25, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Papers) (using the term “minimum scrutiny test”). Thus, the same standards of
review that apply to unprotected groups (such as the LGBT community, people with
disabilities, and undocumented immigrants) also extend to the classifications imposed by
racially or gender-impactful laws. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993) (stating that all statutory classifications “that neither proceed[] along suspect lines nor
infringe[] fundamental constitutional rights” are subject to rational basis review).
25. See Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
supra note 24, at 5 (showing Justice Rehnquist using the term “minimum scrutiny test” to
refer to the type of review that the court performs where formal heightened scrutiny does not
apply).
26. While there are some scholars who argue that the tiered system of scrutiny either is
descriptively approaching its demise or normatively ought to be, see, e.g., Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482–94 (2004), I express no opinion
on either of these related issues herein. Rather this Article suggests only that—within the
tiered framework of scrutiny that currently exists—rational basis review ought to be taken
seriously as one way of bringing claims on behalf of those even within the heightened tiers.
Relatedly, it is worth noting that “protected class rational basis review” would not necessarily
alleviate all of the difficulties that have caused scholars to call for the demise of the tiered
approach, including, most notably, the use of heightened scrutiny to derail affirmative action
efforts.
Although this issue too exceeds the scope of this Article, I note that although I
believe rational basis review has greater potential than is often recognized, I also believe there
are benefits for groups seeking protections that come with a finding of heightened scrutiny—
benefits that most likely exceed the drawbacks (such as constitutional attacks on group-based
affirmative action). See, e.g., Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell and the Unfinished
Business of Formal Equality, 125 YALE L.J.F. 1, 7–11 (2015). I think this is especially so for
the most marginalized within a group (such as prisoners, low-income individuals, and youth),
most of whom will benefit, if at all, from the law as a result of deterrence and moral norms
shifts, rather than litigation-based results. Id. at 9–11. Thus, I think groups that stand a
realistic possibility of achieving heightened scrutiny—like the LGBT rights movement—have
a real interest in pursuing and achieving heightened scrutiny; although, as described herein,
there are reasons why they too may have an interest in ensuring the continued robustness of
rational basis review, in both the lead-up to, and even after they enter the heightened canon.
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campaign.27 But, as I have written elsewhere, this characterization
substantially oversimplifies what is, in reality, a messy and inconsistent
jurisprudence—one that has often afforded meaningful opportunities to
social movements seeking to disrupt the status quo.28 Thus, although
canonical accounts of rational basis review would dismiss its potential
significance for achieving social movements’ equality goals, the history
of equality struggles tells a different story—one of significant, albeit
partial, opportunities for sparking constitutional change.
As importantly, the present moment is one of markedly enhanced
opportunities for rational basis review. The Court’s recent LGBT
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) rights cases—which the Court has
declined to situate as a form of heightened scrutiny review—have
increasingly destabilized deferential formulations of rational basis
review.29 And, contemporary rational basis victories have not been
limited to the LGBT rights context; but rather have spread to an array

27. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is Constitutional (and
Desireable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 402, 410 (2016) (describing the rational basis
standard as “enormously deferential to the government” and “almost empty”). For a
description of the canonical account of rational basis review (as weak and useless), as well as
the way this account mischaracterizes and overlooks the ways that rational basis review has
been used successfully by social movements, see generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1
(describing the deep divide between the canonical account of rational basis review and the
ways that social movements have successfully used rational basis review to effectuate
constitutional change).
28. See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (describing the many contexts in which
rational basis review has historically opened up opportunities for constitutional change,
including, among others, the critical role of rational basis review in the LGBT rights
movement’s campaign for same-sex marriage; securing meaningful equal protection scrutiny
for women, nonmarital children, and gays and lesbians; the demise of the crack/cocaine
disparity; and many other arenas in which rational basis review has afforded social movements
opportunities to generate constitutional change); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Lifting the Veil
on Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 377, 382 (2012) (listing examples of
the Supreme Court’s use of “rigorous rational basis scrutiny” to provide avenues for
constitutional change).
29. See, e.g., Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 569 (discussing the ways
that the Court’s contemporary LGBT rights cases place pressure on the deferential
formulation of rational basis review); cf. Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous
and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281, 284 (2015) (“The rational basis test is enjoying a bit of
a comeback.”). I am not the first scholar to observe the potential of the LGBT rights cases for
contemporary race and gender justice claims. For two recent accounts by leading scholars, see
Robinson, supra note 24, at 153–58 (arguing that there are important ways that the Court’s
recent LGBT rights cases afford more significant protections than the Court’s existing
heightened scrutiny jurisprudence, and arguing that their principles should be extended to
race and sex cases); and Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword: Equality
Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (observing the “differences in empathy . . . within and
across” the Supreme Court’s contemporary racial justice and LGBT rights precedents, and
urging consideration of what a jurisprudence of renewed racial empathy might look like).
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of contexts in the lower and state courts30—including racial justice
domains.31 Thus, although no doctrinal innovation (including rational
basis review) is likely to be a panacea for the limitations of
contemporary race and gender justice litigation, both contemporary
doctrine—and historical inquiry—suggest that rational basis review may
provide a way around some of its most intractable barriers.
Moreover, even if the victories under a protected class rational
basis review approach are piecemeal, its potential for restarting our
stalled constitutional conversation around race and gender injustice is
important. Today, one of the principal obstacles to continued progress
for race and gender justice is the invisibility of the structures of race and
gender subordination—coupled with widely shared assumptions that
such structures are natural and justified.32 Protected class rational basis
review—by focusing on the thin underpinnings of many racially and
gender-impactful laws—holds the possibility of disrupting these widely
shared assumptions.33 In short, to the extent that we desire to
denaturalize and ultimately delegitimize existing structures of race and
gender oppression, it may be precisely through undermining widely
shared assumptions of rationality that we make the greatest progress.
Experience with protected class rational basis review—both
historically and today—suggests that just such a delegitimizing dynamic

30. Generally, when I use the term “lower courts” herein, I use it to signify the lower
federal courts, including the federal district courts and courts of appeals. When I intend to
signify state courts as well, I use the more inclusive term (used here) “lower and state courts.”
31. See, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1065–67 (9th Cir. 2014)
(undocumented immigrants), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1180 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2017); Bush v.
City of Utica, 558 F. App’x 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (refusal to provide emergency services in
low-income neighborhood); United States v. Byars, No. 8:10CR50, 2011 WL 344603, at *11–12
(D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2011) (crack/cocaine disparity); Mason v. Granholm, No. 05-73943, 2007 WL
201008, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2007) (prisoners); Lewis v. Ala. Dep’t Pub. Safety, 831 F.
Supp. 824, 825–29 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (criminal records discrimination in employment); Nixon
v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 288–90 (Pa. 2003) (criminal records discrimination in
employment); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888–91 (Minn. 1991) (crack/cocaine
disparity). Several of the government policies successfully challenged on rational basis review
in recent years—including criminal records discrimination and the crack/cocaine disparity—
have been recognized to be significant racial justice priorities in view of their impact on racial
minorities. See, e.g., Ban the Box, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/campaigns/ban-the-box/
[https://perma.cc/RSB4-TXZJ] (describing the reasons why criminal records discrimination in
employment is especially problematic for people of color in view of their disproportionate
mass incarceration); Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminaljustice-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/R54J-ESBH] (identifying the crack/cocaine disparity as a
critical explanatory factor in the mass incarceration of racial minorities).
32. See infra note 450 and accompanying text (addressing this issue).
33. Cf. Siegel, supra note 29, at 91 (“By unsettling judgments about legitimacy, equality
law can amplify the voices of those who challenge tradition, even as it encourages inequality
to assume new forms.”)
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is indeed possible. As this Article details, racial justice advocates and
women’s rights organizations made extensive use of rational basis
arguments to challenge racially and gender-impactful laws during the
1970s—often with striking levels of success.34 In the course of such
litigation, common racialized and gendered assumptions—including the
presumed connection of standardized test scores to employee
competency, the fairness and neutrality of school “tracking” systems, the
unfitness of unwed mothers to teach, and the inability of pregnant
women to do their jobs—were questioned and often rejected by lower
court judges, and sometimes by the Supreme Court itself.35 Moreover,
even where the Supreme Court ultimately sidestepped such protected
class rational basis arguments, lower court litigation—and the shift in
public views it helped to bring about—often ultimately culminated in
other forms of durable legal or social change.36

34. See infra Parts II–III.
35. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511–14 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d on other
grounds, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (public school tracking systems); infra notes 101–65
and accompanying text (standardized test scores and employee competency); infra notes 248–
91 and accompanying text (pregnancy); infra notes 372–418 and accompanying text (unwed
mothers).
36. One prominent example of this can be seen in the women’s rights movement’s
litigation campaign challenging mandatory maternity leave policies and other forms of
pregnancy discrimination in the early 1970s. As described in Section III.A, this litigation
campaign was highly successful, primarily through the use of rational basis arguments. See
generally Section III.A (arguing that there was no rational basis for treating pregnancy any
differently than other temporary disabilities). Although the Supreme Court held in 1974 in
Geduldig v. Aiello that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination (and that the
classification there was rational), 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 & n.20 (1974), the ideas that the
women’s rights movement forwarded through, inter alia, this campaign—and that many judges
endorsed on rational basis review—were sufficiently well entrenched by the mid-1970s that
when the Court extended its Geduldig holding to Title VII in 1976, see Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133–36 (1976), Congress promptly amended the law to incorporate
explicit pregnancy discrimination protections for both public and private employees. See
generally S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RES., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978 (Comm. Print 1979)
(recording the remarks of legislators, drawing extensively on arguments made by feminist
litigators—and endorsed by judges—in the early pregnancy discrimination cases, which
questioned the rationality and fairness of distinguishing pregnancy from other forms of
temporary disabilities). Interestingly, it appears that the undermining of the justifications for
pregnancy discrimination also dovetailed with legislators’ ability to “see” pregnancy
discrimination as sex discrimination. See generally id. (showing that by the time the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was enacted, legislators perceived pregnancy discrimination as irrational
and unfair, as well as perceiving it as sex discrimination). For fascinating, and far more
comprehensive, accounts of the history of the the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
debates within the feminist movement over how to conceptualize pregnancy discrimination
that preceded it, see generally Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 961 (2013); and Kevin Schwartz, Equalizing Pregnancy: The Birth of a Super-
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Similarly, today, one can see such dynamics at work in the arenas
where protected class rational basis arguments continue to be made.37
For example, the crack/cocaine sentencing disparity, once widely
embraced as necessary to address a serious social policy problem, has
today seen its underpinnings so thoroughly undermined that it has been
radically reduced—and may soon be eliminated.38 While the judicial role
in this process has been largely overlooked (perhaps because it has been
confined to the less visible lower and state courts), judges—relying on
rational basis review—were among the earliest establishment figures to
lend credence to the arguments of racial justice advocates that the
crack/cocaine disparity lacked meaningful justification.39 And, as those
justifications have been undermined, the racially discriminatory nature
of the policy has become increasingly intelligible to policymakers as
well.40 In short, even today, protected class rational basis review can—
and has—continued to play a role in addressing issues of substantial
importance to racial and gender justice advocates.
As the forgoing discussion suggests, understanding the potential of
protected class rational basis review requires departing from a singular
focus on Supreme Court-centric strategies for constitutional change.
Rather, most of the success of protected class rational basis review—
historically and today—has derived from the ability of social movements
to harness the indeterminacy of the Supreme Court’s rational basis
jurisprudence in making arguments in the lower courts—arguments
which, in turn, have helped to generate further social and legislative
change.41 As scholars such as Reva Siegel and Robert Post have
theorized in other contexts, it is this type of messy and multi-sited
constitutional dialogue—between social movements and an array of
Statute (2005) (Yale Law Sch. Student Prize Papers No. 41, 2015), http://digitalcommons
.law.yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/41/ [http://perma.cc/F429-R692].
37. The type of “protected class rational basis” arguments I discuss herein appear to have
become less common following the 1970s, in part because of shifting strategic incentives for
litigators (as a result of heightened scrutiny being afforded to sex discrimination, as well as the
addition of public employees to the coverage of Title VII), and in part because of overall
shifts in rational basis standards away from meaningful rational basis review. See infra notes
429–35 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, there have continued to be contexts in which
race and gender justice organizations have successfully deployed this type of reasoning.
38. As discussed infra, the crack/cocaine disparity was once widely perceived as necessary
to address the social ills understood to be uniquely associated with crack, a perception that
has been thoroughly undermined. See infra notes 464–72 and accompanying text. As
described infra, judges interrogating the disparity on rational basis review have played an
important role in the evolution of the perception of the disparity’s lack of justification. See
infra notes 464–72 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 464–72 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 464–72 and accompanying text.
41. See infra Parts II–IV.
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other legal and social actors—that has opened up opportunities for
change, even as such change has remained largely invisible in
mainstream canonical accounts.42
Taking protected class rational basis review seriously also
challenges us to question prevailing accounts of where meaningful
rational basis review is available. As I have written elsewhere, the two
dominant ways that the canon accounts for the existence of meaningful
rational basis review—“animus” and “rational basis with bite”—are
descriptively incomplete and substantively problematic, insofar as they
are situated as the exclusive pathways “in” to more meaningful forms of
rational basis review.43 Rather, as the history of protected class rational
basis review reminds us, there are a wide array of messy approaches that
the courts have taken to meaningful rational basis review—including
many which ignore the need for any threshold showing and simply apply
meaningful rationality review.44 To the extent that we wish to preserve
and expand pathways for undermining the legitimacy of racial and
gender oppression, we ought to view with concern the ways that the
contemporary canon erases this messy “back end” practice and seeks to
impose gatekeeping requirements to meaningful rational basis review
which the current doctrine does not demand.
* * *
In short, there are substantial reasons to believe that protected class
rational basis review holds real promise for race and gender justice
litigation today. However, realizing that promise may depend on our
willingness and ability to look beyond the common sense wisdom of how
rational basis review operates to the messy reality of how rational basis
review has been (and is today) actually applied. This Article seeks to do
so by introducing readers to protected class rational basis review
through an extensive study of its practice during its most successful and
prominent era—the 1970s.45
42. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 378–87 (2007) (developing the theory of
democratic constitutionalism); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323,
1413–17 (2006) (same); infra Parts II–IV.
43. See Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1, at 36–45.
44. See id. at 46–47; see also infra Part IV (extensively describing how “animus” and
“rational basis with bite” doctrines provide a reductive and misleading account of how
rational basis review is actually applied by the courts); infra Parts II–III (describing the ways
that protected class rational basis review was helpful to advocates precisely because it helped
them to sidestep otherwise vexing threshold questions).
45. In other forthcoming work, I describe the descriptive inaccuracies in the
contemporary canon of rational basis review, and how they artificially cabin our
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Part I, by way of background, describes general developments in
rational basis review during the late 1960s and the 1970s that facilitated
the success of protected class rational basis review claims, and discusses
the ways that those general developments are, to a significant extent,
mirrored in contemporary equal protection law.
Part II turns to a discussion of 1970s-era racial justice rational basis
claims. Section II.A describes the successful use of protected class
rational basis review by racial justice advocates in the lower courts in the
late 1960s and the 1970s—and the ways that such arguments permitted
advocates to succeed without requiring courts to determine whether
racial impact alone should be considered a form of race discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Section II.B turns to the arrival of
such arguments before the Court in the 1976 case of Washington v.
Davis,46 and describes the reasons why the Justices—who were
simultaneously grappling more broadly with how to define the Court’s
approach to rational basis review—may have avoided directly
addressing such arguments.
Part III then turns to sex equality litigation in the 1970s, and the
role that protected class rational basis arguments played there. Section
III.A describes the successful use of rational basis arguments by gender
equality advocates in pregnancy discrimination contexts, and the Court’s
ambiguous response to such arguments in the cases of Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur47 and Geduldig v. Aiello.48 Section III.B then
discusses the use of rational basis arguments in intersectional
discrimination49 contexts (often arising at the conjuncture of race-, sex-,
and poverty-based discrimination) during this time frame, and their
denouement before the Supreme Court in the cases of King v. Smith50
and Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews.51
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of this history for race
and gender justice today, and argues in favor of a revitalized tradition of
protected class rational basis review. This Part also addresses possible

understandings of how rational basis review is actually used by social movements. See
generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (discussing the ways that the contemporary canon
obscures the rich history of the use of rational basis review by social movements to generate
openings to create constitutional change).
46. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
47. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
48. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
49. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (seminal work developing the theory of intersectionality).
50. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
51. 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (mem.) (per curiam).
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critiques of such an approach to contemporary race and gender justice
claims.
I. RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW DURING THE 1970S AND TODAY52
In 1972, writing in the Harvard Law Review foreword, Gerald
Gunther observed “a new trend”: the willingness of a majority of the
Justices “to acknowledge substantial equal protection claims on
minimum rationality grounds.”53 (Gunther famously referred to this as
rational basis with “bite.”)54 Gunther’s observations would prove to be
prescient.55 During the 1970s, robust forms of rational basis review—
often resulting in the constitutional invalidation of the classifications
complained of—would become increasingly common, in both the lower
courts and in the Supreme Court itself.56
This turn toward robust forms of rational basis review was driven
substantially by a number of cases decided by the Court in the early
1970s, in which it invalidated sex and illegitimacy classifications on

52. The discussion in this Part is drawn principally from a prior article addressing links
between the Court’s 1970s sex and illegitimacy discrimination precedents and the rise of
robust rational basis review during that era. See generally Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads,
supra note 1 (describing how the early sex and illegitimacy cases were linked to the rise of
more meaningful forms of rational basis review in the 1970s). I owe a debt of gratitude to Earl
Maltz, whose article unearthing the Supreme Court’s debates over rational basis during this
era originally drew me to this line of inquiry. See generally Earl M. Maltz, The Burger Court
and the Conflict over the Rational Basis Test: The Untold Story of Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 264 (2014) (describing the Court’s significant
debates over rational basis review in the case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam)).
53. Gunther, supra note 13, at 19.
54. Id. at 20–24. Although “rational basis with bite” is the most common scholarly way of
describing robust forms of rational basis review today, this Article generally does not use that
term. In its modern usage, “rational basis with bite” is often understood to connote a special
tier within rational basis review, bundled with its own gatekeeping requirements such as
animus. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760, 763
(2011). See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (describing extensively contemporary
accounts of “rational basis with bite”). Because I think such an account of rational basis
review oversimplifies existing doctrine and is not ultimately helpful to groups seeking equality
reform, I avoid the term (and its associated connotations) herein. Instead, I principally use the
broader term “robust rational basis review.”
55. Gunther’s observations in the foreword were also highly influential. Gunther’s article
was regularly cited, including by some of the Justices in their internal debates, to argue in
favor of more robust forms of rational basis review. See, e.g., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Draft Opinion re: Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, No. 74-1044, at 10–17 (May 19, 1976) (on file
with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers).
56. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 537–44; see also William D.
Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L.
REV. 519, 522 (2005).

95 N.C. L. REV. 975 (2017)

2017]

PROTECTED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

989

rational basis review.57 For example, in the influential 1971 case of Reed
v. Reed,58 the Court concluded that an Idaho statute giving automatic
preference to male executors was “arbitrary” and lacked a rational
relationship to the state’s objectives.59 Relying on the Lochner-era
precedent of F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,60 the Court further
opined that even on the minimum standard of review, “[a] classification
‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation . . . .’ ”61
At the time, it was unclear whether the Court’s turn in Reed and the
other sex and illegitimacy cases62 should be understood as extending

57. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 537–44. Interestingly, these
developments in the Supreme Court were driven at least in part by protected class rational
basis review arguments themselves in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, statutes and
state policies discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy—which were in many circumstances
arguably motivated by civil rights backlash and efforts to subordinate African Americans—
were challenged by a number of litigators both as being racially discriminatory (and
sometimes also discriminatory against women) as well as failing rational basis review. See, e.g.,
Brief Amicus Curiae for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. & the
National Office for the Rights of the Indigent at 13, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(No. 508) (making the race discrimination argument, and also arguing that there were “no
rational reasons in favor of discriminating against illegitimates under the Louisiana statute”).
See generally infra Section III.B (discussing several cases of this kind). Although advocates’
race discrimination arguments would generally drop out of the cases by the time they were
decided by the Supreme Court, some of the illegitimacy cases in which advocates raised
rational basis racial justice arguments ultimately generated meaningful precedents that later
provided the basis for further development of protected class rational basis arguments in the
lower courts. See generally Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the
Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015) (discussing extensively advocates’ race
discrimination claims in the early illegitimacy cases). There are also reasons to believe that
traditions of robust rational basis review by administrators at the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”)—which had been spread to poverty litigators by the
1960s—played a role in reviving notions of robust rational basis review in the late 1960s. See
generally Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015) (describing the
history of administrative equal protection at HEW, and how it spread to poverty litigators,
influencing doctrinal arguments in the late 1960s).
58. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
59. Id. at 76.
60. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
61. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster, 253 U.S. at 415).
62. In addition to Reed, there were a significant number of other sex and illegitimacy
cases decided by the Court on rational basis review during this era. See, e.g., Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13–17 (1975) (sex); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642–45
(1975) (sex); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631–34 (1974) (illegitimacy); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172–76 (1972) (illegitimacy); Glona v. Am. Guarantee &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74–76 (1968) (illegitimacy); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70–72
(1968) (illegitimacy).
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broadly to all classifications subject to minimum tier review,63 or
whether it should instead be understood as marking a special disfavor
for sex and illegitimacy discrimination.64 But as the number of cases in
which the Court declined to situate its sex and illegitimacy precedents as
a form of heightened scrutiny grew, the lower courts increasingly read
Reed and the other sex and illegitimacy cases broadly, as mandating a
meaningful form of review for all minimum tier cases.65 Thus, across a
host of contexts during the 1970s—including those lacking any direct
relationship to sex or illegitimacy discrimination—the lower courts
endorsed meaningful forms of rational basis review.66
The advent of these more meaningful forms of rational basis
review—outside of the sex and illegitimacy context—generated intense
controversy within the Court.67 While many of the Justices supported
more robust forms of rational basis review generally (not just as applied
to sex and illegitimacy), some did not.68 And, even among those who
favored the across-the-board application of more meaningful standards
for rational basis review, there were deep divisions regarding what,
exactly, such review should entail.69 Ultimately, these divisions would

63. Because the Court has used varying formulations of the standards it applies to cases
not subject to formally heightened scrutiny, I consider the term “minimum scrutiny test”
borrowed from Justice Rehnquist, to be a more accurate descriptive term than “rational basis
review.” See, e.g., Memorandum from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., supra note 24, at 5 (using the term “minimum scrutiny test” rather than “rational
basis review”). I nevertheless also use the more familiar term “rational basis review” herein.
References to the two are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
64. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 537–44; The Supreme Court,
1972 Term—Sex Discrimination by Federal Government in Payment of Fringe Benefits to
Armed Services Personnel, 87 HARV. L. REV. 116, 123 n.43 (1973) (noting that Reed appeared
to reveal a “special sensitivity to sex classifications”).
65. See, e.g., Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 856–57 (D. Mass. 1973) (applying
Reed and Weber as the applicable standard in an equal protection case involving military
veterans), rev’d, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); see also Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at
539–40, 564 n.140. As I discuss elsewhere, it is unsurprising that most courts at the front end of
constitutional equality change are unwilling to make the type of global pronouncements
demanded by heightened scrutiny approaches. See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1
(noting that courts share the social context that generates discriminatory laws, and thus may
be predictably reluctant to make global assessments regarding the invidiousness of laws
targeting a group at the front end of constitutional change).
66. See, e.g., Robison, 352 F. Supp. at 856–57; see also Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads,
supra note 1, at 564 n.140 (noting that Reed was cited outside of the sex discrimination context
sixty-eight times during the two-year period from 1974–1975, and that in forty of those cases
the litigant prevailed).
67. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
68. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 544–54 (describing the
perspectives of the various Justices, as revealed by the debates in Murgia); Maltz, supra note
52, at 266–76 (same).
69. See Maltz, supra note 52, at 266–76.

95 N.C. L. REV. 975 (2017)

2017]

PROTECTED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

991

preclude the Justices from forming a majority for any systematized or
formalized statement of its rational basis case law, despite at least one
major internal attempt to do so.70 As such, into the 1980s, the Court
would continue to apply varying standards in its rational basis case law,
without formally explaining the metrics by which such cases were
decided.71
Although the Court itself never resolved the disputes over the
proper formulation of the rational basis standard raised by its early
1970s rational basis cases, other events ultimately pushed the lower
courts and litigants away from more robust formulations of rational
basis review. Thus, as sex and illegitimacy gradually came to be
canonized as “quasi-suspect classifications,” demanding formally
heightened review, academics and others began to reimagine the early
sex and illegitimacy cases as outside the canon of rational basis review.72
As such, important cases such as Reed and Weber73—decided under the
Court’s minimum tier of scrutiny—came to be reconceptualized as
“[h]eightened scrutiny under a deferential, old equal protection guise[,]”

70. See id. As described at length in both Maltz and Eyer, the case of Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam)—although finally decided by
a bland per curiam opinion—was actually the site of a major (ultimately unsuccessful) effort
on the part of the Justices to resolve their disputes over whether the rational basis standard
should generally be applied more meaningfully, and if so, what the contours of that analysis
should look like, see id. at 314–17; Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 544–54;
Maltz, supra note 52, at 266–76.
71. See Maltz, supra note 52, at 282 (“[B]y the late 1980s, the Justices had abandoned the
effort to bring consistency and coherence to the Court’s rational basis jurisprudence. Instead,
even Justice Rehnquist had at least implicitly accepted the idea that rational basis analysis
could be used as a kind of doctrinal safety valve that would allow the Justices to on occasion
strike down classifications that they found particularly offensive . . . . [T]his use of the rational
basis test remains a staple of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence to this day.”).
72. See, e.g., Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 554–64, 573–74; see also,
e.g., Appellees’ Brief on the Merits, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (No. 80-1538), 1981
WL 389636, at *51 (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), as a
heightened scrutiny case); Brief for Amicus Curiae National Organization for Women,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (No. 80-251), 1981 WL 390369, at *4 (citing Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in the context of arguing that heightened scrutiny applies to sex
discrimination); Brief of the ACLU & the ACLU of Northern California, in Support of
Petitioner, Amici Curiae, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (No. 79-1344),
1980 WL 339750, at *6 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), as authority for the
proposition that sex discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny). See generally infra note
74 (collecting casebooks that today identify Reed and Weber as only “purporting” to apply
rational basis review). Note that contrary to the standard account, the canonization of sex and
illegitimacy as subject to formally heightened scrutiny (both in the case law and in academia)
was a gradual process, which took place over a period of years in the late 1970s and early
1980s. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 554–64.
73. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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and thus irrelevant to contemporary rational basis standards.74 And so,
stripped of its most meaningful precedents, rational basis review drifted
away from the more robust formulations that had often characterized its
application in the 1970s—toward more deferential forms of review.75
Today, there are again pressures that are pushing courts and
litigants to take seriously the application of meaningful standards under
the minimum tier of equal protection review. Just as in the 1970s, when
the Court’s early sex and illegitimacy cases pushed the courts and
litigants toward robust forms of rational basis review, the success of the
LGBT rights movement’s equal protection claims are working to expand
conceptions of what minimum tier review entails today.76 Thus, as the
Court has consistently declined to canonize its LGBT rights cases as
“heightened scrutiny” cases, it has again opened space for litigants,
lower courts, and scholars to take seriously the possibility that equal
protection—even outside of its formally heightened tiers—demands
meaningful review.77
These revitalized approaches to rational basis review have not been
restricted to any one doctrinal approach. Thus, while discussions of
“animus” and a special “rational basis with bite” standard have
dominated scholarly descriptions of the LGBT rights cases’ connection
74. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683–84
(13th ed. 1997) (first alteration in original). In the modern era, most casebooks do not
describe Weber and Reed as true rational basis cases, typically characterizing them as only
“purporting” to apply rational basis review, or otherwise suggesting that they are outside the
Court’s canonical rational basis doctrine. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D.
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2012); STONE ET
AL., supra note 24, at 637, 717; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 712; see also Eyer,
The Canon, supra note 1, at 18 n.80, 19 n.95 (collecting casebooks).
75. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th
Cir. 2004); EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS,
AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 52–53 (1999); Eyer,
Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 554–64. Note that although the courts moved
toward more deferential formulations of rational basis review during this era, there remained
sufficient uncertainty and ambiguity in the doctrine for social movements to, at times,
continue to be able to make use of rational basis review to generate initial constitutional
change. See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (describing a variety of ways that social
movements have made use of rational basis review to open up space for constitutional change
during all eras of modern constitutional history).
76. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 565–76; see also cases cited supra
note 31; cases cited infra note 438.
77. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 565–76; see also, e.g., Ariz.
Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014) (relying in part on Romer in
invalidating law discriminating against Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
recipients on rational basis review), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1180 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2017);
Mason v. Granholm, No. 05-73943, 2007 WL 201008, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2007)
(relying on Romer to invalidate law that discriminated against prisoners on rational basis
review). See generally cases cited supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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with rational basis review,78 in fact the cases themselves—and the lower
courts’ application of them—have, as in the 1970s, applied a variety of
diverse, often diffuse and poorly defined approaches to robust rational
basis scrutiny.79 While some scholars have understandably criticized this
aspect of the Court’s decisions (i.e., their lack of a clearly defined
doctrinal framework), it also means that the potential of those decisions
has few obviously delineated bounds.80 As such, the contemporary
moment of expanding minimum tier review offers much uncertainty, but
also many potential opportunities for those who might seek to effectuate
equality goals via rational basis review.
As the history set out in the following Parts demonstrates, these
opportunities are not limited to those outside the protected classes.81
Rather, those today within the protected classes—such as racial
minorities and women—may also benefit in substantial ways from
expanded conceptions of what rational basis review entails. Indeed, as
the rise of protected class rational basis review in the 1970s illustrates,
courts’ adoption of meaningful minimum tier review can substantially
sidestep otherwise vexing questions regarding the limits of what race or
sex discrimination “is.”82
II. RACIAL JUSTICE AND THE ROLE OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW IN
BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN THE 1970S
Today, racial justice claims under the Constitution are often
thought of as inextricably intertwined with strict scrutiny.83 In this
conception, strict scrutiny represents the standard applicable to all
constitutional race discrimination claims, and thus the limits of where

78. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 54, at 759–60; see also Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1, at
37–38 (describing the tendency of the canon to focus on specific theories of “rational basis
with bite” and “animus” as the exclusive explanations for meaningful rational basis review,
including, inter alia, the LGBT rights cases).
79. See cases cited supra note 31; cases cited infra note 438; see also Bambauer &
Massaro, supra note 29, at 302 (“The decisions overturning laws that discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation are analytically fuzzy.”); Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1, at 567–80
(exploring this issue in depth). See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(invalidating law without relying on formally heightened scrutiny—utilizing complex
reasoning and not clearly defining its doctrinal approach); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (same).
80. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Mini-Domas as Political Process Failures: The Case for
Heightened Scrutiny of State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 12,
13 (2014) (noting that all of the LGBT rights cases have “suffered criticism for their
ambiguous levels of scrutiny and lack of doctrinal rigor”).
81. See infra Parts II–III.
82. See infra Parts II–III.
83. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
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strict scrutiny is applied demarcate the outer boundaries of such claims.84
But in fact, ever since the initial rise of the tiered system of equal
protection review, racial justice advocates have also harnessed rational
basis arguments to make racial justice claims.85 Thus, just as Serena
Mayeri has observed in other contexts, it is the Supreme Court’s choice
of which arguments to take up, rather than the arguments themselves,
that have largely defined our conception of the scope of equal protection
advocacy.86
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, such arguments were often
successful and permitted both racial justice advocates and many judges
to sidestep what were then burgeoning disputes over the boundaries of
constitutional race discrimination.87 Thus, rational basis arguments
served as a means of avoiding entirely what became one of the central
racial justice disputes of the 1970s—whether race discrimination claims
required proof of intentional discrimination.88 This Part discusses these
early rational basis claims by racial justice plaintiffs, as well as how the
Supreme Court’s refusal to engage with such “protected class rational
basis” claims in Washington v. Davis has made their legacy largely
invisible.
A. The Rise of Rational Basis Racial Justice Arguments in the Lower
Courts (1968–1976)
In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,89 it remained
uncertain what form the “new equal protection” would take.90 Although

84. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., infra note 93 and accompanying text.
86. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 227–33 (2011) (making a similar observation in the context of an
exploration of the nuanced claims made by the women’s rights movement, which were not
nearly as unidimensional as the Court’s ultimate opinions); Mayeri, supra note 57, at 1280–81
(describing the race and gender equality arguments that were raised in the early illegitimacy
cases and the way that they were ignored at the Supreme Court level, and thus have been
largely forgotten).
87. See infra Section II.A. Throughout this Article, the term “boundary disputes” is used
to refer to disputes about the boundaries of what can be considered constitutional race (or
sex) discrimination. Disputes over whether disparate impact discrimination can be
conceptualized as a form of constitutional race discrimination are a classic example of such
boundary disputes.
88. See generally Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2016) (including extended discussion of the complicated and
central role that disputes over the significance of intent in equal protection doctrine played in
1960s- and 1970s-era race discrimination jurisprudence); infra Sections II.A, II.B (describing
how rational basis review afforded an opportunity to sidestep the burgeoning issue of whether
intent was required to prove race discrimination).
89. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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it was clear that “separate but equal” was no longer the generally
governing rule, the Brown opinion itself did not define the contours of
what doctrinal regime would take its place.91 But by the late 1960s, the
Court had coalesced around a two-tier approach to equal protection,
under which suspect classes (such as race) and fundamental rights (such
as the right to marry) received strict scrutiny—and other forms of
government action were subject to rational basis (minimum tier)
review.92
In this new equal protection environment, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (“LDF”) and other civil rights groups embraced not only
the use of heightened scrutiny arguments, but also rational basis
review.93 Thus, across a host of cases in the late 1960s and 1970s, racial
90. See Gunther, supra note 13, at 8 (using this term to describe developments in equal
protection doctrine under the Warren Court); cf. Yoshino, supra note 54, at 750 (using this
term to refer to the contemporary Court’s approach to reaching equality goals).
91. Brown, 349 U.S. at 298–301; see, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 235–39 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Equality
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1478–89 (2004); cf. Eyer, supra, note 88, at 8–22 (noting that even
prior to Brown, the Court precluded formal racial discrimination vis-à-vis voting and jury
service rights, and thus had developed a set of sub-constitutional doctrines for addressing
formal equality challenges, many of which initially carried over to the post-Brown era).
92. Gunther, supra note 13, at 8 (describing the Warren Court’s two-tier approach); see
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (declaring that race classifications were subject to
strict scrutiny and that that right to marry was fundamental).
93. See Motion for Leave to File Brief for the Urban Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae at
9–16, McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (No. 1033) (on file with George Washington
University Libraries in NEA Archives, Series 1, Box 1421, Folder 20) (making, inter alia, a
rational basis argument for equal school funding across districts); Brief for Appellant at 66–
67, Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1977) (No. 75-2321), repudiated by
Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 501 (1987) (on file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd
Manuscript Library in ACLU Collection, Box 3154) (making the rational basis argument in
the context of a police violence case); Brief Amicus Curiae for National Education
Association at 74, United States v. Georgia, 445 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971) (No. 30,338) (on file
with George Washington University Libraries in NEA Archives, Series 17, Box 2997)
(arguing in a teacher desegregation case that the Fourteenth Amendment “imposes upon
school districts the requirement of employing reasonable and non-discriminatory standards
and procedures in hiring and promoting teachers[,]” and citing, inter alia, rational basis cases);
Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae at 15–18, 34–35, Hansen v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (No. 21,167, 21,168) (on file with the Library of Congress in NAACP Collection,
Box V:341, Folder 7) (showing the NAACP arguing for an effects approach to heightened
scrutiny, but also suggesting that the district’s tracking system was unlawful as it failed
rational basis review in its actual operation); Brief for Amicus Curiae: National Education
Association at 4–15, Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Nos. 21,167, 21,168) (on
file with the Library of Congress in NAACP Collection, Box V:341, Folder 6) (arguing that
tracking system in Washington, D.C., must be invalidated because it was racially
discriminatory, but also, independently because it was arbitrary in its implementation); Brief
for the N.E.A. Commission on Professional Rights & Responsibilities, Amici Curiae at 12–17,
Henry v. Coahoma Cty. Bd. of Educ., 353 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1965) (No. 21,438) (on file with
George Washington University Libraries in NEA Archives, NEA1006.RG, Box 2997)
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justice plaintiffs contended that—even if the circumstances did not
render the application of strict scrutiny appropriate—the relevant
government action failed rational basis review.94 As government action
increasingly presented “second generation” racial justice issues (such as
whether government actions having a disparate racial impact were
actionable), this approach allowed racial justice organizations to sidestep
disputes over the boundaries of what forms of race discrimination were
actionable—by arguing that the relevant government action failed even
minimum standards of review.95
Rational basis arguments were typically not the frontline argument
of racial justice organizations.96 But by the early 1970s, as racial justice

(making argument that teacher’s dismissal was racially discriminatory, but also arguing that
any teacher dismissal that is arbitrary or capricious violates substantive due process); infra
notes 260, 327 and accompanying text (discussing in-depth several of the relevant cases).
94. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 613–17 (5th Cir.
1975) (employment of unwed mothers); United States v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.2d
70, 74–75 (4th Cir. 1973) (testing in employment); Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 279–80 (5th Cir. 1972) (testing in employment); Chance v. Bd. of Exam’rs,
458 F.2d 1167, 1177–78 (2d Cir. 1972) (testing in employment); Ga. Ass’n of Educators v. Nix,
407 F. Supp. 1102, 1107–11 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (testing in employment); United States v. North
Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343, 349–51 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (testing in employment), vacated, 425 F.
Supp. 789 (E.D.N.C. 1977); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 579–82 (S.D. Iowa 1974)
(criminal records discrimination in employment); Arrington v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 306
F. Supp. 1355, 1358–59 (D. Mass. 1969) (testing in employment); Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp
31, 38–41 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (qualification for benefits where applicant had nonmarital
relationship), aff’d on other grounds, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 511–14 (D.D.C. 1967) (tracking in education), aff’d on other grounds, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Nansemond Cty. Sch. Bd., 351 F. Supp. 196, 202–08 (E.D.
Va. 1972) (applying standards on rational basis review like those used in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in the context of testing in employment, but ultimately
denying relief), rev’d, 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
95. See sources cited supra note 93. As Reva Siegel has shown, lower courts also during
this era blurred the boundaries between intent and impact as ways of demonstrating
discrimination—concepts that later were very clearly demarcated by the Supreme Court (with
intent being the showing demanded to trigger strict scrutiny). See Siegel, supra note 29, at 14–
20. The cases described herein typically used rational basis review as a way of sidestepping
altogether the question of whether more impact-oriented forms of discrimination were
sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause, although they
sometimes did use racial impact as a trigger for more meaningful rational basis review (much
as, for example, today, many scholars conceive of animus as a trigger for “rational basis with
bite”). See cases cited supra note 94. See generally Part II (describing the role of rational basis
review in racial justice claims in the 1970s). This specific version of “protected class rational
basis review” would arguably be problematic today under Washington v. Davis, see infra
Section III.B, but the approach taken by other courts—simply applying a generally
meaningful form of rational basis review (which they understood to extend to all contexts, not
simply to depend on a racial-impact trigger)—is not, see, e.g., cases cited supra note 94; cases
cited infra notes 260, 327 and accompanying text.
96. Typically, rational basis arguments were presented as a fallback argument to arguing
for some kind of heightened scrutiny, although they also sometimes were made by racial
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litigation pushed into new domains, they increasingly gained credence in
the lower courts.97 Thus, across a host of contexts, courts found that
regardless of whether a racially disparate impact was sufficient, standing
alone, to trigger strict scrutiny, some showing of rationality was, at a
minimum, required.98 And, finding such a rational basis to be lacking, a
variety of courts held, in turn, that racially burdensome government
action was invalid on rational basis review—across contexts as diverse as
testing regimes, criminal records discrimination, educational tracking
systems, and welfare requirements.99
The case of Chance v. Board of Examiners,100 brought by the
NAACP LDF in September of 1970, was emblematic of this approach.101
Following years of increasing unrest over the small proportion of black
and Latino principals in the New York City school system,102 the LDF
took on Chance as one of a series of cases it brought in the late 1960s
and early 1970s challenging employment testing and seniority regimes in
both the private and public sectors.103 As it did in many such cases, the
LDF contended that the test for qualifying supervisors was both
discriminatory—having a disparate impact on blacks and Latinos—and
unrelated to the capability to perform the job of principal, representing
an arbitrary barrier to blacks’ and Latinos’ advancement.104

justice organizations as their primary argument. See supra note 93 (citing briefs); infra notes
104, 147 (same).
97. See cases cited supra note 94.
98. See cases cited supra note 94.
99. See cases cited supra note 94.
100. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. Id. at 1177–78.
102. See CHRISTINA COLLINS, “ETHNICALLY QUALIFIED”: RACE, MERIT, AND THE
SELECTION OF URBAN TEACHERS, 1920–1980, at 148–50 (2011).
103. See Chance, 458 F.2d at 1168, 1170. The most famous of such cases is, of course,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which would ultimately establish the disparate
impact principle under Title VII. See id. at 429–36. For a discussion of the LDF’s role in early
disparate impact arguments, including in Griggs, see, for example, JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 444–52
(rev. ed. 2004); Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 288–93 (2011); David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 VAND. L. REV. 197, 205–30 (2014).
104. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21–46, Chance, 458 F.2d 1167 (No. 71-2021)
(on file with the National Archives at New York City) [hereinafter Chance NAACP Brief].
These arguments—and the protected class rational basis review arguments made in a number
of other cases during this era—bore significant similarities to the statutory disparate impact
standard under Title VII. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 93. However, plaintiffs also
made—and courts embraced—a wide variety of other rational basis arguments in the context
of racially and gender impactful laws during this era as well. See sources cited supra notes 93–
94. Even in the context of Chance itself, the Second Circuit would ultimately conclude that it
did not need to address the issue of whether a disparate impact might trigger more meaningful
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Following extensive expert discovery, the district court, on July 14,
1971, agreed, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction.105 Noting that the “examinations . . . have the de facto effect
of discriminating . . . against qualified Black and Puerto Rican
applicants[,]” the court observed that “the existence of such
discrimination, standing alone, would not necessarily entitle plaintiffs to
relief.”106 But, the court further held that where “the examinations result
in substantial discrimination against a minority racial group qualified to
take them, a strong showing must be made by the Board that the
examinations are required to measure abilities essential to performance
of the supervisory positions for which they are given”; a showing the
Board of Examiners had not made.107 Thus, although nominally
eschewing Title VII precedents, the district court imposed a standard
very similar to that recently adopted in the Title VII context in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.108
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the assigned panel immediately
recognized the importance of the case.109 Seven groups of outside
entities or individuals had requested leave to participate as amici,
offering a diversity of strongly polarized views of whether the
Constitution required—or, conversely, permitted—the type of approach
that the district court had endorsed.110 Foreshadowing the divisions that
scrutiny, as the test “failed to meet . . . the rational relationship standard[.]” See Chance, 458
F.2d at 1177–78.
105. See Chance v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 330 F. Supp. 203, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d, 458 F.2d
1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
106. Id. at 214.
107. Id. at 216, 223. As noted, infra note 108 and accompanying text, this ambiguous
standard most closely resembles the Griggs standard (rather than either of the two potentially
applicable constitutional standards—rational basis and strict scrutiny), although the district
court denied adopting the Title VII approach. Id. at 215.
108. 401 U.S. 424, 429–36 (1971) (imposing in the Title VII context requirements that
employers demonstrate the job-relatedness of any employment qualifications having a
disparate racial impact, regardless of discriminatory intent).
109. See Memorandum of Judge William H. Timbers, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, to Judge Wilfred Feinberg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and
Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Md., re: Chance v. Bd. of Exam’rs,
No. 71-2021, at 1 (Feb. 17, 1972) (on file with Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript
Library, Wilfred Feinberg Collection, Box 32) (noting that the case would likely have
“precedential effect throughout the Country”).
110. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith et al. at 7–24,
Chance, 458 F.2d 1167 (No. 71-2021) (on file with the National Archives at New York City);
Brief Amicus Curiae of Aspira of America, Inc. at 4–16, Chance, 458 F.2d 1167 (No. 71-2021)
(on file with the National Archives at New York City); Brief of Charles Wiener (pro se) as
Amicus Curiae at 8–42, Ex. 1, Chance, 458 F.2d 1167 (No. 71-2021) (on file with the National
Archives at New York City) [hereinafter Chance Brief of Charles Wiener (pro se) as Amicus
Curiae]; Brief for the New York Association of Black Educators as Amicus Curiae at 11–37,
Chance v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972) (No. 71-2021) (on file with the
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would later erupt publicly over affirmative action, Chance divided the
traditional liberal coalition, with black and Latino organizations
supporting the plaintiffs, and labor and Jewish organizations arguing
that the district court’s decision privileged race over a fair and
reasonable merit-based regime.111
In their briefing, the defendants argued that numerous aspects of
the district court’s reasoning—from its finding of a disparate impact to
its conclusion that the exam was not job-related—were erroneous.112 But
among their principal arguments was that the district court had—
regardless of racial impact—applied the wrong standard of review.113
Noting that “it is inevitable that various state imposed classifications will
have a varying impact on different racial groups[,]” defendants argued
that “[u]nless the state draws [purposeful] distinctions on the basis of
race, the Federal court’s role is restricted to ‘declaring whether there is a
reasonable basis for the classification . . . .’ ”114
In response, the LDF contended that the defendants erroneously
sought to distinguish between purposeful discrimination and disparate
impact, and that “the interests of those discriminated against are
essentially the same and deserve the same degree of protection whether
employment opportunities are denied explicitly and intentionally or
inadvertently.”115 But they also strongly argued that “even if the rational
relationship test . . . is applied, the decision below must be upheld.”116
Noting that “[t]he court below rested its decision on findings that the
Examiners could demonstrate no relationship between their tests and

National Archives at New York City); Brief of the Public Education Association (PEA) as
Amicus Curiae at 6–29, Chance, 458 F.2d 1167 (No. 71-2021) (on file with the National
Archives at New York City); Brief of the United Federation of Teachers et al., Amicus Curiae
at 11–35, Chance, 458 F.2d 1167 (No. 71-2021) (on file with the National Archives at New
York City).
111. See sources cited supra note 110; see also SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE
CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 172 (2014) (noting that the
summer of 1972 is when divisions among the liberal coalition over affirmative action “cracked
wide”). See generally DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2012) (documenting
extensively the ways that affirmative action later divided labor and Jewish organizations from
other parts of the liberal coalition).
112. Brief for Defendant-Appellant: Board of Examiners at 7, 26, Chance, 458 F.2d 1167
(No. 71-2021) (on file with the National Archives at New York City).
113. Id. at 36–41.
114. Id. at 39–40 (quoting Johnson v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 449 F.2d 871, 876 (2d Cir.
1971)).
115. Chance NAACP Brief, supra note 104, at 34–35.
116. Id. at 46.
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the purpose for which they were used,” the LDF argued that, regardless
of the standard of review, the plaintiffs must prevail.117
Judge Wilfred Feinberg, assigned to write the majority opinion,
viewed the matter as “not an easy case[.]”118 One of the white candidates
who had passed the exam—only to see exam-based promotions
suspended after the district court’s injunction—participated in the case
as an amicus, and had made clear to Judge Feinberg and his colleagues
that “[w]e are dealing not with abstractions but with people . . . .”119
Detailing the long efforts he had made to pass the examination, the
teacher, Charles Wiener, argued that the district court’s ruling
represented nothing less than the ultimate “culminat[ion]” of “a
constant erosion of the merit system . . . .”120
But while sympathetic to Wiener, Judge Feinberg and his
colleagues would see things very differently. Agreeing with plaintiffs
that the district court had appropriately found that the test was not “jobrelated,” the opinion for the Second Circuit stated that such
examinations were thus “wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid
state objective.”121 As such, the panel concluded that it was “unnecessary
to reach [the] most difficult question” of whether heightened scrutiny
was applicable to de facto discrimination.122 Because the defendant
“failed to meet its burden even under the rational relationship standard,
which would be the least justification that the Constitution requires[,]”
no further inquiry was required.123 Thus, the court rejected the notion
that the test marked an indicator of merit, finding instead that it
constituted an arbitrary barrier to minority advancement.124
While the LDF was bringing Chance and cases like it across the
country, the National Education Association (“NEA”)—one of the
leading national teachers’ unions—was bringing a similar set of
challenges to workplace examinations on behalf of black teachers in the
South.125 Although once a segregated association that initially declined
117. Id. at 45.
118. Interview by Jeffrey Morris with Wilfred Feinberg, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit 252 (Dec. 20, 1996) (transcript on file with Columbia University, Rare
Book & Manuscript Library, Wilfred Feinberg Collection, Box 205).
119. Id.
120. Chance Brief of Charles Wiener (pro se) as Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 27.
121. Chance v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 458 F.2d 1167, 1175, 1177 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970)).
122. Id. In relation to this issue, the Court—perhaps less than candidly—contended that
the district court had in fact applied rational basis review. Id.
123. Id. at 1178.
124. See id.
125. The LDF was actively involved in disparate impact litigation around the country at
this time. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. But they were counsel in only one of the
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to endorse Brown, by the early 1960s, the NEA was increasingly
working to achieve teacher desegregation.126 By the mid-1960s, the NEA
had become deeply concerned about the “displacement” of black
teachers as a result of desegregation, and began a series of investigations
in the South to determine the scope of the problem.127 Ultimately, the
NEA would hire former U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division head Stephen Pollak128 to bring a series of lawsuits challenging

National Teacher’s Exam (“NTE”) cases. See Walston v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Nansemond Cty.,
492 F.2d 919, 920 (4th Cir. 1974); infra note 129. Most of the cases were spearheaded by the
NEA, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (“CRD”), or both. See cases
cited infra note 129; see also Scott Baker, An American Dilemma: Teacher Testing and School
Desegregation in the South in ESSAYS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTHERN EDUCATION:
EXCEPTIONALISM AND ITS LIMITS 163, 183 (Wayne J. Urban ed., 1999) (quoting the
NAACP’s Jack Greenberg as stating that “the problem [of teacher terminations incident to
desegregation] was more widespread than we could handle”).
126. See, e.g., NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N OF THE U.S., RECENT HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS
OF NEA POLICY AND PROGRAM AS RELATED TO THE EDUCATIONAL PHASES OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 1 (1965) (on file with George Washington University Libraries in NEA Archives,
Box 2185, Folder 7); The Record Shows NEA Is Leader in Fighting Discrimination in U.S.,
DETROIT EDUC. NEWS, Oct. 23, 1963, at 3 (on file with George Washington University
Libraries in NEA Archives, 1006.RG, Box 2997); see also LEE, supra note 111, at 226
(describing the early history of the NEA as a segregated union that did not endorse Brown
until 1961).
127. Extensive archival documents make clear the NEA’s concerns over the problem of
the displacement of black teachers incident to desegregation, as well as, particularly, the use
of the NTE in discriminatory ways. See generally, e.g., George D. Fischer, President, Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity (June 16, 1970) (on file with George Washington University Libraries in NEA
Archives, MS 2766, Series 2, Subseries 2, Box 916) (testifying to the NEA’s findings on
discriminatory treatment of black teachers in the post-desegregation South as well as the
discriminatory use of the NTE); NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N OF THE U.S., REPORT OF TASK FORCE
SURVEY OF TEACHER DISPLACEMENT IN SEVENTEEN STATES (1965) (on file with George
Washington University Libraries in NEA Archives, Series 17, Box 2997) (documenting
extensively the displacement of and discrimination against black teachers incident to
desegregation); NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE NEA TASK FORCE ON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI (1970) (on file with George
Washington University Libraries in NEA Archives, Box 931, Folder 1) (documenting
extensively the NEA’s investigation of desegregation issues, including teacher displacement
and the use of the NTE in Mississippi and Louisiana); Boyd Bosma, Racial Discrimination
Against Teachers, 10 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC., Jan.–Feb. 1972, at 59 (describing the
problem of discrimination against black teachers and problems with the NTE); Memorandum
from Boyd Bosma, Assistant Dir. for Civil Liberties & Intergroup Relations, to Staff Ad Hoc
Comm. on the Nat’l Teacher Examination re: Implementation of New Business Item Four 1
(Sept. 15, 1970) (on file with George Washington University Libraries in NEA Archives, Box
2658, Folder 1) (describing the NEA’s concerns over the use of the NTE and proposing
action).
128. Interview by Katia Garrett with Stephen J. Pollak, in Washington, D.C. (June 14,
2005), in STEPHEN J. POLLAK, ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 194, 200–07 (2014), http://dcchs.org/StephenJPollak
/StephenJPollak_Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMH8-AEAR].
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the termination of African American teachers as a consequence of
teacher desegregation.129
At the center of the controversy in many of the NEA cases was the
use of the National Teacher’s Exam (“NTE”)130 and other standardized
tests as a basis for teacher qualifications or dismissals.131 Southern states
and school districts had originally, with the encouragement of the NTE’s
creator Ben Wood, turned to the adoption of the NTE to justify racebased pay differentials in the 1940s.132 As courts finally began to order
faculty desegregation in the late 1960s, many of those same states and
school districts also turned to the NTE as a basis for thinning the ranks
of African American teachers.133 Typically adopted directly after (or in
anticipation of) teacher desegregation, and without validation of the cut129. For a sampling of the cases in which the NEA participated in relation to this issue,
either as parties or as amici, see, for example, Walston, 492 F.2d at 920; United States v.
Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1973); Baker v. Columbus Mun. Separate
Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 432 F.2d 875,
876 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1094 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978); United States v.
North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343, 345 (E.D.N.C. 1975); see also Ga. Ass’n of Educators v. Nix,
407 F. Supp. 1102, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (NEA affiliate, unclear if NEA itself participated);
National Education Association, Draft Testimony to Civil Rights Commission on Minimum
Competency Testing 18, 22 (July 3, 1979) (on file with George Washington University
Libraries in NEA Archives, Series 7, Subseries 6, Box 2185, Folder 16) (describing an early
challenge brought in 1966 by the NEA’s Florida affiliate to Florida’s institutionalization of a
standardized testing regime incident to teacher desegregation).
130. One of the prominent cases involved the use of the Graduate Record Exam
(“GRE”), rather than the NTE. Armstead, 461 F.2d at 277–81. However, the legal principles
involved in that case were essentially the same as in the other cases. Throughout, I refer to
these cases generally as the “NTE cases.”
131. See generally cases cited supra note 129 (listing cases challenging the use of the
NTE—or occasionally another standardized test—as a condition of new or continued teacher
employment). The NEA did not participate as a party in every one of the cases challenging
the NTE, nor were those the only cases they filed or participated in as amici. The CRD was
also actively involved in bringing NTE challenges, and NTE issues also arose in a number of
existing desegregation cases. See infra notes 142, 148 and accompanying text (describing the
CRD’s participation in NTE cases); see also Carter, 432 F.2d at 875, 878 (involving an existing
desegregation case in which the NTE issue was raised and NEA participated as amicus). The
NEA itself was also involved in challenges to the non-hiring, dismissal, and demotion of
African American teachers in the South that were not directly related to the NTE. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1, 2–6 (N.D. Ala. 1971). However, the NEA was
probably the leading entity involved in challenging the use of standardized testing in the postdesegregation South. See cases cited supra note 129.
132. See Baker, supra note 125, at 167–78 (explaining in detail the origins of the NTE); see
also R. SCOTT BAKER, PARADOXES OF DESEGREGATION: AFRICAN AMERICAN
STRUGGLES FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUITY IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1926–1972,
at 44–62 (2006) (same).
133. See Baker, supra note 125, at 178–90 (explaining how the NTE was used as a legally
defensible way of preventing faculty desegregation); see also BAKER, supra note 132, at 173,
178–80 (same).
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off score,134 there was considerable reason to believe that many if not
most of the southern states and school districts adopting the NTE during
this time did so for reasons that were intentionally discriminatory.135
These uses of the NTE put the Educational Testing Service
(“ETS”), the testing agency that assumed responsibility for the NTE in
the 1950s, in a difficult position. While NTE proponents—including
apparently ETS—had originally stoked racial fears in encouraging the
southern states to adopt the NTE in the 1940s and 1950s,136 ETS was
aware by the 1970s that there were increasing legal challenges to the use
of standardized testing, especially in the context of race.137 The NEA
itself was also putting increasing pressure on ETS to address racially
discriminatory uses of the NTE, with at least some affiliates urging the
organization to remove the test from the market altogether because of
its widespread discriminatory use in the South.138 Moreover, it appears
that many of the staff responsible for the NTE at ETS in the early 1970s
themselves harbored genuine concerns about ensuring the test’s racially
non-discriminatory use, leading the organization to adopt standards
responsive to those concerns.139
134. In most instances, both the test itself and the relevant cutoff standards were adopted
without any study of whether they bore any relationship to teacher quality. See, e.g., Brief
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of National Education Association & South Carolina Education
Association at 9–17, United States v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973)
(No. 73-1141) [hereinafter United States v. Chesterfield Amicus Brief] (on file with Stephen
Pollak). In contrast, the racial impact of such laws was often an explicit part of the discussion
incident to their adoption. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 40–44, Armstead, 461 F.2d 276 (No.
71-2124) (on file with Stephen Pollak) [hereinafter Armstead Brief for Appellees] (discussing
the circumstances of the adoption of standardized testing measures in that case). See generally
Baker, supra note 125 (discussing the history of the adoption of the NTE in the South at
length).
135. See sources cited supra note 134; see also cases cited supra note 129 (citing NEA
cases).
136. See sources cited supra notes 132–35.
137. See, e.g., James R. Deneen, New Influences on Selection and Evaluation Processes, in
DENEEN ET AL., EDUC. TESTING SERV., THE SELECTION AND EVALUATION OF TEACHERS
5, 5–6 (Oct. 19, 1971), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED073157.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKR9BCN7] (presentations to the American Association of School Personnel Administrators);
Thelma Spencer, Use of Tests: Employment and Counseling (Feb. 18–20, 1972), in
STANDARDIZED TESTING ISSUES: TEACHERS’ PERSPECTIVES 73, 74 (1977), https://ia600305
.us.archive.org/23/items/ERIC_ED146233/ERIC_ED146233.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9R23TPT].
138. See, e.g., Memorandum from Boyd Bosma to Samuel B. Ethridge et al. re: National
Teacher Examinations 1 (Sept. 6, 1972) (on file with George Washington University Libraries
in NEA Archives, Box 2658, Folder 1); Letter from Fred Husmann, Assistant Exec. Sec’y for
Prof’l Dev., to Mr. James R. Deneen, 2 (July 20, 1972) (on file with George Washington
University Libraries in NEA Archives, Box 2658, Folder 1).
139. Officials at ETS were concerned regarding inappropriate and discriminatory uses of
the NTE as well as other standardized exams such as the GRE. See, e.g., sources cited supra
note 137; sources cited infra note 141; see also Interview by Katia Garrett with Stephen J.
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As such, by the 1970s, ETS was taking a clear stand against
unvalidated uses of the NTE (such as those in the post-desegregation
South), and against any use of the test as the exclusive basis for teacher
terminations.140 Thus, ETS often joined the NEA—either as experts or
amici—in litigation challenging the NTE; although the organization was
also often careful to counter the plaintiffs’ more categorical claims for
the NTE’s invalidity.141 In addition to the support they received from
ETS, the NEA also was often joined as a party plaintiff by the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, whose head, J. Stanley
Pottinger, had begun working with the NEA on the issue of black
teacher displacement while he was at the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”).142

Pollak, supra note 128, at 222 (“I never thought that the ETS was other than in good faith in
trying to have tests that were not discriminatory. I think ETS made great efforts to protect
against discrimination in its tests.”); Interview with Stephen J. Pollak in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 20, 2015) (notes on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (describing ETS
employees as being eager to participate in the early cases, and troubled by the uses to which
school districts were putting the tests).
140. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 141. See generally ETS, GUIDELINES FOR USING
THE NATIONAL TEACHER EXAM (1971) (on file with George Washington University
Libraries in NEA Archives, Box 2190, Folder 2) (explaining the contexts where the use of the
NTE was and was not appropriate).
141. See, e.g., Affidavit of James R. Deneen, Educ. Testing Serv., at 16–17, Baker v.
Columbus Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (No. EC 70-52-S) (on
file with the University of Mississippi in J.P. Coleman Collection, Folder 65-19); Interview by
Katia Garrett with Stephen J. Pollak, supra note 128, at 204; see also Affidavit of Winton H.
Manning, Educ. Testing Serv., at 31–33, Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 325
F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (No. EC 70-51-S) (on file with the University of Mississippi in
J.P. Coleman Collection, Folder 65-17) (critiquing the Starkville School District’s use of the
GRE); Brief Amicus Curiae for Educational Testing Service at 20–29, United States v. North
Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (No. 4476) (on file with the Educational Testing
Service Archives) [hereinafter North Carolina Brief Amicus Curiae for Educational Testing
Service] (critiquing North Carolina’s use of the NTE, and arguing that it was inappropriate,
but also extensively discussing the general validity of the test, and suggesting that the
plaintiffs’ categorical critiques of the NTE should not be addressed); Letter from Shields
Sims, Attorney at Law, Sims, Sims & Sims, to Judge J. P. Coleman, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, re: Baker v. Columbus, No. EC 70-52-8, at 1 (Sept. 10, 1970) (on file with the
University of Mississippi in J.P. Coleman Collection, Folder 65-19) (showing counsel for the
school district in Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District expressing the view
that “[f]rankly, I can not understand how Dr. Deneen [ETS Director of Teacher Testing and
an expert witness in a number of NTE cases] still has a job with Educational Testing Service.
If I ‘ran down’ my work as much as he did his I am sure that my boss would fire me, and
should.”).
142. See, e.g., Memorandum from Boyd Bosma to Dale Robinson re: Plans for NEA-OCR
Meeting on Wednesday, December 8, at 1 (Nov. 30, 1971) (on file with George Washington
University Libraries in NEA Archives, Series 17, Box 2997); Memorandum from J. Stanley
Pottinger, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, to Chief State
School Officers and Superintendents re: Nondiscrimination in Elementary and Secondary
School Staffing Practices 1–5 (Jan. 14, 1971) (on file with George Washington University
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Rational basis arguments were not the only arguments raised in the
NTE cases. There was considerable evidence that the southern
jurisdictions adopting the tests had done so for intentionally racially
discriminatory reasons.143 Furthermore, a Fifth Circuit decree regarding
teacher desegregation in the case of Singleton v. Jackson Municipal
Separate School District144 also offered the basis for arguing that
southern states had failed to comply with their existing remedial teacher
desegregation obligations.145 Additionally, by 1971, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. also offered a basis for arguing—by analogy to Title VII—
that race discrimination necessarily incorporated disparate impact
concepts.146
The NEA incorporated all of these arguments into its briefs in the
various NTE cases.147 But it also argued that even minimal rationality
review demanded constitutional invalidation.148 Noting that “[i]t is well
settled that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses . . . prohibit
State officials from denying certificates and licenses to professional
candidates on the basis of arbitrary requirements[,]” the NEA argued
that the use of the NTE and other standardized tests without validation
constituted precisely such arbitrary criteria.149

Libraries in NEA Archives, Series 17, Box 2997). See generally cases cited supra note 129
(listing cases in which the United States was sometimes a party plaintiff).
143. See cases cited supra notes 133–35.
144. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
145. See id. at 1219.
146. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–36 (1971).
147. See generally Armstead Brief for Appellees, supra note 134; Reply Brief of PlaintiffIntervenors, United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (No. 4476)
(on file with Stephen Pollak); Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Legal
Argument, North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (No. 4476) (on file with Stephen Pollak)
[hereinafter North Carolina Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Legal
Argument]; United States v. Chesterfield Amicus Brief, supra note 134.
148. See sources cited supra note 147. The Civil Rights Division, in contrast, seems to have
been much less interested in rational basis arguments in the NTE cases, and indeed often
argued exclusively against rational basis as the standard. See generally Trial Brief of the
United States, North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (No. 4476) (on file with Stephen Pollak);
Reply Brief for the United States, North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (No. 4476) (on file with
Stephen Pollak). But cf. Supplemental Trial Brief of the United States at 4–7, North Carolina,
400 F. Supp. 343 (No. 4476) (on file with Stephen Pollak) (arguing that the district court’s
decision was still valid after Washington v. Davis as it was based on rational basis review).
ETS and the NAACP LDF also raised the rational basis argument in several of the NTE
cases. See, e.g., North Carolina Brief Amicus Curiae for Educational Testing Service, supra
note 141, at 21; Brief for Appellants at 33–40, Walston v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Nansemond Cty.,
492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974) (Nos. 73-1492, 73-1493) (on file with Stephen Pollak)
(represented by NAACP LDF).
149. North Carolina Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Proposed Findings of Fact & Legal Argument,
supra note 147, at 65. See generally sources cited supra note 147. The principal crux of these
arguments was typically not that the NTE was, in its content, irrelevant to what teachers do,
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And indeed, although not all courts agreed that the use of the NTE
and other standardized tests in the South lacked a rational basis, many
did. Across a series of cases, both district courts and courts of appeals
would hold that—regardless of whether the adoption of such tests was
intentionally discriminatory—the ways they had been used by postdesegregation districts failed rational basis review.150 For example, in the
1972 case of Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School District,151
the Fifth Circuit, citing to Reed v. Reed, stated
Although [the Defendant] may have discretion to establish an
appropriate classification, the classification must not be an
arbitrary one, i. e., acting without any reasonable basis. . . . We
agree with the lower court’s finding that the GRE score
requirement was not a reliable or valid measure for choosing good
teachers.152
Other courts similarly embraced rational basis reasoning in striking
down use of the NTE and other standardized tests in the postdesegregation South.153 Thus, although the NEA and other actors
challenging such testing requirements were not always successful154—and
sometimes prevailed on other grounds—rational basis arguments were
but rather that it had not been shown to have any relationship to teacher quality. These
arguments were aided by the fact that ETS experts testified in many of the NTE cases that the
defendants were using the test for purposes for which it could not provide valid predictive
information, such as for teacher retention or rehiring. See, e.g., United States v. Chesterfield
Amicus Brief, supra note 134, at 13–17.
150. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text.
151. 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
152. Id. at 280 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971)). In response to Judge
Rives’s proposed concurrence in part and dissent in part, which referenced Title VII and the
Griggs disparate impact standard, the author of the opinion, Judge Dyer, would note that “I
studiously avoided Griggs and the other Title VII Civil Rights Act cases because I thought
they were unnecessary . . . [and] I am not sure where it might lead us in this type of case if we
start analogizing cases cited under the Civil Rights Act.” Letter from Judge David W. Dyer,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to Judge Richard T. Rives, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, re: Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., No. 71-2124, at 1
(May 22, 1972) [hereinafter Letter from Judge Dyer to Judge Rives] (on file with the
University of Mississippi in J.P. Coleman Collection, Folder 65-17).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1973);
Ga. Ass’n of Educators v. Nix, 407 F. Supp. 1102, 1107–11 (N.D. Ga. 1976); North Carolina,
400 F. Supp. at 349–51; Teachers (Mississippi), 3 RACE REL. L. SURV. 161, 180–81 (1972)
(reporting on the case of Pickens v. Okalona Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 380 F. Supp. 1036
(N.D. Miss. 1974)); see also Armstead, 461 F.2d at 279–80; cf. United States v. Nansemond
Cty. Sch. Bd., 351 F. Supp. 196, 202–08 (E.D. Va. 1972) (adopting a robust form of rational
basis review, but finding test to be sufficiently validated), rev’d, 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974).
154. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1107–09 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). The South Carolina
litigation, where ETS switched sides and supported South Carolina, was unsuccessful at both
the district court and the Supreme Court level. See infra notes 158–63.
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probably the leading rationale for courts striking down or limiting the
growing use of teacher testing to thin the ranks of black teachers.155
Indeed, into the mid-1970s, courts used rational basis review to strike
down uses of the NTE as a basis for discharging or not hiring black
teachers—often relying directly on ETS arguments that particular uses
of the test were irrational.156
But while the NTE cases thus showed the promise of protected class
rational basis review, they also ultimately showed its complications.157
From the start, Pollak had recognized the “very important” role that
ETS participation (on the side of the plaintiffs) played in the cases.158
Eventually, the State of South Carolina, a pioneer in the introduction of
discriminatory testing requirements,159 itself turned to ETS to validate its
use of the NTE, commissioning ETS to perform an extensive statistical
validation study.160 And with ETS now defending the use of the exam,
the district court did not find its use to be irrational.161 Ultimately, the
NEA would not even raise the rational basis argument on appeal162—
155. See generally supra note 129 (listing cases in which the NEA participated as parties or
amici, many of which were decided favorably on rational basis review).
156. See cases cited supra note 153.
157. In particular, as described infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text, they
demonstrated how critically such cases may depend on fact witnesses willing and able to
substantiate the irrationality of government practices. See generally Marie-Amélie George,
Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of LGBT Rights (Sept. 27, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (detailing how social science developments
and shifting professional norms outside of the law—which led non-law actors to the
conclusion that there was not a viable basis for treating gays and lesbians as mentally ill or less
capable parents—played a key role in encouraging state actors to resist and undermine
discriminatory state laws targeting gays and lesbians).
158. See Interview with Stephen J. Pollak, supra note 139.
159. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 132, at 44–62.
160. See Motion to Affirm for the State Parties at 32 n.27, Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South
Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978) (Nos. 77-422, 77-543). See generally Brief Amicus Curiae for
Educational Testing Service, United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.S.C. 1977)
(No. 75-1610) (on file with the Educational Testing Service Archives) (describing extensively
and defending the validation study that ETS performed for South Carolina), aff’d sub nom.
Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978).
161. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. at 1107–09.
162. Rather, the NEA would argue that (1) the district court had erred in not applying the
burden-shifting approach to intentional discrimination adopted in Keyes v. School District No.
1; and (2) as to the Title VII claims, a more stringent showing than a “rational relationship”
was required of the defendants. See generally Jurisdictional Statement for the National
Education Association et al., Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (Nos. 77-422,
77-543) [hereinafter Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina Jurisdictional Statement] (showing
that the NEA raised only the two aforementioned arguments on appeal and did not raise the
rational basis argument). As discussed infra, the amendment of Title VII to include public
employers shifted litigants’ incentives in ways that encouraged arguments based on rational
basis review’s weakness as compared to the Title VII disparate impact standard. See infra note
433 and accompanying text.
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and the Supreme Court would summarily conclude that the use of the
test satisfied even Title VII’s more rigorous disparate impact
standards.163 Thus, neither rational basis—nor Title VII’s disparate
impact standard itself—proved to be a panacea for the problems of
teacher discrimination in the post-desegregation South.
But if the South Carolina litigation unquestionably represented a
significant setback for challengers of NTE’s use in the South, it did not
conclusively put an end to all NTE challenges. Indeed, as late as the
mid-1980s, the North Carolina NTE litigation—site of one of the early
rational basis victories for advocates—remained pending as judges
continued to grapple with the new factual and legal context.164
Ultimately, it would be a further shift by ETS itself that finally put the
controversy over the NTE to rest. In response to the enduring criticisms
of the NTE’s inefficacy and discriminatory effects—problems effectively
proven and publicized in the NEA’s rational basis litigation—ETS
eventually phased out the test entirely.165
* * *
Cases like Chance and Armstead—which invalidated racially
impactful government actions on rational basis review—did not
represent the only doctrinal approach that courts took in addressing
government actions having a racially disparate impact in the early to
mid-1970s. Rather, they represented only one of an array of approaches
to constitutional disparate impact arguments that succeeded in the lower
courts during this time.166 But it is clear that, for at least some of the
163. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. at 1026; cf. id. at 1027–28 (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the statutory standard under Title VII was higher than a “rational
basis” and that the case should be set for argument). By the time that the South Carolina
litigation was resolved by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had made clear that the
standards under Title VII’s disparate impact provisions exceeded those applicable under the
Constitution on rational basis review. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976)
(making clear that Title VII’s disparate impact requirements did not extend to the
Constitution and exceeded the demonstration of “some rational basis”).
164. See generally Order, United States v. North Carolina, No. 4476 (E.D.N.C. June 23,
1982) (on file with Stephen Pollak) (ruling on various motions at a later stage of the
continuing North Carolina litigation).
165. See, e.g., NYC Teachers Protest Exam, FAIRTEST, http://www.fairtest.org/nycteachers-protest-exam [https://perma.cc/R5EN-389K]. Of course, this is not to suggest that the
testing systems that have replaced the NTE are themselves free from concern. On the capacity
of racial discrimination to replicate itself and adapt to new legal and social environments, see
generally Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016) (discussing
this issue extensively).
166. There were a number of approaches taken by the lower courts to effects arguments
during the early 1970s. Among the most common was to directly apply Griggs and the
EEOC’s guidelines, often without situating them within the constitutional tiers of review at
all. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc’y of the N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 490 F.2d 387, 392–
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judges who embraced them, such rational basis approaches were
important—allowing them to sidestep burgeoning disputes over the
proper role of intent in constitutional race discrimination litigation, and
providing a more manageable standard than wholesale incorporation of
Title VII.167 As such, even as the Supreme Court increasingly took up
and gradually embraced arguments that intentionality marked the sine
qua non of race discrimination under the constitution, racial justice
rational basis arguments allowed many lower courts to continue to
sidestep such disputes.168
During the 1975 Term, the Supreme Court would finally take up
and decide the case that today is thought to be emblematic of such
disputes over the role of intent in constitutional race discrimination
claims: Washington v. Davis. The following Section turns to a discussion
of Davis, and its role in erasing the history of protected class rational
basis review.
B.

Washington v. Davis

Despite the success of rational basis racial justice arguments in the
lower courts during the early 1970s, such arguments remained largely
absent from the Supreme Court’s opinions during that same time
frame.169 Thus, although cases raising such arguments reached the Court
during the early 1970s, the Court generally ignored or side-stepped
addressing them in its final opinions.170 As such, while there was a well97 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1973); Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912, 919–21 (E.D. Wis. 1975), aff’d,
534 F.2d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 1976); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251, 253–54
(N.D. Ohio 1972); Siegel, supra note 29, at 14–15 (describing an array of lower court
approaches to effects arguments in equal protection jurisprudence during this era, including
several that blended effects/intent arguments).
167. See, e.g., Letter from Judge Dyer to Judge Rives, supra note 152, at 1 (indicating that
he had “studiously avoided Griggs and other Title VII Civil Rights Act cases because [he
was] . . . not sure where it might lead” the Court to adopt those standards in the constitutional
context); see also Memorandum of Judge Wilfred Feinberg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, to Judge William H. Timbers, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
and Judge Roszel C. Thomsen, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Md., re: Chance v. Bd. of
Exam’s, No. 71-2021, at 1 (Mar. 31, 1972) (on file with Columbia University, Rare Book &
Manuscript Library, Wilfred Feinberg Collection, Box 32) (indicating that he had revised the
majority opinion to “make even more clearly the point that Mansfield did not use the
‘compelling interest’ test”).
168. See cases cited supra notes 94, 153–54. See generally Eyer, supra note 88
(documenting the Court’s gradual turn toward intent-mandatory standards in the early 1970s).
169. See sources cited infra note 170.
170. This is true both in cases where the advocates failed to persuade the Justices that their
rational basis claims were viable and in those cases where advocates did ultimately persuade
the Justices of their arguments. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968)
(avoiding plaintiffs’ race discrimination arguments, but holding for plaintiffs on rational basis
review). See generally Mayeri, supra note 57 (discussing Levy and other illegitimacy cases in
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developed jurisprudence of rational basis arguments in racial justice
cases in the lower courts in the 1970s, such arguments were virtually
entirely absent from the opinions of the Court itself.171
The continued success of such rational basis racial justice arguments
in the lower courts, despite the lack of obvious support in the Supreme
Court’s own racial justice case law, arguably reflected the unique nature
of rational basis arguments as a vehicle for racial justice. Because
rational basis review represents the lowest tier of review, courts
deploying such arguments felt free to rely on—and frequently did rely
on—the full array of rational basis cases, seeing no need to restrict
themselves to race cases alone.172 As such, cases like Reed v. Reed and
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.173—today generally
characterized as simply precursors to heightened scrutiny for sex and
illegitimacy, but understood at the time as important rational basis
cases—were regularly relied on to state the general rational basis
standard by lower courts in the 1970s, including in racial justice
domains.174
Although the Court had long avoided both addressing racial justice
rational basis arguments—and deciding conclusively whether to move
sex and illegitimacy classifications out of the rational basis realm—these
two disputes would both come to the fore during the 1975 Term.
Ultimately, the Court would resolve neither issue, choosing instead to
leave to “another day” the issue of how to properly understand its

which the Court found for plaintiffs on rational basis review, but did not address advocates’
race or sex discrimination arguments). Conversely, in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141–43
(1971), the Supreme Court found against the plaintiffs, finding no race discrimination—but
also failed to engage with advocates’ rational basis arguments, see id. at 141–43; see also
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the National Office for the Rights of the Indigent at
10, Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (Nos. 154, 226) (making the rational basis argument in a brief for,
inter alia, the LDF).
171. As Serena Mayeri has documented, intersectional arguments, raising sex and race
discrimination issues together, were also made to the Court during this time frame and are
similarly invisible today because they do not appear in the Court’s published opinions. See
generally MAYERI, supra note 86 (exploring the use of intersectional arguments in early sex
discrimination litigation); Mayeri, supra note 57 (exploring the use of intersectional
arguments in early cases involving nonmarital children).
172. See generally cases cited infra note 174 (showing that the lower courts relied on
rational basis precedents from the sex discrimination and illegitimacy discrimination context
to adjudicate race-related rational basis claims).
173. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
174. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir.
1975); Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 461 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1972);
Chance v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 458 F.2d 1167, 1177 (2d Cir. 1972); Ga. Ass’n of Educators v. Nix,
407 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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contemporary rational basis jurisprudence.175 And, although the Court
would later come back to sex and illegitimacy classifications—eventually
making clear that both should receive a formally heightened standard of
review176—it would leave other important aspects of rational basis
review, including the viability of protected class rational basis review,
generally unclear.177
Washington v. Davis, filed in 1970 and challenging the use of a
widely used civil service test in police hiring, was an unlikely case to
bring rational basis racial justice claims to the fore.178 Davis was not
litigated in the lower courts as a rational basis racial justice case, but
rather under another then-prevalent approach of arguing that the
standards under Title VII and the Constitution were coextensive.179
Thus, although the plaintiffs’ complaint raised, inter alia, constitutional
claims,180 and the plaintiffs’ claims at summary judgment were made on
the constitutional bases alone,181 both the parties and the courts
generally treated the statutory and constitutional standards as
coextensive.182 As such, as it came up to the Court, Davis’s focus was on
whether Title VII standards were met, rather than on equal protection’s
arguably distinctive tiers of scrutiny.183

175. Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the Conference re: Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, No. 74-1044, at 1 (June 15, 1976) (on file with the Washington & Lee
University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers). See generally infra notes 216–24 and
accompanying text (discussing the proceedings in Murgia).
176. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 554–63.
177. See generally infra notes 230–32 and accompanying text, Part IV (noting the ways that
the viability of protected class rational basis review was left unclear by the Court’s decision in
Davis). On the Court’s continuing failure to reconcile the diverse strands of its rational basis
jurisprudence after the 1975 Term, see generally Maltz, supra note 52.
178. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1976).
179. See sources cited infra note 182.
180. Washington v. Davis, like many of the cases described herein, was filed before Title
VII was expanded to extend to public employers. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 238 n.10. The
plaintiffs had, however, also raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the anti-discrimination
provisions of the D.C. Code. See Appendix at 24, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492)
[hereinafter Davis Appendix] (Amended Complaint in Intervention), microformed on FO0097-75 (Info. Handling Servs. & Library Educ. Div., Katherine R. Everett Law Library,
Univ. of N.C. Sch. of Law).
181. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 234 (noting that the respondents’ summary judgment motion
was based on the Fifth Amendment, not on “any statute or regulation”).
182. See Davis Appendix, supra note 180, at 88–97 (Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment); id. at 26–27
(Amended Complaint in Intervention). Simply applying Griggs and other Title VII standards
was a common approach to constitutional disparate impact claims during this time frame. See
sources cited supra note 166 and accompanying text.
183. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957 n.2, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (applying Griggs
and explaining why Title VII cases were relevant to equal protection analysis), rev’d, 426 U.S.
229 (1976).
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Before the Supreme Court, the parties continued this focus, arguing
the case primarily in terms of Title VII standards.184 Thus, the
defendants—although arguing summarily in their brief that the test need
only be “rational”—primarily dedicated their brief to arguing that they
indeed satisfied the statutory Title VII standards.185 And the plaintiffs,
similarly, focused principally on arguments under the statutory standard,
restricting their constitutional arguments to two footnotes suggesting
that the constitutional and statutory standards should be the same.186
Similarly, the amici in Davis mostly addressed the constitutional
issue only perfunctorily, if at all, apparently content to allow the Court
to treat the case as one in which Title VII standards governed. Thus, the
LDF, for example, filed a brief that presumed that Title VII applied, and
then argued principally that under Title VII the Court must apply a
higher standard than rational basis.187 And ETS, participating as amici,
alluded to the constitutional dimension of the case only in a footnote—
virtually exclusively focusing on the statutory standards.188 Other amici
were similarly circumspect, alluding to the possibility of differing
standards for constitutional claims only in passing, if at all.189 As such,

184. There were two separate issues relating to statutory standards that were often
conflated or simply ignored in the parties’ arguments in Davis: first, whether the case should
be decided on the statutory causes of action actually brought by plaintiffs (which did not
include a Title VII claim—as Title VII did not apply to District of Columbia employees when
the case was brought—but did include § 1981 and D.C. Code claims), and if so what those
standards were; and second, whether Title VII standards were the applicable standards
directly under the Constitution. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–52. Although the parties did not
seem eager to directly address either of these specific questions, ultimately the Supreme Court
would address them both. See id.
185. See Brief for Petitioners at 2, 16–35, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492); see also Brief
of the Federal Respondents at 1, 14–15, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492) (assuming that
Title VII standards applied).
186. See Brief for Respondents at 15 n.21, 26 n.35, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492).
187. See Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 2–9,
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492). The LDF brief in Davis appears to display the shifting
incentives that advocates confronted more generally after the amendment of Title VII to
apply to public employees, which encouraged arguments which promoted the strength of the
statutory standard—arguments which were typically most easily made by distinguishing the
statutory standard from the less stringent rational basis standard. See id. at 7.
188. Brief Amicus Curiae for Educational Testing Service at 40 n.56, Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(No. 74-1492).
189. See Brief of American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae at *ii,
15 & n.18, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492) (referring ambiguously to the possibility that
there might be differences in the treatment of “public” employment, but never directly
referencing the equal protection clause or the Constitution); Brief of the Executive
Committee of the Division of Industrial-Organizational Psychology (Division 14) of the
American Psychological Association at *2, 26 n.47, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (No. 74-1492) (same).
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there was little discussion in the briefing before the Court, in either the
parties’ or the amici’s briefs, of the case’s constitutional dimensions.190
Although the amici and parties in Davis were largely silent on the
constitutional issue, other cases the same Term would make clear that
rational basis arguments were increasingly being deployed by plaintiffs
with racial justice claims. For example, in petitioning for certiorari in the
case of Tyler v. Vickery191—a challenge to the Georgia Bar Exam’s
racially disparate impact—the ACLU and private counsel Ray McClain
relied extensively on protected class rational basis arguments, suggesting
that racially disparate impact should trigger the “fair and substantial
relation” test adopted by Reed and other early 1970s rational basis
precedents.192 Similarly, in the case of Drew v. Andrews—ultimately
dismissed as improvidently granted by the Court and discussed more
fully in Part III193—the plaintiffs’ attorneys prominently deployed
protected class rational basis arguments in support of their claims.194
190. Indeed, the original certiorari memo circulated to the Court’s “cert pool” did not
discuss the constitutional dimension of the case at all. See Preliminary Memorandum from S.,
law clerk, re: Washington v. Davis, No. 74-1492, at 1–5 (Aug. 22, 1975) (on file with the
Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers).
191. 426 U.S. 940 (1976) (mem.).
192. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Tyler, 426 U.S. 940 (No. 75-1026). Showing
the intersection among many of the early 1970s arguments made in the lower courts in racial
disparate impact cases, the ACLU also argued that the “fair and substantial” relation
standard demanded a showing essentially equivalent to that under Title VII. See id. at 4, 10.
There was a substantial divide within the ACLU about whether to petition for certiorari
review in Tyler, with preeminent figures such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressing concerns.
See Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Mel Wulf re: Tyler v. Vickery, No. 75-1026, at 1 (Jan.
30, 1976) (on file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library in ACLU
Collection, Box 3551); Letter from Laughlin McDonald, Dir., S. Reg. Office, ACLU
Foundation, Inc., to Melvin L. Wulf, ACLU, re: Tyler v. Vickery, No. 75-1026, at 1 (Dec. 17,
1975) (on file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library in ACLU
Collection, Box 3551); Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Laughlin MacDonald, S. Reg.
Office, ACLU, re: Tyler v. Vickery, No. 75-1026, at 1 (Sept. 22, 1975) (on file with Princeton
University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library in ACLU Collection, Box 3551). It also
appears that the decision to frame the issue on the merits within the rubric of protected class
rational basis review was a modification from the original certiorari petition, which instead
sought to argue directly for the viability of statutory-style disparate impact claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment, distinguishing prior precedents such as Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (1972), and Geduldig v. Aiello on the grounds that they did not apply to
administrative action. See ACLU, Draft Petition for a Writ of Certiorari re: Tyler v. Vickery,
No. 75-1026, at 6–9 (undated) (on file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library in ACLU Collection, Box 3551).
193. 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (mem.) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently
granted).
194. See Brief of Respondents at 37–49, Drew, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318), microformed on
FO-0113-75 (Info. Handling Servs. & Library Educ. Div., Katherine R. Everett Law Library,
Univ. of N.C. Sch. of Law) [hereinafter Drew Respondents’ Brief]. See generally Oral
Argument, Drew, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318) [hereinafter Drew Oral Argument],
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1318 [https://perma.cc/M4KY-PF3G (staff-uploaded
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Thus, at the time that Davis came before the Court, constitutional
disparate impact arguments—and in particular those invoking protected
class rational basis review—were presented to the Court, just not in the
briefing of Davis itself.
And indeed, although the parties seemed content to avoid the
constitutional issue in Davis, the Justices were not. Concerned that
Davis would be used to “constitutionalize Griggs and Title VII sub
silentio[,]”195 Justices, including Powell and Rehnquist, pushed the
parties at oral argument on the proper constitutional standard, bringing
the issue to the fore.196 Questioning whether “the standards applicable
under the Equal Protection Clause are identical to the standards
applicable under Title VII[,]”197 several of the Justices repeatedly pushed
the parties to more clearly differentiate the standards applicable to the
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.198
Perhaps unsurprisingly, defense counsel for Washington, D.C.,
David Sutton, argued in response to these queries for the application of
rational basis review—although he also admitted that he thought the
statutory and constitutional standards were “pretty close[.]”199 But so did
the plaintiffs’ counsel, prominent civil rights attorney and sometimes
Washington Research Fund employee, Richard B. Sobol.200 In 1969,
Sobol and his co-counsel George Cooper had written an early and
influential article in the Harvard Law Review explaining the theory of
why test and seniority provisions having a racially disparate impact
should be considered race discrimination under Title VII.201 In that
archive)] (recording discussions of rational basis and racial justice arguments at oral
argument); infra Section III.B (discussing Drew).
195. See Memorandum from CW, law clerk, to Justice Powell re: Washington v. Davis, No.
74-1492, at 6 (Feb. 23, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law
in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers) (showing Powell’s handwritten notation “Yes” next to this
quote by CW).
196. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–14, 16–17, 22–24, 28–33, 45–57, 60, 68–69,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (No. 74-1492) [hereinafter Davis Oral Argument
Transcript].
197. Id. at 16.
198. Id. at 16–17, 22–25, 28–31.
199. Id. at 16; see also id. at 12–13, 16–17, 24–25. One of the curious features of Washington
v. Davis is that both the plaintiffs and the defendants appear to have generally agreed that
rational basis was the standard, but that that standard entailed something closely resembling
the Title VII disparate impact standards. See id. at 12–13, 16–17, 24–25; sources cited infra
note 200.
200. See Davis Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 196, at 48–57, 68, 75; see also
Interview by Joseph Mosnier, Ph.D., with Richard B. Sobol, in New Orleans, La. 51–52 (May
26, 2011), https://cdn.loc.gov/service/afc/afc2010039/afc2010039_crhp0015_sobol_transcript
/afc2010039_crhp0015_sobol_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYW8-D4G4].
201. See George Cooper & Richard B. Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82
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article, Sobol and Cooper had argued as to public employment that “the
law seems to be moving toward emphasis on the impact of [the]
challenged action rather than on the purposes behind it[,]” i.e, that
impact was the relevant constitutional standard.202
But by the time Sobol argued Davis in 1976, he apparently read the
applicable law differently.203 Cases such as James v. Valtierra204 and
Jefferson v. Hackney205 had been decided by the Supreme Court in the
interim, strongly suggesting that the Court was not inclined to adopt a
constitutional standard under which impact alone sufficed to trigger
heightened scrutiny.206 Therefore, Sobol, like a number of his
contemporaries, apparently believed by the time Davis was argued that
disparate impact arguments for strict scrutiny were likely foreclosed.207
Thus, when probed at oral argument for his position on whether strict
scrutiny was appropriate, Sobol demurred, repeatedly stating that, “we
have not argued and have never argued that there is a racial
classification in this case which demands strict scrutiny or a compelling
interest. We are content to rely on the necessity that there be a rational
basis for the use of [the] test . . . .”208
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1649–69 (1969) (laying out theory of why disparate impact
discrimination should be considered a form of discrimination under Title VII); see also
GREENBERG, supra note 103, at 450 (discussing the influence of Cooper and Sobol’s
“theoretical approach” on the NAACP’s legal theory in Griggs); Garrow, supra note 103, at
217–18, 220–21 (noting the major role played by both the article and Cooper himself directly
in framing the Griggs arguments on appeal).
202. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 201, at 1671 n.4.
203. See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
204. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
205. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
206. See Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141–42 (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
race discrimination claim in the context of discrimination against low-income housing, and
suggesting that the relevant inquiry was whether the classification rested on “distinctions
based on race” (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969))); see also Jefferson, 406
U.S. at 546–49, 549 n.18 (relying on Valtierra, rejecting a constitutional challenge to
government action that clearly had a racially disparate impact). See generally Eyer, supra note
88, at 22–59 (documenting the many small steps the Court took during the early 1970s toward
an intent-mandatory approach to equal protection).
207. See, e.g., Davis Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 196, at 56–57 (stating that he
(Sobol) read the “California housing case” (i.e., Valtierra) as indicating that racial impact does
not alone create a racial classification or demand strict scrutiny); see also id. at 53 (showing
Sobol discussing Jefferson v. Hackney at oral argument); Memorandum from Richard F.
Bellman, Staff Counsel, Nat’l Comm. Against Discrimination in Hous., Inc., to Edward
Rutledge & Jack E. Wood, Jr., Exec. Co-Dirs., Nat’l Comm. Against Discrimination in Hous.,
Inc. re: The Implications of the Valtierra Decision 3 (May 3, 1971) (on file with the Library of
Congress in NAACP Collection, Box VI:F73, Folder 9) (noting that Valtierra “appears to
have immunized all exclusionary zoning and land-use practices from Fourteenth Amendment
attack, except in those cases in which a clear racially discriminatory purpose can be
established”).
208. Davis Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 196, at 57.
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Nevertheless, embracing the tradition of protected class rational
basis review, Sobol also argued that there was no “rational basis” for the
employer’s use of the test.209 Noting that “the only rational basis for the
use of a test is that it does the employer some good[,]” Sobol contended
that the defendant had failed to show that there was any relationship at
all between performance on the test and the “skills needed by a
policeman.”210 Thus, although Sobol, like the defendants, generally
argued that the Title VII and constitutional standards were comparable,
he situated both as demanding only a showing of “rationality[.]”211
But although Sobol thus eschewed traditional race discrimination
arguments—situating the case instead within the rubric of protected
class rational basis arguments—at conference, the Justices did not
meaningfully engage with the rational basis argument.212 Thus, although
several of the Justices adverted to commonalities or differences between
the statutory and constitutional standards, it appears that none
attempted to situate the case within the Court’s rational basis
jurisprudence.213 Ultimately, seven Justices would vote for reversal,
concluding that under the applicable standards, the test satisfied
constitutional review.214
Although this desire to avoid the rational basis arguments in Davis
may have reflected the Justices’ general disinclination to engage with
such arguments, it may also have reflected the complications of other

209. See id.; sources cited infra notes 210–11 and accompanying text; see also George
Cooper, Introduction: Equal Employment Law Today, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 263, 275
(1973) (showing Sobol’s co-counsel, in an article three years prior to Washington v. Davis,
observing that the Fourteenth Amendment “bars all arbitrary action against any class”—not
just those protected under Title VII—in the public employment context).
210. Davis Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 196, at 57, 63.
211. See id. at 49, 51–57, 62–63; see also Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Oral Argument Notes
re: Washington v. Davis, No. 74-1492, at 3 (Feb. 25, 1976) (on file with the Washington and
Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers) (“[Sobol] do[es] not argue that
there is a racial classification—thinks it is not. Therefore does not think strict scrutiny test
applies. Applicable test is rational basis.”).
212. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
213. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Docket Sheet re: Washington v. Davis, No. 74-1492,
at 1–2 (Mar. 5, 1976) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box
224, Folder 5) (showing none of the justices attempting to situate the case within the Court’s
rational basis jurisprudence, but focusing on the Title VII-equal protection divide); Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., Docket Sheet re: Washington v. Davis, No. 74-1492, at 1–2 (undated)
(on file with the Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box I:368, Folder 7)
(same); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Docket Sheet re: Washington v. Davis, No. 74-1492, at 1–
2 (undated) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Papers) (same); Justice Potter Stewart, Docket Sheet re: Washington v. Davis, No.
74-1492, at 1–2 (undated) (on file with Yale Manuscripts & Archives in Potter Stewart Papers,
Box 426) (same).
214. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 231, 248 (1976); sources cited supra note 213.
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pending matters. By the time Davis was argued, internal disputes had
erupted in the seemingly unrelated case of Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia215 over the appropriate approach to the Court’s
rational basis review standards generally.216 Although Murgia nominally
involved the constitutionality of Massachusetts’s mandatory retirement
rules for police officers—rules that were ultimately upheld virtually
unanimously by a per curiam opinion—internally it marked a major
reckoning among the Justices over the proper understanding of their
recent rational basis precedents.217
At the center of such disputes was the proper stature of the Court’s
recent sex and illegitimacy cases—and whether they were properly
understood as reflecting the Court’s general rational basis approach or
instead as some form of formally heightened standard of review.218 But
concerns over racial justice also colored at least some of the Justices’
perspectives in Murgia as well. Thus, for example, Justice Powell argued
in a proposed majority opinion for the Court that “the relationship [on
rational basis review] may not be trivial or illogical, as this would fail to
comport with the requirement of rationality and may indicate that the
defined purpose actually masks an improper (for example, racially
discriminatory) purpose.”219
But although Murgia showed that at least some of the Justices were
aware of the potential for connections between racial justice and
rational basis review,220 it was also, by the spring, apparent that the
215. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
216. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 544–54 (detailing the internal
deliberations in Murgia); Maltz, supra note 52, at 267–76 (same).
217. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 308–17; see also Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1,
at 544–54 (detailing the internal deliberations in Murgia); Maltz, supra note 52, at 267–76
(same).
218. For an extended account of the role that disputes over the sex and illegitimacy cases
played in Murgia, see Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 544–54.
219. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Draft Opinion re: Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, No. 741044, at 15 n.17 (May 19, 1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of
Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers).
220. Powell’s relationship to these arguments is difficult to ascertain from the historical
record. While his draft opinion in Murgia seems to suggest his attentiveness to the
interrelationship of rational basis arguments and racial justice concerns, he was quite
dismissive of the arguments for constitutional invalidity put forward in the bar exam case,
Tyler v. Vickery, which also made racial justice rational basis arguments. See Brennan, supra
note 213, at 2 (identifying Powell as stating, in relation to Davis, “Not a Title VII case . . . .
The bar exam case from 5th Circ [Tyler v. Vickery] flatly & properly rejects that analysis”).
But in Tyler, both the Court of Appeals (which rejected plaintiffs’ constitutional claims) and
the plaintiffs (who argued for constitutional invalidity) framed their arguments in terms of
rational basis precedents like Reed v. Reed. Compare sources cited note 192 (demonstrating
that the Tyler v. Vickery plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari review relied principally on Reed),
with Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that Title VII
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Justices might not be able to reach a resolution in that case as to the
proper approach.221 Thus, although many of the Justices agreed in
Murgia that something more than a uniformly deferential approach to
rational basis review was appropriate, they continued to have deep
divisions about what precisely such an approach would entail.222
Ultimately, Justice Powell would come close to obtaining a majority for
formalizing a more rigorous approach to rational basis review.223 But
that effort would finally fail over internal differences, and the Justices
would instead agree to issue a bland per curiam opinion, leaving the
Justices free to “fight . . . another day” as to the proper approach to
rational basis review.224
Perhaps because of these roiling disputes in Murgia225—over the
foundational issue of the Court’s basic rational basis standard—the
majority opinion in Davis ultimately only obliquely engaged with
Sobol’s rational basis arguments.226 Holding that “the Court of Appeals
standards did not apply, and applying Reed, but finding that the exam established a valid
classification under Reed). As a result, it is difficult to interpret Powell’s comments in this
regard, aside from their disavowal of the notion that Title VII standards directly apply under
the Constitution.
221. See Maltz, supra note 52, at 267–69.
222. Id. at 270–76.
223. See id. at 270–72 (showing that—although the Justices were divided as to the
specifics—Justices Brennan, White, Stewart and Blackmun all at some point following the
circulation of Powell’s draft indicated that they would be willing to endorse elements of his
reasoning providing for more systematically meaningful standards of rational basis review).
The push to use Murgia as a vehicle for institutionalizing a more rigorous approach to rational
basis review originally came from Justice Brennan, but he turned authorship of the majority
opinion over to Powell when divisions emerged on the Court in relation to Brennan’s original
draft. See id. at 267, 270; see also Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 546–50.
224. See Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to the Conference, supra note
175, at 1 (noting that the per curiam disposition “leaves, I think, each of us free to ‘fight again
another day’ ” regarding the appropriate approach to rational basis review); Maltz, supra note
52, at 276
225. I have not found any historical materials directly connecting Murgia and Davis.
However, the divides that the debates in Murgia unearthed regarding the Justices’
perspectives on the proper approach to rational basis review clearly were relevant to any
engagement with Sobol’s rational basis theory, since his theory depended on the application
of meaningful standards of rational basis review—precisely the subject of the Justices’ debates
in Murgia. Compare sources cited supra notes 215–24 (discussing the internal debates in
Murgia over whether the Court’s precedents demanded meaningful rational basis review),
with Davis Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 196, at 53–54 (articulating the view that
meaningful rational basis review of the test at issue was required). Given this fact—and the
fact that a majority of the Justices viewed the test at issue in Davis as sufficiently related to
the job to meet the more stringent statutory standards—it is not difficult to see why the
Justices might have eschewed addressing Sobol’s argument more directly. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248–52 (1976) (holding that the test at issue in Davis satisfied even the
more demanding statutory standards).
226. The Court would also, the same Term, dodge racial justice rational basis arguments in
Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v.
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erroneously applied the legal standards applicable to Title VII cases[,]”
the Court in Davis did reject both parties’ claims that the Title VII and
constitutional standards were coextensive.227 But rather than engaging
directly with the argument that the plaintiffs had in fact made—that
rational basis required at least some showing of job-relatedness—the
Court instead focused on a claim that no party had made: that impact
alone was sufficient to make a claim of racial discrimination under the
Constitution.228 And thus framed, the Court would famously conclude
that discriminatory purpose—not impact—was the touchstone of a
showing of constitutional discrimination.229
This framing—while solidifying the Court’s turn to an intent-based
standard for constitutional race discrimination—did little to clearly
address the nature or viability of protected class rational basis review.230
Thus, although the Court unfavorably cited to some of the existing
protected class rational basis cases decided in the lower courts, it
disapproved them only “to the extent that those cases rested on or
expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is
unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation”—language
clearly inapplicable to Sobol’s rational basis theory.231 The Court also
did not meaningfully engage with the rationality of the classification at
issue in Davis itself, summarily suggesting only that, “it is untenable that
the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly to
upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees . . . particularly
where the job requires special ability to communicate orally and in
writing.”232
*

*

*

Andrews, 425 U.S. 559, 559 (1976) (mem.) (per curiam) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted); see infra Section III.B.
227. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39.
228. Id. at 239–48.
229. Id. at 239–43.
230. See Eyer, supra note 88, at 53–54 (discussing the impact of Davis on solidifying the
Court’s existing turn to an intent-based standard for constitutional race discrimination).
231. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 244–45. Note that this language was a retreat from language in
Justice White’s original draft, which categorically stated, “[W]e cannot agree with these
decisions.” See Justice Byron White, Draft Opinion re: Washington v. Davis, No. 74-1492, at
14 (first draft, undated) (on file with the Library of Congress in Byron White Papers, Box 348,
Folder 10). While the original wording could potentially be read as repudiating the specific
legal approach of invalidating racially impactful laws on rational basis review, the wording in
the ultimately published draft could not, as proof of “discriminatory racial purpose” is not
necessary to making out a rational basis violation, and indeed would automatically take one
out of the realm of rational basis review. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–41.
232. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245–46.
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Ultimately, although the parties in Davis squarely framed the case
within the rubric of protected class rational basis review, the Justices
declined to adopt that framing.233 As such, protected class rational basis
arguments did not form a part of Davis’s much-discussed legacy. Indeed,
the erasure of protected class rational basis review from the opinion was
so complete that—although Davis itself has become famous in the canon
of constitutional equality law—the very idea of protected class rational
basis review has largely been forgotten. Instead, heightened scrutiny
(and its attendant showing of “intentional discrimination”) emerged in
Davis’s aftermath as the exclusive canonical account of how racial
minorities achieve constitutional change.234
But even as protected class rational basis review was gradually
erased from the canon, its impacts endured. Title VII’s expansion to
cover public employees—resulting in part from the perceived unfairness
and irrationality of employment practices initially challenged on rational
basis review—meant that much of the work originally done under the
rubric of protected class rational basis review had, by the mid-1970s, a
firm statutory grounding.235 Thus, challenges to the unfairness and
irrationality of public employment testing regimes have continued under
statutory disparate impact doctrine, sometimes leading to considerable
changes in public employment selection practices.236 Other struggles—
such as those against the NTE—ultimately resulted in change outside
the courts, as criticisms originally made by racial justice advocates in
protected class rational basis litigation became entrenched and
widespread.237
Moreover, although protected class rational basis review faded
from the canon—and rational basis review generally entered an era
where it was less robust—the use of rational basis review by racial
justice advocates never entirely disappeared.238 Thus, the tradition of
233. See supra notes 225–32 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, S. REP. NO. 92-415,
at 11–12 (1971) (alluding explicitly to some of the early decisions in which advocates relied in
part on rational basis arguments in challenging public employment testing regimes in the
debates over whether to amend Title VII to include public employees).
236. For a discussion of some of this continuing work in the public employment context, as
well as the impact it has had on improving approaches to employee selection in public
employment, see, for example, Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn
Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 253–56
(2010).
237. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
238. This is not to suggest that protected class rational basis review arguments have not
retrenched since the 1970s—they have. However, as elaborated in Part IV, the reasons for
that retrenchment appear to have more to do with general fluctuations in the standards
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protected class rational basis review endures today: in the decisions of
judges questioning the crack/cocaine disparity, invalidating ex-offender
employment restrictions, and problematizing the denial of public
services to impoverished neighborhoods.239 Moreover, as Part IV
elaborates, we are today poised at a constitutional moment—like the
moment that arose in the 1970s—that renders the resurgence of such
arguments uniquely plausible. Before describing these contemporary
possibilities, Part III returns first to the history of the use of protected
class rational basis arguments; describing the ways that such arguments
were used by sex equality advocates in the 1970s.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROLE OF RATIONAL BASIS
REVIEW IN BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN THE 1970S240
In the race discrimination context, disputes regarding the
boundaries of constitutional race discrimination—and the turn to
protected class rational basis review that they inspired—arose only after
the instantiation of race as a suspect class.241 In contrast, in the sex
discrimination context, major questions regarding the boundaries of sex
discrimination arose virtually immediately, and thus were considered
simultaneously with advocates’ early efforts to situate sex discrimination
as subject to a heightened form of constitutional review.242 Thus, in the
early 1970s, arguments over the boundaries of what was “discrimination
because of sex” were often intertwined with more general arguments
over whether rational basis, or some higher standard, marked the
appropriate standard of review for sex discrimination.243
As a result, sex equality advocates often had dual motivations for
making rational basis arguments in the early 1970s. Such arguments
applied to rational basis review than decisions like Davis. See infra Part IV. Moreover, even
during the era in the 1990s when rational basis review was treated as most deferential (and
thus protected class rational basis review claims were least plausible), protected class rational
basis review continued to be used to destabilize the existing constitutional consensus
regarding the fairness and neutrality of important racially impactful practices, such as the
crack/cocaine disparity. See infra notes 464–72 and accompanying text. As elaborated in Part
IV, as contemporary rational basis standards are becoming increasingly meaningful, we stand
at a unique juncture for again further expanding the potential of protected class rational basis
review.
239. See supra cases cited note 31; infra cases cited notes 438 and 464–72.
240. My discussion in this Part is greatly indebted to the work of a number of outstanding
legal historians, who have previously unearthed the history of many of the cases I discuss
herein, including Serena Mayeri, Karen Tani, and Deborah Dinner. See generally MAYERI,
supra note 86; Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
343 (2010); Mayeri, supra note 57; Karen M. Tani, supra note 57.
241. See supra Section II.A.
242. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
243. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
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were necessitated not only by the possibility that a court might not find
that a particular form of discrimination was “because of sex,” but also by
the then-likely probability that the court might find, regardless, that only
rational basis review applied.244 In a time when many courts continued to
apply rational basis review generally to sex discrimination classifications,
boundary disputes were far from the only reason to raise rational basis
arguments.
Nevertheless, advocates’ turn to rational basis arguments did have,
much like in the race context, salutary effects for disputes over sex
discrimination’s boundaries. Litigation challenging pregnancy
discrimination and intersectional discrimination—today among
constitutional sex discrimination’s most intractable domains—was
comparatively successful in the early 1970s, in part because the
boundaries of sex discrimination mattered far less under a rational basis
standard.245 Thus, definitional issues that are today heavily policed—as
the gateway to heightened scrutiny246—attracted far less disputation, and
were often sidestepped altogether, in a rational basis regime.247 Below,
two of the most prominent areas in which early gender equality
advocates
sidestepped
such
definitional
issues—pregnancy
discrimination and intersectional discrimination—are discussed.
A. The Role of Rational Basis Arguments in Early Pregnancy
Discrimination Litigation (1971–1974)
Early on, advocates in the women’s rights movement made
challenging pregnancy discrimination a top priority.248 Recognizing that
discrimination related to pregnancy marked one of the most significant
obstacles to equality for women, pregnancy cases virtually immediately
occupied a central place in women’s rights advocates’ expanding
constitutional docket.249 As such, by the early 1970s, an increasingly

244. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
245. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
246. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271–74 (1993)
(rejecting § 1985 claim for conspiracy to deprive women of the right to abortion because there
was no sex-based animus where animus was aimed at abortion and not women per se); Risa E.
Kaufman, Note, The Cultural Meaning of the “Welfare Queen”: Using State Constitutions to
Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 301, 314–21 (1997)
(noting the inadequacy of federal equal protection doctrine to address welfare discrimination
against poor black women, due to gatekeeping cases such as Davis).
247. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
248. See MAYERI, supra note 86, at 63.
249. Id.; see also Dinner, supra note 240, at 349–50.
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large number of cases challenging pregnancy discrimination under the
equal protection clause were pending in the lower courts.250
In such pregnancy discrimination cases, advocates were regularly
faced with arguments that today would be considered risible regarding
pregnant women: that such women became increasingly
“unattractive”;251 that they would prompt student jokes or tittering;252
and that they were incapable of concentrating due to their
preoccupation with “the three classic fears of pregnancy—miscarriage,
agony in labor, and a deformed child.”253 But coupled with such
arguments were also often less obviously stereotypical rationales, such
as the need for continuity (a prime concern for teachers), and the
possibility that pregnant women might, at some point in their pregnancy,
become genuinely physically incapacitated.254
In responding to such arguments, early pregnancy discrimination
plaintiffs had little alternative but to make the case for such policies’
invalidity under rational basis review. Although even the earliest
advocates typically also made arguments for heightened scrutiny255—
based on the argued involvement of sex discrimination and the burden
250. See MAYERI, supra note 86, at 63; Dinner, supra note 240, at 349–50. These cases
arose across a host of different contexts, including, inter alia, discrimination against pregnant
state employees, see, e.g., LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1185 (6th Cir.
1972) (teachers), aff’d, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Schattman v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 459 F.2d 32, 33
(5th Cir. 1972) (administrative employees); infra notes 268–91 and accompanying text
(teachers), exclusion of pregnancy from publicly funded disability plans, see, e.g., Aiello v.
Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 793–94 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev’d sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974); infra notes 295–317 and accompanying text, and ineligibility of pregnant
women for unemployment compensation, see, e.g., Turner v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 423 U.S. 44,
44 (1975).
251. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to Self re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 3–4 (Oct. 15,
1973) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 175, Folder 1)
(expressing the view that “[i]t is true that in the later stages of an individual pregnancy a
woman may appear rather unattractive[,]” but noting that this issue “could be handled
adequately, I think, on an individual basis”).
252. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 (1974).
253. Brief for Petitioners at 5, LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (No. 72-777).
254. See, e.g., LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 648.
255. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Brief on the Merits at 18–21, Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd.,
326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971) (No. 678-70-R) (on file with the National Archives at
Philadelphia) [hereinafter Chesterfield Plaintiff’s Brief on the Merits]; Reply Brief to Trial
Memorandum of Defendants at 9–11, LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208
(N.D. Ohio 1971) (Nos. C 71-292, C 71-333) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical
Society in Women’s Law Fund Records). For an excellent history of the early development of
pregnancy discrimination challenges that emphasizes the heightened scrutiny arguments made
by plaintiffs, see Dinner, supra note 240, at 349–52. Although my focus herein is on the
rational basis arguments raised by such plaintiffs (in view of the subject of this paper), such
plaintiffs, as Dinner argues and unearths, also raised rich intertwined claims to sex equality
and reproductive liberty. Id.
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on fundamental rights—such arguments initially had only very thin
doctrinal underpinnings.256 As such, advocates also labored to make the
case for the irrational and spurious nature of pregnancy policies, an
endeavor often aided by the antiquated and stereotypical justifications
offered by those arguing in their defense.257 Thus, sex equality advocates
argued not only that pregnancy discrimination should be afforded
heightened scrutiny—because, inter alia, it was a form of sex
discrimination and sex discrimination should be afforded heightened
scrutiny (both open questions at the time)—but also that pregnancybased classifications were themselves irrational.258
Although such rational basis arguments by sex equality advocates
appear to have been motivated at least as much by uncertainty over the
general sex discrimination standard as by defendants’ arguments that
pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination, they would prove
valuable in responding to both.259 Judges ruling in favor of sex equality
advocates’ claims quickly embraced the idea that policies that
discriminated on the basis of pregnancy failed to further any rational
government interest—finding that legitimate concerns, such as
continuity, were as often hindered as helped by such policies.260 And

256. At least two of the early prominent cases that were filed challenging pregnancy
discrimination policies, Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board and LaFleur v. Cleveland
Board of Education, had been fully litigated at the district court level before Reed v. Reed, the
first case in which the Supreme Court reversed its trajectory of rejecting sex discrimination
claims, was decided. See Chesterfield, 326 F. Supp. at 1159 (decided on May 17, 1971);
LaFleur, 326 F. Supp. at 1209 (decided on May 12, 1971); cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77
(1971) (decided on Nov. 22, 1971).
257. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant at 5–15, Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d
629 (2d Cir. 1973) (No. 72-1676) (on file with the National Archives at New York City)
(making the rational basis argument); Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 29–54, LaFleur v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (No. 71-1598) (on file with the Western
Reserve Historical Society in Women’s Law Fund Records) (same); Brief for United Auto
Workers as Amicus Curiae at 13, 17, LaFleur, 465 F.2d 1184 (No. 71-1598) (on file with the
Western Reserve Historical Society in Women’s Law Fund Records) (same); Brief for the
Women’s Equality Action League as Amicus Curiae at 11–15, LaFleur, 465 F.2d 1184 (No. 711598) (on file with the Western Reserve Historical Society in Women’s Law Fund Records)
(same); Chesterfield Plaintiff’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 255, at 10–18 (same).
258. See sources cited supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 260–67 and accompanying text; see also Dinner, supra note 240, at
373–74 (noting that even courts that rejected the notion that pregnancy dismissal policies
discriminated on the basis of sex often found them unconstitutional on rational basis review).
260. See, e.g., Green, 473 F.2d at 632–37 (striking down mandatory maternity leave policy
on rational basis review); Scott v. Opelika City Sch., 63 F.R.D. 144, 147–49 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(same); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 795–801 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (striking down exclusion
of pregnancy from state disability benefits program on rational basis review), rev’d sub nom.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Bravo v. Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155, 156–59 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (striking down mandatory maternity leave policy on rational basis review), rev’d 525
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although many decisions striking down discriminatory pregnancy
policies also commented on their nature as sex discrimination, the
relevance of such commentary in the context of a rational basis holding
(the lowest standard of review, arguably applicable regardless of
whether sex discrimination had occurred) was often far from clear.261
This ambiguity may have been viewed as non-ideal from the
perspective of sex equality advocates, who wanted definitive precedent
holding that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination and that
sex discrimination was subject to strict scrutiny262—but there are reasons
to think that it facilitated the ease with which judges reached agreement
in the early pregnancy discrimination cases.263 For example, in the case
of Green v. Waterford Board of Education,264 the three-judge panel
agreed internally only that the policy was irrational—but not necessarily
that it was sex discrimination.265 And yet, the opinion’s statements
equating pregnancy discrimination with sex discrimination aroused little
internal dissension—perhaps because such language was arguably dicta,
F.2d 695 (1975) (unpublished table decision); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp.
501, 504–06 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (same); Chesterfield, 326 F. Supp. at 1160–61 (same).
261. See cases cited supra note 260. In some cases, the court’s view of pregnancy as sex
discrimination may nevertheless have played an important role, as some courts understood
the expansion of rational basis review, see supra Part I, as extending only to the sex
discrimination context, see, e.g., LaFleur, 465 F.2d at 1188–89 (striking down policy as
“arbitrary and unreasonable” under Reed—but unclear whether understood Reed to be the
standard just for sex discrimination). But for courts who understood rational basis review to
be robust even outside the sex discrimination context—a position embraced by many lower
court judges during this time—a recognition of sex discrimination was arguably simply dicta.
See, e.g., Aiello, 359 F. Supp. at 796–97 (assuming that pregnancy discrimination is sex
discrimination, and striking policy down under Reed, but also articulating the view that
“Reed . . . mark[s] a general shift in the ‘rational basis’ test to a standard ‘slightly, but
perceptibly, more rigorous’ ” (quoting Green, 473 F.2d at 633) (citation omitted)).
262. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 240, at 396.
263. See infra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
264. 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
265. It is not entirely clear from internal records whether the judges in Green all agreed
that the relevant policy should be characterized as sex discrimination—but it appears that at
least one did not. See, e.g., Memorandum from Judge J. Edward Lumbard, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Judge Wilfred Feinberg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, re: Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676, at 1 (Dec. 8, 1972) (on file
with Columbia University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Wilfred Feinberg Collection,
Box 47, Folder 16) (characterizing the equal protection problem as being the singling out of a
particular illness for special treatment, and arguing that it was invalid on rational basis
review); Memorandum from Judge J. Edward Lumbard, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, to Judge Wilfred Feinberg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, re:
Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., No. 72-1676, at 2 (Jan. 23, 1973) (on file with Columbia
University, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Wilfred Feinberg Collection, Box 47, Folder
16) (requesting—ultimately unsuccessfully—that Judge Feinberg remove a passage of the
opinion characterizing pregnancy discrimination as discriminatory against women as “corny
and unnecessary”).
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given the majority’s application of rational basis review.266 In other cases,
courts simply concluded that the classification was irrational, expressly
eschewing reliance on the notion that it was sex discrimination.267 As
such, rational basis arguments often offered courts a way out of
grappling directly with the thorny question of sex discrimination’s
relationship to pregnancy.
Although many courts agreed that discriminatory pregnancy
policies were constitutionally invalid (albeit on varying rationales), by
1973, a circuit split had developed. The Fourth Circuit, en banc, had
concluded in the case of Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board268
that the mandatory maternity leave imposed by the defendant on
teachers was constitutional, furthering legitimate school board
interests.269 The Sixth Circuit, in contrast, had held in LaFleur v.
Cleveland Board of Education270 that a very similar policy was
unconstitutional because it was “arbitrary and unreasonable[.]”271 As
such, in the spring of 1973, the Court granted certiorari review in both
Chesterfield and LaFleur, consolidating the two cases for argument.272
Rational basis arguments had been featured prominently in the
lower court arguments in both Chesterfield and LaFleur—both sets of
plaintiffs had argued not only for heightened scrutiny (based on both sex
discrimination and fundamental rights arguments), but also for the
invalidity of the mandatory maternity leave policies under rational basis
review.273 Indeed, between the two cases, the parties had developed a
strong record, in which it had been shown that the identified purposes of
the policies (such as continuity and health concerns) were at best
unsupported, and often undermined, by the actual terms of the
policies.274 As such, both the plaintiffs and several of their amici pressed

266. See Green, 473 F.2d at 633–34; see also sources cited supra note 265 (discussing the
internal deliberations in Green).
267. See Bravo v. Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155, 157–59 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev’d 525 F.2d
695 (1975) (unpublished table decision); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501,
505, 507 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
268. 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
269. Id. at 397–99.
270. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff’d, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
271. Id. at 1188–89.
272. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 411 U.S. 947, 947 (1973) (mem.) (granting
certiorari and consolidating the cases); Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., 411 U.S. 947, 947
(1973) (mem.) (same).
273. See sources cited supra note 257.
274. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–48 (1974)
(discussing the evidence of the tenuous relationship between the policies and the reasons
offered for them).
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strongly in the lower courts that the policies simply failed to further any
legitimate state interest.275
On appeal before the Supreme Court, both the Chesterfield and the
LaFleur plaintiffs would—despite considerable changes in the law
making heightened scrutiny arguments more plausible—continue to
argue the rational basis point.276 Although foregrounding arguments that
sex discrimination warranted heighted scrutiny, and that fundamental
rights were implicated, both sets of plaintiffs continued to contend
that—even if rational basis review applied—they must prevail.277
Asserting that Reed v. Reed established a rational basis standard “of
general applicability[,]” the plaintiffs suggested that there must at least
be a rational reason for differentiating pregnancy from other conditions
causing temporary disabilities, and that the defendants had failed to
show that such a reason existed.278
As the Justices debated Chesterfield and LaFleur internally, the
importance of these rational basis arguments quickly became
apparent.279 Although a plurality of the Court had recently concluded in
Frontiero v. Richardson280 that sex discrimination warranted strict
scrutiny, a majority of the Court continued to disagree with this

275. See sources cited supra note 257.
276. See infra notes 277–78 and accompanying text (detailing the plaintiffs’ rational basis
arguments). On the changing legal landscape vis-à-vis strict scrutiny, see generally Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (holding that sex is a suspect
classification warranting strict scrutiny). The lower courts had also by this time become far
more receptive to arguments for treating pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex
discrimination. See Dinner, supra note 240, at 376–81.
277. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 24–29, LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (No. 72-1129)
[hereinafter Chesterfield Brief for Petitioner] (showing the Chesterfield plaintiff’s arguments);
Brief for Respondents at 48–56, LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (No. 72-777) [hereinafter LaFleur Brief
for Respondents] (showing the LaFleur plaintiffs’ arguments).
278. LaFleur Brief for Respondents, supra note 277, at 48; see also Chesterfield Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 277, at 24–29; LaFleur Brief for Respondents, supra note 277, at 48–56.
279. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Docket Sheet re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
No. 72-777, and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 1–2 (Oct. 19, 1973) (on
file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 175, Folder 1); Justice
William J. Brennan, Docket Sheet re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and
Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 1–2 (undated) (on file with the Library of
Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box I:310, Folder 3); Justice William O. Douglas,
Conference Notes re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v.
Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 1–3 (Oct. 19, 1973) (on file with the Library of
Congress in William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1625); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Docket Sheet
re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd.,
No. 72-1129, at 1–2 (Oct. 19, 1973) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of
Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers); see also MAYERI, supra note 86, at 90–92 (describing the
internal deliberations in LaFleur).
280. 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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approach.281 Moreover, it rapidly became clear that few on the Court
believed that pregnancy discrimination was properly characterized as
sex discrimination as such.282 Thus, it quickly became apparent in the
Justices’ deliberations that there was not a majority for a sex
discrimination approach (with or without the application of heightened
scrutiny).
Nevertheless, many of the Justices on the Court had serious
concerns regarding the policies at issue in LaFleur and in Chesterfield.283
Viewing such mandatory pregnancy leave policies as “arbitrary” and
“irrational” in their singling out of pregnancy among all temporary
disabilities, many of the Justices felt that the policies ought not to
survive equal protection review.284 Thus, initially, it seemed plausible
that rational basis arguments might form the basis for the Court’s
invalidation of the mandatory maternity leave policies at issue in
Chesterfield and LaFleur.285
But although rational basis arguments marked the most common
point of agreement among the Justices,286 ultimately it was decided that
Justice Potter Stewart—who wished to resolve the case on irrebuttable
presumption287 grounds—would write.288 Thus, the final majority opinion
281. See sources cited supra note 279; see also Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference
Notes re: Pregnant Teacher Cases, Nos. 72-777, 72-1129, at 1–2 (Oct. 17, 1973) [hereinafter
Powell, LaFleur Notes] (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers).
282. See sources cited supra note 279; see also Dinner, supra note 240, at 397; Justice Harry
A. Blackmun, Notes re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v.
Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 1–2 (Oct. 15, 1973) [hereinafter Blackmun, LaFleur
Notes] (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 175, Folder
1); cf. Powell, LaFleur Notes, supra note 280, at 1–2 (noting that the Court need not decide
whether this was a sex classification given that rational basis was the appropriate standard).
283. See infra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
284. See sources cited supra note 279; see also Blackmun, LaFleur Notes, supra note 281, at
2–5; cf. Powell, LaFleur Notes, supra note 280, at 6–9 (showing that Justice Powell initially
believed that the LaFleur but not the Chesterfield policy failed rational basis review).
285. See sources cited supra note 283; see also MAYERI, supra note 86, at 91.
286. See MAYERI, supra note 86, at 91 (noting that Justice Blackmun proposed that the
Court could avoid the “ ‘difficult analytical question[s]’ associated with sex discrimination
analysis by treating the leave policy as a traditional equal protection violation that lacked a
rational basis, and the Justices seemed poised to do just that” (alteration in original) (quoting
Memorandum from JBO, law clerk, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 13 (Sept. 24,
1973) (on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers))); see also infra note 293 and accompanying text (showing that Justice Stewart’s
“irrebuttable presumption” rationale was controversial among the Justices).
287. The “irrebuttable presumption” doctrine determined that the state violated principles
of due process where a legislative classification rested on so-called “irrebuttable
presumptions” regarding a particular class (in LaFleur and Chesterfield, the irrebuttable
presumption that all women are incapacitated by pregnancy comparatively early in
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largely situated the policies’ constitutional wrong in the school district’s
categorical presumption of incapacity—allegedly a due process
violation289—despite the fact that plaintiff’s counsel in LaFleur had
conceded never making such a due process claim.290 Only Justice Powell
fully embraced the rational basis argument in his final opinion,291 arguing
that the equal protection clause was violated where, as here, the policies
“are either counterproductive or irrationally overinclusive” with regard
to the government’s legitimate interests.292
Although ultimately LaFleur and Chesterfield were thus decided on
the basis of a legal argument orthogonal to both of the equal protection
arguments raised by sex equality advocates, it soon became apparent
that due process arguments would not provide a way of evading the
equal protection dispute for long.293 Even during the course of the
LaFleur deliberations, several of the Justices had become increasingly
uneasy with the opinion’s due process irrebuttable presumption
rationale.294 Indeed, Justice Stewart himself, who authored the majority
pregnancy). See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974). Soon after
LaFleur, incoherencies in the doctrine led to its early demise. See infra notes 293–94 and
accompanying text.
288. See Letter from Justice William O. Douglas to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger re:
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., No.
72-1129, at 1 (Oct. 22, 1973) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers) (“remind[ing]” the Chief Justice that at conference “it seemed to
be the consensus” that LaFleur and Chesterfield should be assigned to Justice Stewart); see
also Blackmun, supra note 279, at 1 (showing that Justice Stewart wished to resolve the case
on irrebuttable presumption grounds); Brennan, supra note 279, at 1 (same).
289. See LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 644–48.
290. See id.; cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (Nos. 72-777, 721129) (making clear that counsel for plaintiffs in LaFleur conceded that a due process claim
was not pled).
291. Compare LaFleur, 414 U.S at 653 (Powell, J., concurring) (holding the policies were
invalid under a rational basis standard of review), with id. at 641–48 (Stewart, J., majority
opinion) (analyzing claims on a rational basis standard but also holding an irrebuttable
presumption is a violation of teachers’ due process rights), and id. at 657–58 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing the irrebuttable presumptions doctrine, and indicating that the
mandatory maternity leave policies should be affirmed). Note that although LaFleur is
commonly understood exclusively as an irrebuttable presumption case today, significant parts
of the majority’s reasoning appeared to rely on a straightforward rational basis analysis. See,
e.g., id. at 643 (majority opinion) (concluding that “the arbitrary cutoff dates embodied in the
mandatory leave rules before us have no rational relationship to the valid state interest of
preserving continuity of instruction”). Thus, although Powell was the only Justice to fully
embrace an equal protection rational basis analysis, components of the majority’s reasoning
do also appear to rest on these grounds.
292. Id. at 653 (Powell, J., concurring).
293. See infra notes 293–94 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 651–53 (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing concerns
about the majority’s irrebuttable presumption rationale); Memorandum from RR, law clerk,
re: Justice Powell’s Concurrence in Maternity Leave Cases, Nos. 72-777, 72-1129, at 3 (Jan. 16,
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opinion, would, shortly after LaFleur, declare that “LaFleur would be
his last conclusive presumption case.”295 Thus, virtually immediately
after LaFleur, it became clear that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
would not continue to provide a basis for evading the equal protection
questions raised by pregnancy discrimination claims.
Sex equality advocates did not have to wait long for a case in which
such questions again became the object of the Court’s consideration.296
Even before the decision in LaFleur was issued, Geduldig v. Aiello—a
case within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction—came up to the Court
and was granted full review.297 Involving a state disability compensation
statute that covered all long-term disabilities save pregnancy, Geduldig
was a case in which the district court had invalidated the statute,
applying rational basis review.298 Like many of the early pregnancy
discrimination cases, the role that sex discrimination arguments had
played in the district court’s decision in Aiello was ambiguous. Although
the district court’s opinion assumed that pregnancy discrimination was
indeed sex discrimination, it also concluded that Reed and other early
1970s cases had generally altered the applicable standard of rational
basis review.299 As such, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments for
strict or even intermediate scrutiny—but nevertheless concluded that
even the lower, rational basis standard could not be met.300

1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 175, Folder 1)
(displaying clerk’s statement that “I have problems with the Stewart ‘irrebuttable
presumption’ reasoning”—Justice Blackmun’s handwritten notation appearing next to clerk’s
statement: “so do I”); Memorandum from Justice William O. Douglas to Justice Potter
Stewart re: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, No. 72-777, and Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty.
Sch. Bd., No. 72-1129, at 1 (Jan. 18, 1974) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Box 175, Folder 1) (noting that reading Powell’s concurrence “stirs in me
some of the doubts I had in Vlandis”—another irrebuttable presumption case—and thus
declining to join the majority opinion, and instead concurring in the result).
295. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Supreme Court of the United States Opinions of
William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, October
Term, 1973, at XIX (on file with the Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers,
Box II:6, Folder 17).
296. Cf. MAYERI, supra note 86, at 92 (noting that although “[t]he Court had sidestepped
the central question of whether discrimination based on pregnancy was sex discrimination
under the equal protection clause [in LaFleur,]” such sidestepping was “[n]ot for long”
(citation omitted)).
297. 414 U.S. 1110 (1973) (mem.).
298. See Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 796–801 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev’d sub nom.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
299. Id. at 796–97.
300. Id. at 796–801.
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Initially, the arguments of plaintiffs’ counsel on appeal to the
Supreme Court closely tracked the district court’s reasoning.301 Making a
motion to affirm the judgment, plaintiffs’ counsel argued that Reed
stated the appropriate standard, and that the district court had properly
concluded that the pregnancy exclusion was “arbitrary” and
“irrational.”302 Although also arguing that the pregnancy exclusion was a
form of sex discrimination, the plaintiffs’ primary arguments in their
initial appellate briefs did not turn on the Court so holding.303
But once plenary review was granted, plaintiffs’ arguments shifted.
Arguing passionately that pregnancy discrimination marked the linchpin
of contemporary sex discrimination, young attorney Wendy Webster
Williams made the case strongly—and virtually exclusively—for
considering pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.304
Treating Reed as a case specific to the sex discrimination context—and
not as the “test applicable to ‘all equal protection cases[,]’ ” as the
district court had found305—Williams almost entirely abandoned any
true rational basis argument for invalidity of the policy, opting to hitch
her clients’ fates exclusively to the sex discrimination argument.306
Despite Williams’ arguments, the Justices were, in Geduldig,
disinclined to revisit their very recent (but not publicly announced)
determination in LaFleur that pregnancy discrimination was not a form
of sex discrimination.307 At conference, six of the Justices stated their
view that the classification at issue was not sex discrimination.308 And
unlike the policies at issue in LaFleur and Chesterfield, few regarded the
carve-out for pregnancy disabilities at issue in Geduldig as irrational.309
301. See generally Motion to Affirm, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640)
(initial motion to affirm by plaintiffs closely tracking the district court’s rational basis
reasoning).
302. Id. at 9–16.
303. Id.
304. See Brief for Appellees at 28–52, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640) [hereinafter
Geduldig Appellees’ Brief]; see also MAYERI, supra note 86, at 93 (discussing Wendy Webster
Williams and the background of Geduldig).
305. Aiello, 359 F. Supp. at 796 (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
306. See, e.g., Geduldig Appellees’ Brief, supra note 303, at 28–52.
307. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
308. See Brennan, supra note 294, at XIX (describing the Justices’ positions on the sex
discrimination issue).
309. See id. at XVIII–XX. Developments under state law in California, which had led to
the coverage of disabilities arising from abnormal pregnancies (but still not those arising from
normal childbirth), may have made this conclusion easier for the Justices to reach. See
Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference re: Hansen v. Aiello, No.
A-344, at 1–4 (Oct. 15, 1973) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun
Papers, Box 188) (describing the changes in state law since the filing of the case); Preliminary
Memorandum from R., law clerk, re: Geduldig v. Aiello, No. 73-640, at 1 (Dec. 3, 1973) (on
file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers)
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Because even the plaintiffs conceded that the inclusion of pregnancy
disabilities in the program would radically increase the program’s cost—
requiring a reduction of benefits or an increase in the direct tax that
funded the program310—the Justices generally viewed the exclusion as a
rational one.311
The majority opinion in Geduldig—authored by Justice Stewart—
reflected both of these conclusions. Although Justice Brennan argued in
dissent that discrimination based on pregnancy “inevitably constitutes
sex discrimination[,]”312 the majority opinion in Geduldig dismissed this
perspective summarily, concluding that pregnancy was not the same as
“gender as such.”313 And, the majority also easily concluded that the
exclusion furthered the state’s “legitimate interests[,]” noting that the
state could legitimately seek to preserve the low-contribution, high

(displaying law clerk’s notation that “ectopic pregnancy or miscarriage exclusion may be
irrational”).
310. Geduldig Appellees’ Brief, supra note 303, at 79–80. There were disputes about how
much the addition of pregnancy to covered benefits would cost the program, but even
plaintiffs’ reduced estimate was that the addition of pregnancy would cause a twelve percent
increase in the cost of the program. See id. at 88–89.
311. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Docket Sheet re: Geduldig v. Aiello, No. 73-640, at 1–
2 (Mar. 29, 1974) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Papers) (showing that Justices Stewart and Powell expressly stated their views at
conference that the classification was “rational” and that Justices White and Rehnquist
expressed agreement with those Justices’ views); Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft
Concurrence re: Geduldig v. Aiello, No. 73-640, at 2 (undated) (on file with the Library of
Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 188) (expressing the view in an unpublished
draft concurrence that the plan as modified was “based totally on legitimate and rational
economic realities”). See generally Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–96 (1974) (showing
six Justices joining majority opinion expressing the view that the exclusion need only be
“rationally supportable” and that the state had “legitimate” and non-“invidious” reasons for
the exclusion of regular pregnancy). This no doubt reflected at least in part the Justices’
general disinclination to tinker with social welfare line drawing. See, e.g., Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Certiorari Docket Sheet re: Geduldig v. Aiello, No. 73-640, at 1 (Dec. 14, 1973)
(on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers)
(Powell recording Stewart as having said that “this is a funded insurance plan which is
different from Reed v. Reed [and] Preg. Teachers Case. Calif[.] Ct[.] was wrong.”).
312. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 496 n.20 (majority opinion). The original draft opinion by Justice Stewart had
no mention of the sex discrimination issue at all, but he later amended the opinion to discuss
it summarily, after Brennan circulated his dissent, “forc[ing] the issue.” See Brennan, supra
note 294, at XIX–XX. Note that this footnote in the Geduldig opinion, which refers to Reed as
being a case “involving discrimination based upon gender as such[,]” Geduldig, 417 U.S. at
496 n.20 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)), could be read to signal that the Court by
this juncture was settled on an approach that treated Reed as a case distinctively about sex
discrimination, rather than an application of rational basis review. In fact, this issue remained
unsettled on the Court for some time. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at
554–64 (discussing disputes over whether Reed was properly characterized as a rational basis
case continuing through the end of the 1975 Term).
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benefits nature of the program by excluding a particularly expensive
category of disability claims.314
Ultimately, no Justice would make an argument for the rational
basis invalidity of the pregnancy exclusion in Geduldig, with the dissent
focusing exclusively on the argument that sex discrimination triggered
strict scrutiny and the majority finding the program rational.315 And thus,
although many courts during the same era—both before and after
Geduldig—found other forms of pregnancy discrimination to be invalid
on rational basis review, this history would largely be forgotten.316 Nor
would the Justices’ internal debates in LaFleur—which suggested that
many of the Justices perceived the pregnancy discrimination in that case
to violate rational basis review—become known until much later.317 As
such, heightened scrutiny—and the equation of pregnancy with sex
discrimination—would come to be understood by the canon as key to
constitutional pregnancy discrimination claims.318
But while the constitutional canon would forget the role of
“protected class rational basis review” in early pregnancy litigation
efforts, the impacts of those efforts would nevertheless endure. Sex
equality advocates’ early work making protected class rational basis
arguments—leading courts to reject the rationality of distinguishing
pregnant women from others with temporary disabilities—would help
generate enduring shifts in perceptions of the fairness and legitimacy of
singling out pregnancy for disfavor.319 By the time the Court extended its
constitutional holding in Geduldig—that pregnancy discrimination was
not a form of sex discrimination—to Title VII in 1976, this perspective
would be sufficiently entrenched such that Congress would swiftly
respond with legislative action, protecting public and private employees

314. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494–97.
315. See generally id. (showing no Justice made a rational basis argument for the
program’s invalidity).
316. See infra note 317 and accompanying text. For cases invalidating pregnancy
discrimination on rational basis review before Geduldig, see, for example, sources cited supra
note 260. For sources doing so after Geduldig, see, for example, Cook v. Arentzen, 14 Fair.
Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1643, 1977 WL 4327, at *3 (4th Cir. May 6, 1977), vacated, 582 F.2d
870 (4th Cir. 1978) (invalidating pregnancy discrimination on rational basis review); Crawford
v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1121–24 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
317. Cf. supra notes 289–91 and accompanying text (noting that in the final opinions, only
Justice Powell clearly embraced the rational basis/equal protection rationale).
318. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 1416 (2d ed. 2013) (characterizing Geduldig as having held “that the Equal Protection
Clause governs classifications based on sex itself and does not apply—absent evidence of
intent to discriminate—to classifications that only have a disparate impact on men and
women” (emphasis added)).
319. See sources cited supra note 36.
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alike.320 Therefore, although the memory of protected class rational basis
review would largely be erased, the legal changes it helped to bring
about would be enduring.
B.

Intersectional Discrimination and Rational Basis Review (1967–
1976)321

Although pregnancy discrimination issues were among the most
common of the boundary disputes raised by early sex discrimination
litigation, they were not the first. Indeed, even before Reed v. Reed
afforded sex equality advocates their first major constitutional victory,
claims at the intersection of gender, race, and other axes of
subordination were increasingly being heard in the federal courts.322
Brought by a diverse array of social movement actors (including not
only women’s rights organizations but also race and poverty litigators),
such cases squarely raised fundamental questions regarding how to
constitutionally assess policies that targeted African American women—
policies that also often implicated poverty, nonmarital children, and
fundamental rights.323
Many of these early intersectional cases not only raised questions of
how to address the intersection of diverse claims surrounding rights and
protected class status, but also raised the type of disparate impact issues
that were increasingly provoking disputes more broadly in constitutional
anti-discrimination law.324 Thus—while it was sometimes obvious that
black women had been targeted qua black women—it was as often only
by impact that such arguments could be made.325 As such, as Serena
320. See sources cited supra note 36.
321. Although, for the purposes of narrative structure, this Article includes the discussion
of intersectional claims here in the context of sex discrimination, they could equally be
classified as racial justice claims.
322. Serena Mayeri’s work has uncovered the rich variety of intersectional claims brought
by race, sex, and anti-poverty litigators during this era. For a much fuller account of such
claims, see generally MAYERI, supra note 86; Mayeri, supra note 57.
323. See sources cited supra note 57; sources cited infra note 327.
324. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees and Plaintiff-Appellants at 59–60, 74–77, Smith
v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975) (Nos. 73-2226, 73-2227) (on file with the Western
Reserve Historical Society in Women’s Law Fund Records) [hereinafter Troyan Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellees and Plaintiff-Appellants]; Brief of Defendants at 16–17, Smith v. King, 277
F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (No. 2495-N) (on file with the Library of Congress in Frank M.
Johnson Papers, Box 46); see also infra notes 402–03 and accompanying text (noting that
many of the Justices perceived the race discrimination issue in Drew Municipal Separate
School District v. Andrews as a disparate impact issue).
325. Often, as is also common today, the record in the cases was suggestive of intentional
discrimination, but judges were unreceptive to such suggestions. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief
of Respondents at 1–4, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976)
(mem.) (per curiam) (No. 74-1318) [hereinafter Drew Supplemental Brief of Respondents]
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Mayeri has put it, many of the early cases challenging forms of
intersectional discrimination “ ‘bristle[d] with constitutional issues of
broad importance,’ all of them thorny.”326
Despite presenting a complicated set of issues, and relating to
arenas of discrimination that are today thought of as difficult to reach,
early cases brought at the intersection of race and gender subordination
were often (albeit not always) successful.327 And, where such claims
prevailed, they often did so on rational basis review.328 Thus, as in
numerous other contexts, resorting to meaningful rational basis review
allowed courts and litigants to avoid the complexities of defining the
contours of the “gatekeeping” standards to heightened scrutiny.329
Although the Supreme Court’s avoidance of such intersectional rational
basis arguments in the major cases in which they were raised on appeal
would largely render these arguments invisible, they continued to persist
in the lower courts through the era of robust rational basis review.330
King v. Smith,331 brought in district court in 1966 by anti-poverty
and civil rights litigators,332 demonstrated the potential of such rational
(documenting evidence suggesting that the ban on employment of those with nonmarital
children at issue in Drew was part of a wider effort to reduce the ranks of black teachers
incident to faculty desegregation); cf. infra notes 401–03 and accompanying text (showing that
none of the Justices—not even Justices Marshall or Brennan—were receptive to the race
discrimination argument in Drew v. Andrews).
326. See MAYERI, supra note 86, at 163 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief Amicus
Curiae for the National Education Association at 7, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v.
Andrews, 423 U.S. 820 (1975) (No. 74-1318)) (describing the case of Drew v. Andrews).
327. See cases cited infra note 327.
328. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27, 31–35 (N.D.
Miss. 1973), aff’d, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 425
U.S. 559 (1976) (mem.) (per curiam); Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1137–
44 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th
Cir. 1975); King, 277 F. Supp. at 38–41; see also Cirino v. Walsh, 321 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (Sup.
Ct. 1971). In addition, as Serena Mayeri has observed, the plaintiffs in the early illegitimacy
cases—many of which were successfully litigated at the Supreme Court on rational basis
review—were all African American women and their children. See Mayeri, supra note 57, at
1281.
329. See generally sources cited supra note 327 (showing that judges’ reliance on rational
basis review allowed them to sidestep questions of how to characterize intersectional forms of
discrimination, and whether such discrimination triggered heightened review).
330. See generally sources cited supra note 327 (demonstrating the persistence of
intersectional race and gender rational basis arguments in the lower courts).
331. 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
332. See Complaint at 12, King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (No. 2495-N) (on file with the Library of
Congress in Frank M. Johnson Papers, Box 46) (showing attorneys involved in the case in the
signature block); see also David Margolick, Edward Sparer, 55; Legal Advocate for Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1983, at 14 (describing Sparer’s long career as an anti-poverty lawyer);
Obituary, Howard Thorkelson, PENNLIVE.COM (March 6, 2011), http://obits.pennlive.com
/obituaries/pennlive/obituary.aspx?pid=149110758 [https://perma.cc/287T-AUN9] (describing
Thorkelson’s long career as an anti-poverty lawyer); Sam Roberts, Alvin Bronstein, Lawyer
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basis approaches early on.333 Presenting a challenge to Alabama’s
“substitute father” rule (barring receipt of Aid to Dependent Children
(“ADC”) benefits where a mother was believed to be “cohabit[ing]” or
having a sexual relationship outside of marriage),334 the restriction at
issue in King was one of a number of welfare rules in the South that
overwhelmingly impacted poor black women.335 Intended to control
welfare recipients’ sexuality—and also arguably to ensure that African
American women would remain available as low-wage labor—such rules
presented clear issues of race and gender injustice.336 But, although it
appeared that discriminatory motives may have underlain them, it was
not clear that such policies could be proven to be intentionally
discriminatory.337 Moreover, several of the forms of discrimination
arguably implicated by cases such as King—such as sex, illegitimacy and
morals-based discrimination—did not, at the time, clearly implicate any
form of heightened review under the courts’ existing precedents.338
Who Fought Prison Abuse, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/us/alvin-bronstein-lawyer-who-fought-prison-abuse-diesat-87.html [https://perma.cc/2CKT-3SPW] (describing Bronstein’s long civil rights career);
Sam Roberts, Donald Jelinek, Lawyer for Attica Prisoners, Dies at 82, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/nyregion/donald-jelinek-lawyer-for-attica-prisonersdies-at-82.html [https://perma.cc/N6T3-97E4] (describing Jelinek’s long civil rights career).
333. See King, 277 F. Supp. at 38–41.
334. See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-241, 49 Stat. 620 (repealed in part
1996). Although cohabitation was the term used in the rule, in fact the rule was targeted at
any situation in which an ADC-receiving mother was having a sexual relationship with a man.
See King, 277 F. Supp. at 39; Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief of Fact and Law at 2, 55–56, King, 277 F.
Supp. 31 (No. 2495-N) [hereinafter King Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief] (on file with the Library of
Congress in Frank M. Johnson Papers, Box 46).
335. See sources cited infra notes 335–36.
336. See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL
WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 323–27 (1988); FRANCES FOX
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE 138–45 (1971); Rickie Solinger, The First Welfare Case: Money, Sex, Marriage, and
White Supremacy in Selma, 1966, A Reproductive Justice Analysis, 22 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13,
14–15 (2010); see also Brief for Appellees at 22–28, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No.
949) [hereinafter King Appellees’ Brief].
337. King provides an excellent example of this. There was ample evidence of racial
impact in King—and gender-based impact, although that was taken for granted and not
argued. See, e.g., King Appellees’ Brief, supra note 335, at 22–28. But the evidence of
discriminatory purpose in King was at least somewhat more ambiguous. See id.; see also Reply
Brief for Appellants at 28–29, King, 392 U.S. 309 (No. 949) (setting out defendants’ response
to plaintiffs’ arguments that the regulation was purposefully discriminatory).
338. As to sex and illegitimacy discrimination, the Court had yet to begin its trajectory of
deciding such cases favorably, even on rational basis review. See generally Eyer, Constitutional
Crossroads, supra note 1 (discussing the early development of sex and illegitimacy doctrine in
the Supreme Court). And while cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
offered some basis for challenging morals-based laws in private domains, id. at 484–86, it was
not until Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), that the Court held that those privacy rights
might reach unmarried individuals, id. at 453–55.
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Of course, at the time that King was brought in the lower courts, the
move toward robust rational basis review that would develop in the
1970s also had not yet begun.339 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ attorneys—
building on a decades-long legacy of intra-agency constitutional
lawmaking—argued that the policy failed rational basis review.340 While
acknowledging that “neither the United States nor the Alabama
Constitutions appear to require Alabama to grant financial assistance to
needy, dependant [sic] children[,]”341 they nonetheless forcefully
contended that “once Alabama undertakes to provide a statutory
program of assistance it must do so in conformity with the constitutional
mandate of equal protection.”342 And that mandate, according to the
plaintiffs, demanded that
Alabama cannot pick and choose the mothers and children it will
aid in a whimsical or capricious manner; it cannot exclude needy
children from the program on an arbitrary or irrational ground; it
cannot classify some children as eligible and others as ineligible
without a reasonable basis for distinguishing one class from the

339. See generally supra Part I (describing the rise of robust rational basis review in the
1970s). But see Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308–11 (1966) (applying a meaningful form of
rational basis review in the mid-1960s)
340. King Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief, supra note 333, at 52–62. For a fascinating and extended
discussion of this “administrative equal protection” advocacy, see generally Tani, supra note
57, at 844–59 (discussing the role of the Social Security Administration in the development of
rational basis arguments for restraining discriminatory ADC policies). As Karen Tani
documents, legal theories developed at the Social Security Administration had, for many
decades, suggested that state requirements lacking a rational relationship to the purposes of
ADC to provide for indigent children were constitutionally invalid. Id. There are reasons to
believe that the attorneys—and the courts—in King were influenced by this legacy of
“administrative equal protection.” See id. at 885–89 (discussing King); id. at 867–73
(describing more generally the role of administrative equality protection in the history of
agency efforts to rein in moralistic state rules, like “suitable home” rules); see also King
Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief, supra note 333, at 20–46 (discussing extensively the agency’s position
regarding morals qualifications for ADC, including the agency’s view that, for example,
illegitimacy penalties “raise[d] a question of reasonable classification,” an allusion to the
history of robust rational basis review in the agency’s practice); Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 10,
King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (No. 2495-N) [hereinafter King Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief] (on file with the
Library of Congress in Frank M. Johnson Papers, Box 46, Folder 6) (same, and specifically
characterizing the agency’s “Flemming Ruling” as resting on an “ ‘equal protection’ rationale”
that “strongly supports Plaintiffs’ constitutional argument in this case”).
341. King Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief, supra note 333, at 5. Reflecting the rapidly changing
backdrop of anti-poverty litigation, this concession would be abandoned by the time King
went up on appeal, with the plaintiffs suggesting in the Supreme Court that there is “[a]
persuasive argument that the needy have a right to receive welfare aid” under the
Constitution. See King Appellees’ Brief, supra note 335, at 34 & n.23.
342. King Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief, supra note 333, at 5.
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other; it may only create classifications which are rationally
related to the purpose of the federal and Alabama statutes.343
Because the Alabama rule denied benefits to children on grounds
unrelated to the purposes of the ADC program, and indeed contrary to
them, it failed this standard.344
The plaintiffs also raised other arguments for the rule’s invalidity,
including its racial impact and purpose, its inconsistency with the
requirements of the federal statute, and its impermissible burdening of
mothers’ privacy rights.345 But the three-judge district court panel would
opt to ground its decision squarely on the plaintiffs’ rational basis
arguments.346 Mirroring the plaintiffs’ reasoning nearly verbatim, the
court held that although
there is no vested legal right . . . to receive public financial
assistance . . . , once Alabama undertakes to [do so], it must do so
in conformity with the constitutional mandate of equal protection.
Alabama cannot pick and choose the mothers and children it will
aid through the use of some classifications which are not rationally
related to the purpose of the applicable statutes.347
Concluding that the Alabama regulation was just such “an arbitrary and
discriminatory classification[,]” denying benefits “for reasons unrelated
to and in conflict with the purposes of [the welfare laws,]” the Court
deemed it to be unconstitutional.348
On appeal before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs continued to
vigorously press the rational basis argument.349 Suggesting that “[i]t
would be arbitrary and irrational . . . to infer that the [substitute] father
[i.e., the man with whom the mother was having sexual relations] is
providing parental care and support[,]” the plaintiffs argued that the
substitute father regulation thus contravened the plain purpose of the
Act—to provide support to all needy children.350 Noting that the other
arguments offered by the state fared no better in terms of their
rationality, the plaintiffs contended that under either of the Court’s

343. Id.
344. Id. at 53–61.
345. See generally id. (making a number of other arguments in addition to the rational
basis argument); King Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief, supra note 339 (same).
346. See infra text accompanying notes 346–47.
347. King v. Smith, 277 F. Supp. 31, 40 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aff’d, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(citations omitted).
348. Id. at 41.
349. See King Appellees’ Brief, supra note 335, at 34–46.
350. Id. at 38–40.
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applicable standards of review (strict scrutiny351 or reasonable relation),
the Alabama substitute father regulation must fail.352 The plaintiffs also
reiterated a number of other constitutional arguments—not relied on by
the district court below—urging the Justices that both procedural and
substantive due process concerns were implicated by the intrusive,
vague, and standardless investigations of welfare recipients that the
regulation invited.353
But while the plaintiffs in King focused their arguments on appeal
almost exclusively on constitutional grounds (including the statutory
argument only as a component of the rational basis argument), several
of the Justices preferred a different approach.354 Perhaps drawing on the
arguments put forward in an amicus brief filed by the NAACP and a
variety of welfare organizations—which extensively made the statutory
argument355—a number of Justices pressed the parties at oral argument
on whether the case might be resolved on statutory grounds.356 Martin
Garbus, the plaintiffs’ attorney, assured the Justices that indeed the case
could be so resolved, as the Alabama rule contravened both the
purposes of the federal Act and its definition of the term “parent.”357
At conference, although several of the Justices expressed
receptivity to the equal protection argument, a majority expressed the
351. On appeal, plaintiffs-appellees’ brief argued for strict scrutiny based on a number of
arguments including, inter alia, racial discrimination, and arguments for applying heightened
scrutiny to illegitimacy penalties. See id. at 23–27, 40–41.
352. See id. at 34–46. Although the plaintiffs’ attorneys had argued the rational basis point
below exclusively in terms of equal protection (although they also made separate due process
arguments), on appeal, the plaintiffs’ rational basis argument included both equal protectionand due process-based reasoning. See id.; cf. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and
Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., the National
Office for the Rights of the Indigent, & the Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law at 26–36,
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 949) [hereinafter King LDF and Welfare Rights
Amicus Brief] (making the rational basis argument purely as a matter of equal protection
doctrine); Motion of the Child Welfare League of America, Inc. & the National Council of
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. Amici Curiae, Supporting the Position of the Appellees at 6–
13, King, 392 U.S. 309 (No. 949) (making both the due process rational basis argument and
the equal protection rational basis argument, but separating them out).
353. King Appellees’ Brief, supra note 335, at 47–65.
354. Compare id. at 34–81 (framing arguments for invalidity of Alabama’s substitute father
regulation in terms of the Constitution), with infra notes 357–59 and accompanying text
(describing the Justices’ preference for a statutory ruling).
355. See King LDF and Welfare Rights Amicus Brief, supra note 351, at 12–26; see also
Bench Memorandum from CHW, law clerk, re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at cover, 20–21 (Apr.
18, 1968) (on file with the Library of Congress in Earl Warren Papers, Box 316, Folder 5)
(showing that the statutory argument was made solely in the amicus briefs, and including
Warren’s handwritten notation: “Supremacy or on statute”).
356. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 18:50, 27:15, King, 392 U.S. 309 (No. 949),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/949 [https://perma.cc/RR9Q-MNAR (staff-uploaded archive)].
357. Id. at 39:37.
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view that the decision should be “on the Statute.”358 Ultimately, the
majority opinion would decline to reach the constitutional issue, holding
instead that Alabama’s regulation was inconsistent with the federal
statutory scheme.359 Thus, the Court concluded, “Alabama’s substitute
father regulation . . . [is] invalid because it defines ‘parent’ in a manner
that is inconsistent with . . . the Social Security Act.”360
As Karen Tani has observed, this framing of the majority opinion in
King as a purely statutory opinion has largely obscured King as a
constitutional precedent.361 But, as she persuasively argues, there are
reasons to believe that even the Justices’ statutory holding may not in
fact have been so divorced from constitutional precepts as it might
initially seem.362 As Justice Douglas’s law clerk noted in an internal
memorandum in King,
HEW imposes only one condition on [the ability of the states to
impose more stringent eligibility requirements for ADC than set
forth in the federal Act], which it terms Condition X, which
provides that state plans will be approved . . . “only if the
classification effecting such limitation is a rational one in light of
the purposes of public assistance programs.”363
358. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Docket Sheet re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at 1–2 (Apr. 26,
1968) (on file with the Library of Congress in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Box 541, Folder 4).
Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Fortas were all receptive to the equal protection argument,
with Douglas and Marshall believing it should be the basis for the opinion. See Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr., Docket Sheet re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at 1–2 (undated) (on file with the
Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box I:161, Folder 2); Marshall, supra,
at 1; Justice William O. Douglas, Conference Notes re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at 1–2 (Apr.
26, 1968) (on file with the Library of Congress in William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1426);
Justice Earl Warren, Docket Sheet re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at 1 (Apr. 26, 1968) (on file
with the Library of Congress in Earl Warren Papers, Box 384, Folder 3). In addition, although
by conference Chief Justice Warren argued for a statutory approach, he too apparently
believed originally that the case could go on constitutional grounds. See Memorandum from
CHW, law clerk, re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at 1 (Jan. 8, 1968) (on file with the Library of
Congress in Earl Warren Papers, Box 316) (showing in response to summary by clerk that
mentioned only constitutional arguments for affirmance, a handwritten notation by Earl
Warren: “Affirm”). Ultimately, only Justice Douglas would write separately to make the
equal protection/rational basis argument. See King, 392 U.S. at 334–36 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
359. See King, 392 U.S. at 333 (majority opinion) (declining to reach the constitutional
issue and instead basing the holding on the statutory grounds).
360. Id.
361. Tani, supra note 57, at 884–89.
362. Id.; see also infra notes 362–64 and accompanying text.
363. See Supplemental Memorandum from WAR, law clerk, to Justice William O.
Douglas re: King v. Smith, No. 949, at 1 (Jan. 15, 1968) (on file with the Library of Congress in
William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1426) (quoting Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, Memorandum Concerning Authority of the Secretary, Under Title
IV of the Social Security Act, to Disapprove Michigan House Bill 145 on the Ground of Its
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As Tani’s work has demonstrated, Condition X derived from the
agency’s long tradition of applying a meaningful form of rational basis
review to state requirements.364 Thus, although the agency had, by the
late 1960s, reimagined the basis for policing state requirements as
residing in the statute itself—an approach the Court itself followed in
King—the origins of such an approach lay in administrative
constitutional interpretation, and in rational basis review.365
Despite these rational basis underpinnings, the framing of King as a
statutory precedent would mean that it would not become a part of the
rational basis canon or even the wider constitutional canon.366
Nevertheless, other precedents, explicitly relying on rational basis
review, would soon make the rational basis argument for invalidating
intersectional discrimination an even stronger one.367 Thus, as the
decade turned, organizations litigating on behalf of plaintiffs facing
multiple forms of subordination would continue to draw on rational
basis arguments to make intersectional claims, often relying on early
1970s rational basis precedents such as Reed v. Reed, Eisenstadt v.
Baird,368 and Weber v. Aetna.369
But rational basis arguments were not the only arguments gaining
strength during the early 1970s. Heightened scrutiny arguments,
including arguments for heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination and of
invasive morals discrimination, were also gaining traction during this

Limitations on Eligibility 1 (Mar. 25, 1963) (on file with Professor Karen Tani)) (citation
omitted).
364. See Tani, supra note 57, at 880–81, 887–88.
365. See id. at 880–81, 885–89.
366. But see id. at 885–89 (uncovering King’s roots in administrative constitutionalism).
367. See generally Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (applying a
meaningful form of rational basis review to invalidate illegitimacy discrimination); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (applying a meaningful form of rational basis review to invalidate
sex discrimination).
368. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
369. See, e.g., Troyan Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees & Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 323, at
45–54; Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
9, Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (No. GC 7320-S) (on file with the Mississippi State University Congressional and Political Research
Center in William C. Keady Papers) [hereinafter Drew Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction
Brief]; Brief of Amicus Curiae, the Center for Constitutional Rights at 26–31, Drew, 371 F.
Supp. 27 (No. GC 73-20-S) (on file with the Mississippi State University Congressional and
Political Research Center in William C. Keady Papers) [hereinafter Drew CCR Trial Amicus
Brief]; Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 6–9, Drew, 371 F. Supp. 27 (No. GC 73-20-S) (on file with the
Mississippi State University Congressional and Political Research Center in William C. Keady
Papers) [hereinafter Drew Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum]. For a general discussion
of Reed, Weber, and the other early 1970s rational basis precedents that created the possibility
of making such arguments, see supra Part I.
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same time frame.370 As such, as the mid-point of the decade approached,
there were a considerable array of arguments which advocates could and
did deploy to attack intersectional forms of discrimination.371 Addressing
a variety of measures that targeted African American women—and that
often also targeted poor women raising nonmarital children—advocates
raised both heightened scrutiny and rational basis arguments together in
challenging the constitutionality of state discrimination.372
The trial proceedings in the case of Andrews v. Drew Municipal
Separate School District373 illustrated the diverse approaches that
advocates had embraced in litigating intersectional claims by the early
1970s.374 In Drew, a local school district had, following court-ordered
desegregation,375 imposed a rule barring teachers and teacher aides from
employment when they were the parents of nonmarital children.376 In
practice, all of those “denied jobs under the policy were African
American women.”377 Under this rule, Katie Mae Andrews and several
other teachers and teacher aides had—despite being otherwise
qualified—been denied employment or terminated.378

370. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that sex discrimination warranted strict scrutiny); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 151–66 (1973) (extending the due process right to privacy).
371. See infra notes 378–86 and accompanying text; see also 1 Trial Transcript at 21–22,
Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (No. C 73-299) (on file with
the Western Reserve Historical Society in Women’s Law Fund Records); Troyan Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellees & Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 323, at 38–45; Reply Brief of PlaintiffAppellees & Plaintiff-Appellants at 9–14, Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (Nos. 73-2226, 73-2227) (on
file with the Western Reserve Historical Society in Women’s Law Fund Records); Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 9–18, Smith v. Troyan, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (mem.) (No. 75-734).
372. See sources cited supra note 370.
373. Serena Mayeri has extensively described the context, history, and relevance of Drew.
For a much fuller and fascinating account of the case see MAYERI, supra note 86, at 145–67;
Mayeri, supra note 57, at 1316–23.
374. See infra notes 374–86 and accompanying text.
375. As Serena Mayeri notes, like many of the other policy determinations that followed
on the heels of court ordered desegregation, there are considerable reasons to believe that
this policy was a response to such desegregation. See, e.g., MAYERI, supra note 86, at 146.
376. See Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27, 29 (N.D. Miss. 1973)
(mem.). Although the rule ostensibly applied to all non-married parents, in fact it was applied
exclusively (and categorically) to those who were the parents of nonmarital children. See id. at
29 n.3.
377. MAYERI, supra note 86, at 150; see also Drew CCR Trial Amicus Brief, supra note
368, at 12–17 (describing the rule’s discriminatory purposes and effects as to women and racial
minorities); MAYERI, supra note 86, at 146–51 (further detailing the relationship of the rule to
backlash against civil rights).
378. See MAYERI, supra note 86, at 146.
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In arguing against the policy, Andrews’s attorney, Victor Charles
McTeer, placed rational basis review at the center of his arguments.379
Thus, he contended, “[I]t is clear that a classification whether based on
race, sex or single parent status must never be fanciful, capricious,
arbitrary or unatural [sic]; but rather any classification must be natural
and have a rational basis.”380 Moreover, he further argued, “[t]he
distinctive classification herein is not only unreasonable and
unconstitutional but serves no viable purpose.”381 Thus, he suggested,
regardless of whether heightened scrutiny was triggered, the policy
failed rational basis review.382
But McTeer and his amici—noting the many rights and statuses
implicated by the policy—also raised a diverse array of arguments for
heightened scrutiny as well.383 Noting that the policy acted exclusively
against African American women, McTeer argued that under the policy
“black women are [distinctively] denied their right to employment
without discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment” and
thus the defendant ought to be required to “bear[] a very heavy burden
of justification.”384 McTeer and his amici also suggested that in targeting
single parents, the rule impermissibly burdened the right to “raise one’s
children”385 and to engage in “procreative choice,”386 among the “basic
civil rights of man[.]”387 Thus, the district court would have before it a
host of possible arguments in favor of the policy’s invalidity.

379. See Drew Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Brief, supra note 368, at 9–14 (asserting,
in plaintiffs’ leading brief, the rational basis argument as the primary argument).
380. Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
381. Id. at 11.
382. See supra notes 378–80 and accompanying text; see also Drew Plaintiffs’ Preliminary
Injunction Brief, supra note 368, at 9–14; Drew Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum, supra
note 368, at 4–7; Drew CCR Trial Amicus Brief, supra note 368, at 20–31; Brief of the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7–11, Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (No. GC 73-20-S) (on file with the Mississippi State
University Congressional and Political Research Center in William C. Keady Papers)
[hereinafter Drew EEOC Trial Amicus Brief].
383. See infra notes 383–86 and accompanying text.
384. Drew Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Brief, supra note 368, at 13 (citation omitted);
see also Drew Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 368, at 1–6. See generally
Drew CCR Trial Amicus Brief, supra note 368 (extensively making the sex and race
discrimination arguments); Drew EEOC Trial Amicus Brief, supra note 381 (making the sex
and race discrimination arguments).
385. Drew Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Brief, supra note 368, at 13.
386. Drew CCR Trial Amicus Brief, supra note 368, at 4.
387. Drew Plaintiffs’ Preliminary Injunction Brief, supra note 368, at 13 (citation omitted);
see also Drew Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 368, at 9–10 (making the
“right to procreate” argument).
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Embracing both the plaintiffs’ rational basis and sex discrimination
arguments, the district court agreed.388 Holding the policy
constitutionally invalid, the court opined that the policy could not be
constitutionally sustained, regardless of whether it was deemed sex
discrimination (demanding, in the court’s view, strict scrutiny), or
whether it was considered under rational basis review.389 As to the
rational basis argument, the court observed that “barring an otherwise
qualified person from being employed . . . in the public schools merely
because of one’s previously having had an illegitimate child has no
rational relation to the objectives ostensibly sought to be achieved by
the school officials[.]”390 Thus, the court suggested as its leading
argument that the policy “is constitutionally defective under the
traditional, and most lenient, standard of equal protection and violative
of due process as well.”391
On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs would raise a
similar constellation of issues—including not only rational basis review,
but also race, sex, and fundamental rights claims—for the court’s
consideration.392 But the Fifth Circuit—like the district court—affirmed
simply “[o]n the basis . . . of traditional notions of equal protection,
because the policy created an irrational classification . . . .”393
Considering, and rejecting as entirely unsupported, each of the
defendants’ arguments for the policy’s furtherance of legitimate
government interests, the court concluded that—regardless of whether
the policy discriminated based on sex, race, or fundamental rights—it
“violated traditional concepts of equal protection,” i.e., rational basis
review.394 Thus, the court sidestepped the need to grapple with the
plaintiffs’ complicated claims of intertwined discrimination and
fundamental rights violations.
At the Supreme Court, the Justices would—like the courts below—
show little taste for grappling with the plaintiffs’ complicated,

388. See Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27, 31 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
389. See id.
390. Id. at 31.
391. Id. at 31–37.
392. See generally Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Andrews v. Drew Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975) (No. 73-3177) (on file with the National
Archives at Fort Worth); Brief of the Center for Constitutional Rights, as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Judgment Below, Drew, 507 F.2d 611 (No. 73-3177) (on file with the National
Archives at Fort Worth); Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Drew, 507
F.2d 611 (No. 73-3177) (on file with the National Archives at Fort Worth); Drew EEOC Trial
Amicus Brief, supra note 381.
393. Drew, 507 F.2d at 614.
394. Id. at 614–17.
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intertwined arguments of discrimination and fundamental rights.395 In
briefing and oral argument, McTeer, now joined by North Mississippi
Rural Legal Services and the Center for Constitutional Rights as cocounsel, raised not only the rational basis argument, but also an array of
claims of sex, race, and illegitimacy discrimination—as well as claims of
the infringement of fundamental rights.396 As McTeer contended at oral
argument, pulling together the threads of the argument,
[i]f a Black woman struggles through high school, struggles
through college, and then at the moment when she finally gets out
of the circle of poverty is told that because she bore a child out of
wedlock four years ago she cannot have a job, then indeed, the
constitution is senseless to us and makes no possibility for any
change.397
But if the need for such intersectional claims to be “tested by the
strictest standard of review” was self-evident to the plaintiffs,398 it was
not so apparent to the Justices.399 Although a number of the Justices
initially believed the policy to be unconstitutional, many also struggled
amidst the plethora of intertwined issues raised by the plaintiffs to find a
constitutional theory with which they felt comfortable.400 As Justice
395. See infra notes 399–410 and accompanying text (describing the Justices’ deliberations
in Drew).
396. See Drew Respondents’ Brief, supra note 194, at 34–77; Drew Supplemental Brief of
Respondents, supra note 324, at 1–4. See generally Brief for the Child Welfare League of
America as Amicus Curiae, Drew, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318), microformed on FO-0113-75
(Info. Handling Servs. Library & Educ. Div., Katherine R. Everett Law Library, Univ. of N.C.
Sch. of Law) (arguing against discrimination based on illegitimacy by urging the Court to view
the case through the lens of its effects on non-marital children); Motion for Leave to File
Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. & ACLU, Drew,
425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318) (on file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library in ACLU Collection, Box 1350) (making a sex discrimination argument, and linking
illegitimacy discrimination to historical gender stereotypes and discrimination against
women).
397. Drew Oral Argument, supra note 194, at 34:21. See generally Kerry Abrams &
Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(developing a theory of where arguments based on multiple or cumulative constitutional
rights should succeed).
398. Drew Respondents’ Brief, supra note 194, at 76.
399. See infra notes 399–404 and accompanying text.
400. See infra notes 400–10 and accompanying text. The deliberations were complicated in
Drew, but it appears that if all of the Justices had adhered to their initial instincts regarding
the proper outcome, there would have been a majority for affirming in Drew. See, e.g., Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Docket Sheet re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 741318, at 1–2 (Mar. 5, 1976) [hereinafter Powell, Drew Docket Sheet] (on file with the
Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers) (making clear
that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens voted at conference to affirm if the Court
reached the merits, although they also all indicated it was appropriate to dismiss the case as
improvidently granted); Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to Self re: Drew Mun.
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Powell put it (presaging later judicial difficulties in understanding how
to approach intersectional cases) “no analy[tical] framework fits this
case[.]”401 Thus, the plaintiffs’ efforts to persuade the Justices to see the
case as implicating an interconnected and historically grounded web of
subordination targeting black women apparently did not succeed.
Indeed, only a few Justices saw any constitutionally actionable
discrimination at work in the case at all—and none approached the case
through the intersectional framework that the plaintiffs put forward.
Thus, only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens perceived the case as
implicating any form of discrimination—and then only sex
discrimination.402 For the other Justices, Drew was “[n]ot an
E[qual]/P[rotection] case”403 because race and sex were implicated, if at
all, only by virtue of the policy’s disparate impact—a constitutional
theory soon thereafter rejected by the Justices in Davis.404 As such,
Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 6–8 (Feb. 17, 1976) [hereinafter Blackmun,
Drew Memo] (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 223,
Folder 1) (showing that Justice Blackmun also originally agreed with the decision below);
Preliminary Memorandum from M., law clerk, re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews,
No. 74-1318, at 1 (July 11, 1975) [hereinafter Powell, Drew Memo] (on file with the
Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers) (showing
Powell’s handwritten notations on his clerk’s memo that make clear that Powell initially
believed the case was correctly decided below). However, Justice Blackmun changed his
position following oral argument, and Justice Powell, although still sympathetic, struggled to
find a theory he could endorse. See Blackmun, Drew Memo, supra, at 8; Powell, Drew Docket
Sheet supra, at 1–2. Ultimately, the Justices avoided the need to decide the case by dismissing
it as improvidently granted. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976)
(mem.) (per curiam); see infra notes 415–18 and accompanying text.
401. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Docket Sheet re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v.
Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 2 (Mar. 5, 1976) [hereinafter Blackmun, Drew Docket Sheet) (on
file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 223, Folder 1).
402. See Blackmun, Drew Docket Sheet, supra note 400, at 1–2; Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., Docket Sheet re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1–2
(undated) (on file with the Library of Congress in William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Box I:368,
Folder 6); Powell, Drew Docket Sheet, supra note 399, at 1–2; see also Blackmun, Drew
Memo, supra note 399, at 5–6 (making clear that Blackmun—although receptive to the
rational basis argument—was never receptive to the plaintiffs’ sex and race discrimination
arguments).
403. Powell, Drew Docket Sheet, supra note 399, at 1 (quoting Justice Powell’s
handwritten account of Chief Justice Burger’s expressed views); see also sources cited supra
note 401.
404. See sources cited supra note 402; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48
(1976). Although not attractive to the Justices, there does appear to have been a basis for
finding that the policy at issue in Drew was intentionally discriminatory. As the plaintiffs
noted in a supplemental brief, at the time the policy was implemented, faculty desegregation
had just been ordered in the district and the ranks of black teachers were in the process of
being decimated. See Drew Supplemental Brief of Respondents, supra note 324, at 2. Given
that moderate segregationists had long identified illegitimacy discrimination as a “neutral”
way of achieving segregationist goals, there are substantial reasons to think that the two were
not coincidental. See generally ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW
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despite the substantial ways in which the policy discriminated against
and stigmatized African American women and their nonmarital
children, few of the Justices were receptive to plaintiffs’ race, sex, and
illegitimacy discrimination arguments.405
Initially, it seemed that the plaintiff’s rational basis arguments
might—as they had in the courts below—fare better. A number of the
Court’s swing Justices were originally receptive to the argument that the
school district’s sweeping policy “was not tailored to serve a legitimate
state interest”406—and thus failed rational basis review.407 But, as the
proceedings wore on, two of the key swing Justices (Justices Blackmun
and Powell) became increasingly skeptical.408 As the counsel for the
school district repeatedly pointed out, the case “was not a class
action[.]”409 And thus, as Justice Blackmun observed in his notes, “the
rule is pe[rha]ps too broad, but n[ot] for t[he]se [plaintiffs.]”410 As such,

SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS
(2009) (making clear that even in the immediate aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,
moderate segregationists perceived, and sought to capitalize on, the potential of illegitimacy
based discrimination as a facially neutral way to achieve segregationist goals).
405. See sources cited supra notes 402–03. The Justices appear to have been even less
sympathetic to the fundamental rights arguments that plaintiffs and their amici raised. See
Blackmun, Drew Memo, supra note 399, at 1, 7 (omitting to address the privacy and
“procreative choice” issues raised by plaintiffs and amicus briefs); Powell Drew Docket Sheet,
supra note 399, at 1–2 (showing that none of the Justices—including those who thought Drew
should be affirmed—argued for the case to be decided on fundamental rights grounds); see
also sources cited supra note 401.
406. Powell, Drew Memo, supra note 399, at 1 (quote from Justice Powell’s handwritten
commentary on the front page of the preliminary memorandum concerning the Drew
Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews case).
407. See sources cited supra notes 399, 401. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens—three
of the Court’s swing Justices—were all initially inclined to affirm on rational basis grounds,
but by the Justices’ post-argument conference, only Justice Stevens remained convinced that
this was the proper approach. See sources cited supra notes 399, 401. As described infra, it
appears that Justice Blackmun, and perhaps Justice Powell, was swayed by defense counsel’s
arguments that even if the policy itself was generally irrational, it was not irrational as applied
to the specific plaintiffs (and the case was not a class action). See infra notes 408–09 and
accompanying text.
408. See infra notes 408–09 and accompanying text.
409. See, e.g., Drew Oral Argument, supra note 194, at 10:10.
410. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Notes to Self re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v.
Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1 (undated) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Box 223, Folder 1); see also Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Oral Argument
Notes re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1 (Mar. 3, 1976) (on file
with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 223, Folder 1) (making a
note of this part of the defendant’s oral arguments); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Oral
Argument Notes re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1 (Mar. 3,
1976) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers) (same).
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although a number of the Justices were uncomfortable with the policy,
key Justices also viewed the “analysis choice” as very “difficult.”411
Fortunately for the Justices, the contemporaneous412 issuance of
regulations under Title IX proscribing family status discrimination—as
well as other forms of employment qualifications having a disparate
impact on women—provided, as amici NEA noted, reason for the Court
to “dismiss [the] writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.”413 As the
NEA observed, and the United States would later echo, “the regulations
eliminate the need to decide the constitutional issues at bar,” as they
would likely invalidate the rule regardless of its constitutional stature.414
As such, both the NEA and the United States would urge the Justices to
dismiss the writ without reaching the plaintiffs’ complex constitutional
claims on the merits.415
As Serena Mayeri observes, “[t]he Justices greeted these invitations
to dismiss with palpable relief.”416 At conference in Drew, although the
Justices divided closely on the merits, they overwhelmingly agreed to
dismiss the case as improvidently granted (“DIG”).417 And, although at
least three Justices expressed some concern regarding a DIG—an
outcome which would allow the lower courts’ opinions to stand—even

411. See Powell, Drew Docket Sheet, supra note 399, at 2 (recording his own views
expressed at conference); see also MAYERI, supra note 86, at 163–64 (describing Blackmun’s
conflicted and evolving views on how to resolve Drew).
412. The Title IX regulations were issued shortly before certiorari was granted in Drew,
but apparently were not drawn to the Justices’ attention until after the grant. See
Memorandum from DM, law clerk, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun re: Drew Mun. Separate
Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1 (Apr. 26, 1976) (on file with the Library of Congress
in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 223, Folder 1) (“The petition was granted on October 6,
1975, but as far as I can tell from the papers the Court was never informed of the intervening
regulations . . . . Had these regulations been brought to the Court’s attention, it is extremely
unlikely that the Court would have taken the case.”).
413. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the National Education Association at 2, Drew Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 423 U.S. 820 (1975) (No. 74-1318); see also id. at 3 (describing
the Title IX rule).
414. See id. at 3 (arguing that the Title IX regulations “eliminate the need to decide the
constitutional issues at bar, and this Court should either dismiss the writ as improvidently
granted in light of the supervening change in law”); see also Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 1–6, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559
(1976) (mem.) (per curiam) (No. 74-1318) (making a similar point).
415. See sources cited supra notes 412–13.
416. MAYERI, supra note 86, at 165.
417. See sources cited supra note 401; see also Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger to the Conference re: Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1
(Mar. 8, 1976) (on file with the Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 223,
Folder 1) (noting he had recorded seven of nine Justices as being in favor of a dismissing the
case as improvidently granted as at least one alternative resolution at conference).
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they ultimately agreed to join the Court’s one-line dismissal.418 As such,
Drew ended in an anti-climactic denouement—with the Court allowing
the Fifth Circuit’s holding striking down the policy to stand, but without
any reasoning from the Court itself.419
As Mayeri further observes, this course of events “meant that
[Drew] would remain outside the . . . canon, little known even among
legal scholars.”420 Indeed, like King, Drew too would be essentially
forgotten from the constitutional canon, and thus too the rational basis
canon.421 Although the lower court opinions in Drew were arguably
quite exceptional—striking down a policy situated at the intersection of
a plethora of subordinated identities, including race, sex, poverty, and
illegitimacy—Drew and the rational basis theory it endorsed have rarely
been identified as a meaningful component of how intersectional
discrimination could be addressed.422 Instead, like King and other 1970s
cases in which the courts struck down intersectional discrimination
under rational basis review,423 Drew has, in large part, ultimately been
forgotten. And thus the canon has been constructed without a memory
of protected class rational basis review.
* * *
As in the case of race discrimination, the Supreme Court’s
avoidance of women’s rights litigators’ “protected class rational basis
review” arguments has largely erased the memory of protected class
rational basis litigation from our Supreme Court-centered canon. But if
the legal reasoning underlying feminist litigators’ efforts has been
forgotten, the impacts of those efforts have, to some extent, remained.424
For example, the successful efforts of feminist litigators to debunk the

418. See Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Byron White re: Drew
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, No. 74-1318, at 1 (Mar. 23, 1976) (on file with the
Library of Congress in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 223, Folder 1); see also Drew, 425
U.S. at 559 (dismissing the case as improvidently granted without dissent).
419. See Drew, 425 U.S. at 559 (including one line from the Court stating that the case was
being dismissed as improvidently granted without further explanation).
420. MAYERI, supra note 86, at 165. Here, Mayeri is referring to the feminist canon, but
her observation is equally applicable to the rational basis canon and the constitutional canon
generally.
421. With the notable exception of Serena Mayeri, who has extensively discussed Drew as
an intersectional precedent, resolved in the lower courts on rational basis review, there is
virtually no discussion of the potential of Drew’s rational basis approach to intersectional
discrimination. See MAYERI, supra note 86, at 165 (noting that Drew brought together
“opportunities for constitutional innovation” yet largely remains obscure, even among legal
scholars).
422. See id.
423. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
424. See sources cited infra notes 424–25 and accompanying text.
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rationality of disfavoring pregnancy (as compared to other temporary
disabilities) helped to spur the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which
today affords all employees, both public and private, the right to sue for
pregnancy discrimination.425 And, litigators ultimately succeeded in
directly persuading the courts that penalties based on nonmarital birth
status—so often used to penalize poor African American women—were
so irrational as to warrant presumptive unconstitutionality.426 Thus,
while the early protected class rational basis cases brought by sex
discrimination litigators were not an unqualified success, neither were
they without impact.
Moreover, protected class rational basis claims—as a basis for
arguments by sex equality advocates—never entirely disappeared. Even
as the memory of 1970s-era protected class rational basis cases was
forgotten, sex equality advocates would, more sporadically, continue to
challenge pregnancy discrimination, as well as educational and
employment practices having a disparate impact on women and girls on
rational basis review—at times succeeding.427 Part IV turns to a
discussion of the reasons why such claims—by both race and gender
litigators—became more difficult and less common after the 1970s, as
well as a review of the possibilities offered by the present moment for
revitalizing a renewed tradition of protected class rational basis review.
IV. THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROTECTED CLASS RATIONAL BASIS
REVIEW
Today, cases such as Washington v. Davis and Geduldig v. Aiello
are often understood as shutting down the potential of protected class
equal protection litigation. Conceptualized as bringing an end to an era
of expansive possibilities for constitutional race and sex discrimination
litigation, cases like Davis and Geduldig are widely considered to be the
425. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); see also sources cited supra note 36 and accompanying text.
426. See generally Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1 (discussing the way that
rational basis review paved the way for heightened scrutiny to be applied to illegitimacy
discrimination). Of course, this does not mean that this legal change has eradicated
discriminatory disfavor of nonmarital births. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm:
Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 352–53
(2011).
427. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1122–25 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that
the Marine Corps’ general rule pertaining to pregnancy was “overbroad and overly
restrictive”); Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 709 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding
that defendants could no longer award scholarships based on discriminatory educational
practices); Suarez v. Ill. Valley Cmty. Coll., 688 F. Supp. 376, 382 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(explaining that Geduldig should not be interpreted to mean that state officials may fire a
woman because she becomes pregnant under the equal protection clause).
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turning point at which the Supreme Court retreated to a narrow,
formalistic vision of what race and sex discrimination “is.”428 In this
telling, Davis and Geduldig are often characterized as virtually
impenetrable barriers, foreclosing the types of claims of race (disparate
impact) and gender (pregnancy) discrimination that the plaintiffs in
those cases put forward.429
There is certainly some truth to this traditional account. But as the
foregoing discussion suggests, the legacy of cases like Davis and
Geduldig is also far more complicated than it might initially appear.
Davis and Geduldig were only a small part of a wider tradition of
litigating at the margins of constitutional sex and race discrimination—a
tradition that had substantially and successfully adopted rational basis
review. And, while certain parts of this tradition of litigating at the
margins were clearly eviscerated by Davis and Geduldig, the tradition’s
rational basis arguments were not so obviously affected. Indeed,
precisely because the Court sidestepped advocates’ protected class
rational basis arguments throughout the 1970s, the potential for such
claims continued to exist—even after canonical cases like Davis and
Geduldig were decided.
This is not to suggest that cases like Davis and Geduldig had no
effect on the tradition of protected class rational basis review. Indeed,
Davis and Geduldig did impact judges’ perceptions of which protected
class rational basis arguments could be successful, drawing courts back
from the most expansive visions of what protected class rational basis
review might entail.430 But many judges also continued to perceive
428. See, e.g., Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1785 &
n.17 (2012) (noting that “[t]he overwhelming consensus among constitutional scholars is that
Davis is the source of today’s failed [equal protection] doctrine, insofar as it required direct
proof regarding the minds of government actors[,]” but arguing that the turning point instead
came later in the decade with Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979)).
429. See supra notes 15, 183, 317 and accompanying text.
430. The internal deliberations that followed Washington v. Davis in United States v. North
Carolina (where the three-judge district court originally invalidated North Carolina’s use of
the NTE on rational basis grounds) provide an illustration of how ambiguous Washington v.
Davis’s impact was, even to those who had embraced protected class rational basis arguments.
See United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975), vacated by 425 F.
Supp. 789 (E.D.N.C. 1977). Thus, Judge J. Braxton Craven originally expressed the view that
“Washington does not destroy the ground of decision [for United States v. North Carolina],
which was that a test not shown to relate at all to teaching capacity is irrationally and
arbitrarily required and, therefore, unconstitutional under Fourteenth Amendment minimal
scrutiny.” See Letter from Judge J. Braxton Craven, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, to Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., U.S. District Court for the E. Dist. of
N.C., & Judge Franklin T. Dupree, Jr., U.S. District Court for the E. Dist. of N.C., re: United
States v. North Carolina, No. 4476, at 1 (June 28, 1976) (on file with the Duke University
David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library in James Braxton Craven Collection,
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protected class rational basis arguments as potentially viable after Davis
and Geduldig, and indeed continued to make findings for plaintiffs even
in the precise contexts that those cases addressed (disparate impact and
pregnancy discrimination, respectively).431 As such, Davis and Geduldig
were not, in their immediate aftermath, perceived as the immovable
obstacles to race and gender justice claims that they are often
characterized as today.432
Rather, the retreat of protected class rational basis claims seems to
have been driven far more by the general retrenchment of the 1970s-era
standards of meaningful rational basis review. As sex and illegitimacy
came to be canonized within the heightened tiers, the cases that had
formed the foundation of the 1970s rational basis revolution—cases like
Reed v. Reed and Weber v. Aetna—were gradually stripped from the
rational basis canon and reimagined as mere stepping stones to
heightened scrutiny.433 Incentives for race and gender justice litigators
also shifted, as a changing legal backdrop encouraged arguments that
minimized the power of rational basis review and emphasized other
avenues of legal argumentation.434 Ultimately, protected class rational
Box 266). However, by the fall, he would become persuaded that Davis in fact fatally
undermined the United States v. North Carolina court’s reasoning, in part because the Court
had adopted “the Title 7 test of job relatedness” as the rational basis standard. See Letter
from Judge J. Braxton Craven, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to Chief
Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., U.S. District Court for the E. Dist. of N.C., & Judge
Franklin T. Dupree, Jr. U.S. District Court for the E. Dist. of N.C., re: United States v. North
Carolina, No. 4476, at 1 (Oct. 1, 1976) (on file with the Duke University David M. Rubenstein
Rare Book & Manuscript Library in James Braxton Craven Collection, Box 266). Ultimately,
the judges would decide to reopen the case for further proceedings on the basis of Davis,
finding that it undermined a number of the key assumptions of the prior opinion. See United
States v. North Carolina, 425 F. Supp. 789, 792–94 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
431. See sources cited supra note 429; see also Cook v. Arentzen, 14 Fair. Emp. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1643, 1977 WL 4327, at *3 (4th Cir. May 6, 1977) (invalidating pregnancy
discrimination on rational basis review), vacated, 582 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1978); Crawford, 531
F.2d at 1121–24 (same); cf. Beazer v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1977)
(affirming invalidation of a policy having a racially disparate impact on rational basis review),
rev’d, 440 U.S. 568, 588–94 (1979) (concluding that the policy had a rational basis).
432. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 430 (citing sources demonstrating the understanding
of Davis and Geduldig in their immediate aftermath); sources cited supra note 317 and
accompanying text (describing a modern understanding of Geduldig).
433. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (describing this turn away from robust
rational basis formulations).
434. These forces were complicated and included a number of simultaneous changes in the
legal context within which advocates were litigating. Among the most important was the
canonization of sex as subject to intermediate scrutiny, a development which encouraged legal
observers to retrospectively recharacterize cases like Reed and Weber as outside the rational
basis canon, while also providing strong incentives for sex discrimination litigators to
emphasize intermediate scrutiny’s comparative strength—a move most easily made by
drawing unfavorable comparisons to the rational basis standard. See supra Part I; see also, e.g.,
Amicus Brief of Nancy Mellette in Support of Petitioner United States of America, United
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basis claims would follow the trajectory of broader trends away from
robust rational basis review, significantly declining (although never
entirely disappearing)435 as a deferential vision of rational basis review
again became more dominant.436
Today, there are reasons to believe that protected class rational
basis review may once again hold real potential. Rational basis review
has begun to expand again generally, retreating from the ultradeferential formulation that became common in the 1990s and early
2000s.437 As in the 1970s, this movement has been driven largely by a
particular group’s claims to equality—in the 1970s, the women’s rights

States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), 1995 WL 703385, at *19–21
(contrasting rational basis review unfavorably with the sex discrimination standard). Many
within the women’s rights movement had from early on been comparatively unenthusiastic
about—or indeed, even hostile to—rational basis arguments for sex equality, a backdrop that
no doubt encouraged this trend. See, e.g., Letter from Melvin L. Wulf, Legal Dir., ACLU, to
Norman Redlich, Office of the Corp. Counsel, N.Y.C., re: Reed v. Reed, No. 70-4, at 1 (July 1,
1971) (on file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library in ACLU
Collection, Boxes 1654–55) (criticizing the Corporation Counsel’s office for altering the city’s
amicus brief in Reed v. Reed to list its rational basis argument first); Letter from Melvin L.
Wulf, Legal Dir., ACLU, to Allen R. Derr re: Reed v. Reed, No. 70-4, at 1 (Dec. 20, 1971) (on
file with Princeton University Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library in ACLU Collection,
Boxes 1654–55) (criticizing the attorney who argued Reed, and characterizing the resulting
rational basis opinion as “bland and very narrow”). The amendment of Title VII to extend to
public employers—and the enduring campaign by certain Justices of the Supreme Court to
weaken its disparate impact standards—also encouraged racial justice litigators to use rational
basis review as a point of comparison to disparate impact’s burden on employers, with
rational basis review being characterized as the weaker of the two standards. See, e.g., Nat’l
Educ. Ass’n v. South Carolina Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 162, at 25–26 (declining to
make the rational basis argument, and instead arguing that Title VII’s disparate impact
standards applied to an NTE case, and demanded a higher standard than rational basis
review).
435. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 831 F. Supp. 824, 825–28 (M.D. Ala.
1993); Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 709 F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Suarez v. Ill.
Valley Cmty. Coll., 688 F. Supp. 376, 382 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also cases cited supra note
430 (citing protected class rational basis review cases in the immediate aftermath of Davis and
Geduldig); cases cited infra note 438 (listing recent cases applying a protected class rational
basis approach).
436. The case proceedings in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 399 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), supplemented by 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 97
(2d Cir. 1977), rev’d, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), arguably provide a good example of this shift. In
Beazer, the district court invalidated an employment policy of absolutely prohibiting
methadone users from seeking employment with the transit authority—a policy having a
racially disparate impact—on rational basis grounds, see id. at 1036. The Second Circuit
affirmed Beazer post-Washington v. Davis, finding that the rational basis holding of the
District Court was supported. See Beazer, 558 F.2d at 99. But by the time Beazer reached the
Supreme Court, cases like Reed were increasingly being situated outside the rational basis
canon, and thus, the Second Circuit’s rational basis holding persuaded only a few Justices. See
N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
437. See supra Part I.
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movement, and today, the LGBT rights movement.438 But, like in the
1970s, the Supreme Court’s failure to cabin or clarify its reasoning has
opened up possibilities for other groups who wish to make rational basis
claims—possibilities that are increasingly being realized, especially in
the lower and state courts.439
This is not to suggest that rational basis review is likely to form a
panacea for the limits of contemporary race and gender justice litigation.
Even at its height in the 1970s, protected class rational basis review was
not successful in all circumstances—where government actors did the
work of identifying and proving a real connection between
governmental interests and actions, they often prevailed.440 Moreover,
the move toward robust rational basis review generally is—as of yet—
neither as capacious, nor as widespread, today as the movement of four
decades ago.441 As such, there is little reason to believe that we will see

438. See supra Part I.
439. See supra Part I; see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1065–67
(9th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Arizona policy refusing to provide drivers’ licenses to DACA
recipients on rational basis review), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1180 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2017);
Bush v. City of Utica, 558 F. App’x. 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that discrimination
against residents living in low-income neighborhood in providing emergency services lacked a
rational basis under equal protection clause); United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 671–75
(6th Cir. 2013) (Cole, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fair Sentencing Act should be applied
to offenders sentenced before its enactment, and that the failure to do so was unconstitutional
in view of the lack of rational basis for the crack/cocaine disparity); United States v. Byars,
No. 8:10CR50, 2011 WL 344603, at *11 (D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2011) (holding continued application
of the crack/cocaine disparity to cases where the criminal conduct preceded enactment of the
Fair Sentencing Act was “arbitrary and irrational” and in violation of both the equal
protection and due process clauses); Mason v. Granholm, No. 05-73943, 2007 WL 201008, at
*3–4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2007) (invalidating an amendment to the state civil rights law that
barred suits by prisoners on the basis of rational basis review).
440. See, e.g., supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text (discussing how South Carolina’s
decision to enlist ETS to validate their use of the NTE led to a different result on litigants’
rational basis claims). Yet it is striking how often, despite this fact, government actors lost.
Indeed, as discussed infra, arguably the power of protected class rational basis review is
precisely in its ability to lay bare just how weak and unjustified the governmental reasons
often are for the severe burdens routinely imposed on minority groups by the operation of
ostensibly neutral laws. See infra notes 450–57 and accompanying text.
441. At its height in the 1970s, Reed was regularly cited by the lower courts outside of the
sex discrimination context, often in cases resulting in constitutional invalidation. See, e.g.,
Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 564 n.140 (documenting that Reed was cited
in contexts other than traditional sex discrimination matters sixty-eight times in the two years
from 1974 to 1975, and that the plaintiff prevailed in forty of those cases). Although today
plaintiffs are beginning to have significantly greater success using the LGBT cases in other,
non-LGBT contexts, see, for example, cases cited supra note 31, the trend is not yet as robust
as it was in the 1970s. See supra Part I.
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an immediate or sweeping reversal of the decades of retrenchment in
constitutional race and gender justice litigation.442
And yet, there are many reasons for believing that—to the extent
that equal protection litigation could hold renewed relevance in the fight
for equality rights for minority communities and women today—it will
be, if anything, on rational basis review.443 Today, a realistic perspective
suggests that many if not most of the important issues of race and gender
justice litigation will not in fact be litigated under heightened scrutiny.444
Issues such as felon disenfranchisement laws, the crack/cocaine
sentencing disparity, and cuts to social welfare programs (programs that
are disproportionately relied upon by women)445 have all been regularly
found by the courts not to trigger heightened scrutiny.446 Indeed, the
overwhelming majority of the key issues of importance to the race and
gender justice communities today are ones that are unlikely to fit within

442. It is also the case that some of the successful uses of protected class rational basis
review in the 1970s addressed practices that had strong overtones of intentional
discrimination, perhaps making them more susceptible to constitutional invalidation
generally. See, e.g., supra Section II.B (describing the racially discriminatory origins of the
NTE requirements challenged by litigants using rational basis review in the 1970s). However,
some contemporary practices certainly bear comparable indicia of intentional discrimination
to those challenged in the 1970s. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,
831 F.3d 204, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2016) (detailing the evidentiary basis for concluding that North
Carolina’s omnibus legislation imposing a voter ID requirement and limiting other voting
practices disproportionately used by African Americans was intentionally discriminatory),
petition for cert. filed, No. 16-833 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2016). More importantly, this fact, if true,
simply further emphasizes the importance of meaningful rational basis review, as those cases
unable to make a showing of intentional discrimination will necessarily be relegated to
rational basis review.
443. Cf. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 898
(2012) (observing that “the vast majority of equal protection claims [including those of
minorities] will be subject only to rational basis review”).
444. But cf. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 831 F.3d at 214 (concluding that North
Carolina’s omnibus law regulating a variety of voting practices was enacted with racially
discriminatory intent, and invalidating it on that basis).
445. See, e.g., Rich Morin, The Politics and Demographics of Food Stamp Recipients, PEW
RES. CTR. (July 12, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/12/the-politics-anddemographics-of-food-stamp-recipients/ [https://perma.cc/TCG5-937C] (noting that
women are approximately twice as likely as men to receive food stamps at some point during
their lifetime).
446. See Marion Buckley, Eliminating the Per-Child Allotment in the AFDC Program, 13
LAW & INEQ. 169, 194 (1994) (welfare); Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the
Equal Protection Clause: Why the Definition of “Equal” Requires a Disproportionate Impact
Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85,
125 (2002) (crack/cocaine disparity); Thomas G. Varnum, Let’s Not Jump to Conclusions:
Approaching Felon Disenfranchisement Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act, 14 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 109, 119 (2008) (felon disenfranchisement).
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the narrow constraints of what most judges are willing to “see” as
discrimination.447
Against such a backdrop, it is vital to find ways to nevertheless push
forward our national constitutional conversation surrounding race and
gender justice. As Michael Waterstone recently put it in a different
context,
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment . . . by definition goes . . . to the
heart of a group’s claim for full citizenship under our nation’s
governing charter. It is the Constitution that is our “basic law”
(setting a framework of governance), our “higher law” (setting the
values to which the country aspires), and “ ‘our law’—an object of
attachment that Americans see as the product of their collective
efforts as a people.”448
Or as Charles Lawrence, III, put it nearly thirty years ago, “[b]lacks and
other historically stigmatized and excluded groups have no small stake
in the promotion of an explicitly normative [constitutional] debate.”449
To the extent that constitutional dialog serves as the mechanism for
working out our national normative commitments, finding a way in
which to generate such dialog—in spite of doctrinal constraints—should
be seen as a real and vital objective.450
Protected class rational basis review may provide just such a way to
revitalize our stalled constitutional discourse around race and gender.
Today, one of the principal obstacles to race and gender justice is the
widely shared belief that the contemporary architecture of race and
gender subordination is neutral, rational, and justified.451 It strikes many
447. See generally Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2012) (describing evidence
suggesting that American belief systems regularly and predictably direct adjudicators away
from findings of discrimination); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:
An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1360 (2011)
(“[T]oday, the Court’s race discrimination cases are almost exclusively brought by white
plaintiffs invoking doctrines of strict scrutiny to challenge civil rights laws.”).
448. Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 557 (2014)
(quoting JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 239 (2011)).
449. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 386 (1987).
450. A number of other scholars have also recently articulated the urgency of restarting
our stalled constitutional dialog with respect to race. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 29, at 91–94;
see also Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Essay, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1665–66
(2015). But cf. Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, 5
CONST. COMMENT. 375, 380–81 (1988) (expressing skepticism regarding whether interbranch
constitutional dialogue promotes improved dialog or decision making).
451. See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1575 (2011); cf. TANEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 111 (2015) (“The killing fields of Chicago,
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as common sense that we disenfranchise and discriminate against felons,
that we require voter identification, and that schools and workplaces are
structured around a strict full-time face time norm that is unrealistic for
many parents, especially mothers.452 Certainly, not all of the work of
undermining these assumptions of rationality will be done through
constitutional litigation, much less rational basis review—but rational
basis, by probing the thin underpinnings on which many racially and
gender-impactful laws rest, may afford a rare opportunity to
denaturalize and problematize widely shared assumptions about their
justified nature.453
Importantly, such an inquiry need not and should not entail the
erasure of considerations of race and gender subordination from the
constitutional conversation. Many if not most cases involving protected
class rational basis arguments will continue to involve the presentation
of evidence of intentional race and/or gender discrimination—even if
such evidence does not ultimately persuade the court.454 Moreover, there
of Baltimore, of Detroit, were created by the policy of Dreamers, but their weight, their
shame, rests solely upon those who are dying in them. There is a great deception in this.”).
452. See, e.g., Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 36–46 (2005) (describing the presumptions
by judges that “full-time face-time” norms are a natural and essential component of work,
thus causing disparate impact claims by women—often relating to their status as mothers—to
fail); Ken Paxton, Opinion: Texans Want Reasonable Voter ID, CALLER TIMES (Corpus
Christi), Sept. 14, 2016, at 6A (asserting that voter ID is a common sense measure to ensure
integrity in voting); Sheila Rayam, Opinion: Felon Vote Is Pandering at Its Finest, DEMOCRAT
& CHRONICLE (Rochester), Apr. 28, 2016, at A13, 2016 WLNR 12903495 (arguing that it is
common sense that felons should not be allowed to vote).
453. Cf. Siegel, supra note 29, at 91 (“By unsettling judgments about legitimacy, equality
law can amplify the voices of those who challenge tradition, even as it encourages inequality
to assume new forms.”).
454. See generally cases cited supra note 94 (showing cases often including extensive
discussion of evidence of race discrimination, despite ultimately resolving the case on rational
basis review); cases cited supra notes 260, 327 (same, in the sex discrimination context). To be
clear, the recommendation is not to substitute rational basis claims for claims of race or sex
discrimination, and indeed, historically litigators have typically brought both. See, e.g., supra
note 93 and accompanying text. Of course, there is also the possibility that courts will rely on
rational basis review to avoid making findings of discrimination where they otherwise would
do so. Such an outcome might secure relief in an individual circumstance, but would no doubt
be undesirable from the perspective of anti-discrimination advocacy. See generally Charlotte
S. Alexander, Zev J. Eigen & Camille Gear Rich, Post Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden
Dangers of the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 41–53 (2016) (describing the potential
risks of substituting universalist claims for anti-discrimination claims). However, given the
extreme reluctance of contemporary adjudicators to make findings of constitutional race and
sex discrimination, it is not clear that the risks outweigh the potential benefits (especially if, as
they have traditionally been, such claims are supplementary, and not substituted for
affirmative race or sex discrimination claims). See supra note 446 and accompanying text;
infra note 496 and accompanying text. Moreover, it appears that protected class rational basis
review claims may pave the way for constitutional actors to be able to see race and gender
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are obvious and compelling connections between the lack of justification
for a racially impactful law and its promotion of racial injustice—
connections that at least the lower courts have not traditionally
struggled to see.455 Indeed, protected class rational basis review has—
when successful—often provided a forum for conversations that are
otherwise extraordinarily rare in equal protection litigation regarding
the taken-for-granted harms caused to minority communities by
“common sense,” but ultimately unsupported, laws.456
One need not stretch one’s imagination far to imagine the potential
of such a dialog to meaningfully transform our constitutional
conversation around race and sex. Just as robust rational basis review of
the reasons for same-sex marriage bans ultimately stripped those bans of
injustice precisely because racially or gender-impactful laws are no longer viewed as justified
by important neutral government interests. See, e.g., infra notes 464–72 and accompanying
text (showing how the undermining of the rationality of the reasons for the crack/cocaine
disparity has led to widespread acknowledgment by public figures that it is racially
discriminatory). Thus, it is not clear that protected class rational basis claims should be seen as
in competition with direct race and gender justice findings; rather they may in some
circumstances be a necessary precursor to such findings.
455. There is a fairly striking divide between the lower courts and the Supreme Court in
the historical willingness to engage with race and gender justice issues in the context of the
adjudication of protected class rational basis claims. See generally supra Parts II–III
(describing the widespread success of gender and racial justice claims on rational basis review
in the lower courts, and the tendency of the Supreme Court to instead avoid adjudicating such
arguments). As described, see infra notes 459–63 and accompanying text, there are compelling
reasons to believe that a protected class rational basis strategy has the greatest potential in the
context of the lower and state courts—the arenas in which the vast majority of constitutional
litigation is actually resolved, see, e.g., Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular
Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971, 987–88 (2010) (describing
research by Seth Kreimer which found that in one year, federal trial courts decided about 330
challenges to the constitutionality of statutes). Note that certain variants of the ways that the
lower courts reasoned about this issue are no doubt foreclosed by Washington v. Davis. In
particular, triggering of Title VII standards on the basis of a showing of racial impact—one
popular approach to protected class rational basis review in the 1970s—is clearly no longer
the law. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 166. But this was only one of the many ways that
the courts have approached this issue. See generally supra Parts II–III (describing a variety of
different ways that the courts applied rational basis review to racial justice and gender justice
claims).
456. See sources cited supra note 453. One might argue that the issues of today are less
obvious in their racial targeting than, for example, the early testing requirements discussed,
see supra Section III.A, and thus that judges might today be less likely to recognize their
interconnections with racial justice or address them meaningfully on rational basis review. But
even in the 1970s, there were real debates about whether teacher testing requirements were
imposed for intentionally discriminatory purposes—just as conversely, today, there are real
reasons to think many laws with a racially disparate impact were enacted at least in part
because of the race of those they affect. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v.
McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-833 (U.S. Dec. 30,
2016). Moreover, in modern situations in which courts have relied on protected class rational
basis review, such as the crack/cocaine disparity, they have not struggled to see these
connections. See infra notes 464–72 and accompanying text.
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their public legitimacy, so too demanding a real accounting of the
reasons for racially and gender-impactful laws may hold the seeds of
such laws’ delegitimation.457 And such delegitimation is a necessary step
if we are to create the type of empathy that lies at the heart of any real
contemporary race or gender justice reform.458 It is only by undermining
the sense of justification—and, in certain contexts, urgency—that the
American public feel about maintaining contemporary structures of
systemic oppression that we can hope to take steps toward real reform.
To be clear, such a strategy would likely not entail the Supreme
Court-centric approach that most constitutional law teachers and
scholars embrace.459 As delineated above, the Supreme Court has never
been the primary forum for successful protected class rational basis
claims, and there are few reasons for believing that it would be the
primary forum for such efforts today.460 Rather, it is the lower federal
457. See, e.g., Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 29, at 300–01 (noting that “[t]he strategy
worked” in same-sex marriage cases of “push[ing] hard on the irrationality point and
demand[ing] open and transparent reasons for the laws”); Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1, at
26–28, 41–43 (describing how back-end rational basis review, finding marriage bans to be
irrational, paved the way for the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Obergefell); see also
Mary Bonauto, 27th Annual State Constitutional Law Lecture, Rutgers Law School (Feb. 2,
2016) (noting that LGBT rights advocates—even in the early state court marriage ban
challenges—presented strong rational basis arguments, because they wanted the courts to see
and address the irrationality of the reasons for bans on same-sex marriage). This is not meant
to reduce the decades-long campaign for same-sex marriage to this single discursive move.
Evidently, a wide array of factors have influenced the success of the marriage movement,
including, many would argue, the increased visibility of LGBT people themselves. See, e.g.,
Radhika Rao, Selective Reduction: “A Soft Cover for Hard Choices” or Another Name for
Abortion?, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 203 (2015) (suggesting that “[t]he increased visibility
of LGBT families may have prompted a transformation in the perceptions of homosexuality
in our society and furthered the movement for marriage equality” (citation omitted)). But as
scholars such as Kenji Yoshino have suggested, there has also been a unique power in putting
“on trial” the arguments of marriage equality opponents. See KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW:
MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL 7–8 (2015). See generally Jeremy Byellin, Same-Sex
Marriage in the States Since Windsor, Part 1, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (June 11, 2014), http://
blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/top-legal-news/sex-marriage-states-since-windsorpart-1/ [https://perma.cc/VAS3-9NCV] (describing several of the decisions that followed
Windsor, invalidating state bans on same-sex marriage on rational basis review).
458. Cf. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 244 (rev. ed. 2012) (“Seeing race is not the problem. Refusing to
care for the people we see is the problem.”).
459. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of
Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1002–03 (1998) (noting that “[a]lthough much
important constitutional law is decided in circuit and district courts, constitutional law
casebooks tend to emphasize only the Supreme Court’s decisions[,]” and more broadly
critiquing the Supreme Court-centric nature of the constitutional canon (citation omitted)).
See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (making a similar observation specifically with
respect to rational basis review).
460. See supra Parts II–III. One need only look at the key swing vote at this juncture—
Justice Kennedy—to be pessimistic about the Court’s willingness to embrace an expansive
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courts—and their state court counterparts—that hold real promise as
sites of protected class rational basis review.461 Empowered by the
Supreme Court’s renewed willingness to invalidate laws outside of the
heightened tiers462—and by the “durable doctrinal confusion”463 that has
characterized equal protection’s minimum tier review—there are myriad
and multi-sited opportunities today for advocates to invite judges to take
seriously their role in evaluating the constitutional stature of
contemporary race and gender injustice. And in a constitutional system
like ours, in which constitutional discourse—and ultimately
constitutional law—is built out across a diverse collection of public,
political, judicial, and social movement actors, such contributions,
whatever their source, matter.464
Indeed, the dramatic reduction of the crack/cocaine sentencing
disparity in recent years shows precisely the potential of this type of
multi-sited (and even ultimately unsuccessful) judicial action.465 Even in
constitutional jurisprudence benefitting women and racial minorities, regardless of its
doctrinal framing. See Robinson, supra note 24, at 199–200 (describing Justice Kennedy’s
comparatively discouraging voting record on cases involving race and sex discrimination).
461. State courts provide an especially intriguing area of opportunity, given the ability of
state courts to differentiate their state constitutional standards of rational basis review. See,
e.g., Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dep’t of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 171 P.3d 1110,
1124 (Alaska 2007) (“[U]nder Alaska’s equal protection clause, we do subject legislation to a
more exacting inquiry than under the federal rational basis test . . . .”); see also State v.
Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (finding Minnesota’s crack/cocaine disparity
unconstitutional on rational basis review under the state constitution).
462. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (striking down federal
law whose “principal purpose is to impose inequality”—not relying on heightened scrutiny);
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (“Our cases have
recognized successful equal protection claims . . . where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.” (citation omitted)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996) (holding that a Colorado constitutional amendment barring the treatment of LGBT
individuals as a protected class failed rational basis review).
463. See Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action
Doctrine, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 611–25 (2016) (naming, and describing, the phenomenon
of “durable doctrinal confusion[,]” and suggesting there may be a “beneficial generative
impact of doctrinal confusion on constitutional development”).
464. On the issue of the role that the lower courts and state courts may or should play in
the development of popular constitutional understandings, and ultimately constitutional law,
see generally Aronson, supra note 454 (describing constitutional practice in the lower courts
and suggesting “inferiorizing” judicial review in order to enhance popular constitutional
participation); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE
197 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/lower-court-popular-constitutionalism
[https://perma.cc/XE85-ZFBX] (developing a descriptive theory of how the lower courts may
be unique as agents of popular constitutionalism); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010) (describing how state judicial
elections can and have served as vehicles of popular constitutionalism).
465. See infra notes 465–72 and accompanying text. As described, see infra note 465, not all
of these cases were successful as litigation—in some, judges expressing the view that the
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an era when rational basis review was generally taken to be thin and
permissive, lower and state courts occasionally interrogated the
crack/cocaine disparity on constitutional grounds, finding its premises
woefully unjustified, and emphasizing the devastating and troubling
effects of its racially disparate impacts.466 Over time, these decisions
helped to build a public—and ultimately congressional—consensus
around the notion that the disparity was irrational and racially harmful,
which ultimately led to a dramatic reduction in the disparity ratio (and
may lead to its elimination).467 Through this long process, racial justice
crack/cocaine disparity lacked a rational basis were overruled, or were in dissent, or felt
themselves bound by circuit precedent to nonetheless affirm the law. However, as described,
see infra notes 466–72 and accompanying text, even this discourse appears to have helped to
delegitimize and ultimately largely dismantle the crack/cocaine disparity.
466. See, e.g., Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888–91; see also United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220,
1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., concurring) (concurring because bound by circuit precedent,
but arguing that “[n]either this record nor the ones on prior occasions support the view that
Congress had a sound basis to make the harsh distinction between powder and crack
cocaine”); United States v. Burroughs, 897 F. Supp. 205, 213 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that
if it were addressing the issue de novo—not under the weight of circuit precedent—“it might
well have declared the sentencing scheme to be unconstitutional under rational review”); cf.
United States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065, 1067–71 (3d Cir. 1995) (overruling district court decision
that had departed from crack mandatory minimum based on the district court’s conclusion
that the crack/cocaine disparity was “arbitrary and capricious”); United States v. Clary, 846 F.
Supp. 768, 796–97 (E.D. Mo.) (concluding that the crack/cocaine disparity was racially
discriminatory and “arbitrary and irrational”), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Majied, No. 8:CR91-00038(02), 1993 WL 315987, at *4–5 (D. Neb. July 29, 1993) (rejecting
constitutional challenge based on circuit precedent, but departing downward based on racial
impact and thin factual underpinnings), aff’d in part and vacated in part sub nom. United
States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389 (8th Cir. 1994).
467. The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the issue
of whether the crack/cocaine disparity was justified was issued almost exactly a year after the
Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Russell became the first court to strike down a
crack/cocaine disparate sentencing law on rational basis review. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at
888–91; Issue for Comment, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,851, 62,851 (Dec. 31, 1992). The report and
recommendations issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission several years later (which
embraced some of Russell’s arguments) would help fuel a multi-year series of congressional
efforts to eliminate or reduce the crack/cocaine disparity—efforts that ultimately succeeded in
significantly reducing the disparity. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124
Stat. 2372, 2372 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2012)); U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, Notice, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60
Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,076–77 (May 10, 1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 7–8 (1995); see also United
States v. Byars, No. 8:10CR50, 2011 WL 344603, at *3–4 (D. Neb. Feb. 1, 2011) (describing the
origins of the Fair Sentencing Act). Since that time, a number of decisions in the lower federal
courts have continued to question the remaining disparity, as well as the lack of full
retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act, often deploying rational basis review. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 666–68, 670–71, 673–75, 680–85, 696–98 (6th Cir. 2013)
(en banc) (various concurring and dissenting opinions); Byars, 2011 WL 344603, at *11. In the
last several years, there have been multiple bills introduced in Congress that would further
reduce or eliminate the disparity entirely, or make the Fair Sentencing Act fully retroactive.
See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 3713, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2015); Fairness in
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perspectives on the crack/cocaine disparity—long articulated by racial
justice organizations, but once widely characterized as unjustified—have
become a part of and even dominant in the mainstream discourse.468
It is hard to overstate the extent of this shift. In 1991, when the
Minnesota Supreme Court struck down its state’s crack/cocaine
sentencing disparity on rational basis review, its arguments, adopted
from racial justice advocates, were far from the legal and political
mainstream.469 Thus, the notion that the disparity was irrational—resting
on unsupported assertions of crack’s unique dangerousness and spillover
effects, and having devastating impacts on African Americans—was
rejected by many leading politicians as deeply erroneous, and indeed
dangerous.470 And yet by 2007, opinions regarding the veracity of the
arguments underpinning the disparity had shifted sufficiently such that
then-presidential candidate Barack Obama could make a campaign
promise to end the disparity, contending that no “real difference”
between crack and cocaine existed, except “the skin color of the people
using them.”471 In the legislative action that followed, political leaders in
Congress—some of whom voted for the initial federal disparity—
similarly disparaged the thin underpinnings of the disparity, recognizing
the unsupported and racially devastating impact of the law.472 Thus,
protected class rational basis review helped—over the course of twenty
years—to create the space for a nearly complete reversal of public

Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2015, H.R. 1255, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Mandatory
Minimum Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 3530, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
468. This can be seen most strikingly in the contrast between the disfavor with which a
majority of Congress greeted the rationales behind the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s original
recommendations to eliminate the disparity in 1995, see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-272, at 2–3
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 335–36; see also United States v. Lewis, 90 F.3d
302, 305 (8th Cir. 1996), as compared to the wide acceptance of such arguments in public
discourse today, see, e.g., Blewett, 746 F.3d at 672–73 (Cole, J., dissenting) (quoting
contemporary leadership endorsing rationales); id. at 677–80 (Clay, J., dissenting) (same);
Byars, 2011 WL 344603, at *4–6 (same).
469. See sources cited supra note 467 (making clear that many leading political figures in
Congress, as well as then-President Clinton, continued as late as 1995 to adhere to the view
that crack was uniquely dangerous and that this dangerousness demanded heavier sanctions
than powder cocaine).
470. See supra note 468 and accompanying text.
471. See Barack Obama, XLIV President of the United States: 2009–2017, Remarks at the
Howard University Convocation in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77014&st=&st1= [https://perma.cc/6R87-N8D2] (promising to
eliminate the crack/cocaine disparity).
472. See sources cited supra note 467 (quoting numerous statements by legislators—
including some who enacted the original disparity—embracing the notion that justifications
for the crack/cocaine disparity lacked veracity, and that the disparity had discriminatory racial
effects).

95 N.C. L. REV. 975 (2017)

2017]

PROTECTED RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

1063

perceptions regarding the fairness and necessity of the crack/cocaine
disparity.473
Similar dynamics can be seen in the historical protected class
rational basis review struggles recounted herein. Even where the
protected class rational basis litigation efforts of race and gender justice
litigators ultimately culminated in an unfavorable or anticlimactic
Supreme Court decision, many such efforts also resulted in durable
shifts in perceptions of the fairness and equality stakes of the practices
that they challenged.474 Thus, by the time the Court extended Geduldig’s
holding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination to Title
VII in 1976 in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,475 Congress quickly
responded by amending Title VII to proscribe pregnancy discrimination
against both public and private employees.476 Similarly, although rational
basis challenges to the NTE ultimately experienced an anticlimactic
denouement in the Supreme Court, ETS (the test’s maker) later
removed the test from the market, in recognition of widespread criticism
of its limited assessment value and racially biased results.477 Thus, the
process of undermining the legitimacy of racially and gender-impactful
practices—a process that protected class rational basis review uniquely
promotes—can have and, in fact, has had lasting legal and practical
impacts, even absent Supreme Court endorsement or review.
Such a messy long-range approach to addressing the equality issues
of today may seem unsatisfying and inadequate to address the urgency
of the contemporary racial and gender justice task. But realistically, this
is how constitutional change operates, even when it ultimately
culminates in a Supreme Court decision. The arrival of marriage

473. Judges’ willingness to interrogate the crack/cocaine disparity’s rationality no doubt is
not the only force behind this shift, which has been driven by vigorous and continuing social
movement efforts against mass incarceration. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Take Action,
NEW JIM CROW, http://newjimcrow.com/take-action [https://perma.cc/N8CF-JVEP]
(describing a host of social movement organizations dedicated to acting to end mass
incarceration and to ameliorate its consequences). However, the timing of certain events
(including, for example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s initial questioning of the disparity)
strongly suggests that such decisions have helped imbue social movement arguments with
increased legitimacy, opening space for the penetration of such ideas into mainstream
constitutional and political discourse. See generally supra note 466 and accompanying text
(describing the sequence of events leading to the Fair Sentencing Act). For a more extended
discussion of the ways that rational basis review may facilitate constitutional change in
conversation with the political branches, see generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1.
474. See infra notes 475–76 and accompanying text.
475. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
476. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
477. See, e.g., NYC Teachers Protest Exam, supra note 165.
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equality in Obergefell v. Hodges478 appears rapid to many—but in fact
the first challenges to same-sex marriage bans were heard in the 1970s,
nearly fifty years ago.479 Brown v. Board of Education followed decades
of litigation and social change, and itself precipitated decades more of
litigation over its enforcement.480 Constitutional change is deeply
entwined with constitutional culture, and changing constitutional culture
takes time.481 What we begin today through protected class rational basis
review may bear fruit only during a subsequent era—but that will be
true of any serious efforts at constitutional change.
What then, might all this counsel for those committed to
contemporary race and gender justice? First and foremost, it suggests
that the project of ensuring that robust rational basis review endures—
regardless of the trajectory of LGBT equality law482—ought to be a
priority for those concerned about race and gender justice reform.483
After sex and illegitimacy were canonized within the heightened tiers,

478. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
479. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Ky. 1973), abrogated by
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186–87 (Minn.
1971) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188–97 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). For
a fascinating accounting of this era of same-sex marriage litigation, and the differing goals and
significance that the early same-sex marriage litigation had (as compared to the contemporary
same-sex marriage movement), see generally Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay
Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015).
480. See Landmark: Brown v. Board of Education, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND,
http://www.naacpldf.org/case/brown-v-board-education [http://perma.cc/LL2V-28S3]
(summarizing the history of Brown, including the campaign that led to Brown as well as the
long efforts to enforce it that have followed).
481. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (providing a detailed
historical inquiry, and demonstrating that the Supreme Court has historically moved slowly
and in close keeping with social and political norms regarding racial equality). For a
discussion of the reciprocal role of constitutional culture in shaping constitutional law, see
generally, Siegel, supra note 42.
482. It is not clear at this juncture whether the LGBT community will ultimately be
deemed a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class (or otherwise be treated as warranting some
special form of review). At present, the Supreme Court has not indicated that such specialized
review is appropriate. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (failing to
address the question of whether gays and lesbians are entitled to any special form of scrutiny,
and holding for gays and lesbians without explicitly applying any heightened form of review);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (same). As discussed infra notes 482–90 and
accompanying text, to the extent that the Court finds that the LGBT community is entitled to
specialized review as a class in future cases, there is a risk that early cases such as Romer and
Windsor will be written out of the rational basis canon—just as cases like Reed and Weber
were written out of the canon decades ago.
483. For a discussion of how the legal community’s responses to the trajectory of LGBT
law could potentially impact the availability of meaningful rational basis review, see infra
notes 485–90 and accompanying text.
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scholars and teachers (and to some extent practitioners) largely
abandoned efforts to preserve cases like Reed and Weber as rational
basis precedents, characterizing such cases instead as “[h]eightened
scrutiny under a deferential, old equal protection guise.”484 Despite the
fact that such cases were widely understood in the 1970s as generally
applicable rational basis precedents—an understanding that was never
repudiated by the Supreme Court—the canon was, over time, rewritten
by multiplicitous acts of recharacterization and omission.485 Thus, the
academic legal community widely acceded to—and indeed arguably
drove—the erasure of the sex and illegitimacy cases from the rational
basis canon.
The outcome need not be the same today—regardless of whether
the courts ultimately embrace a formal heightened scrutiny approach to
anti-LGBT discrimination.486 Romer v. Evans487 and United States v.
Windsor488 were—by the Court’s own account—not applications of
formally heightened review,489 and we can and should take them
seriously on their own terms. But there are troubling signs that the
erasure of cases like Romer and Windsor from the rational basis canon
is, in many respects, already under way. Just as cases like Reed and
Weber were reimagined as covert “heightened scrutiny” cases—rather
than applications of true minimum tier review—scholars have already
begun to characterize cases like Romer and Windsor as “purport[ing]” to
apply rational basis review.490 In casebooks, cases like Romer and
Windsor increasingly appear in a separate section for sexual
orientation—rather than in discussions of the general standards for

484. See Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 533 n.21 (quoting SULLIVAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 74, at 683); see also id. at 535, 573 & n.175; supra note 433 (describing
the shifting incentives in relation to this issue for race and gender justice litigators).
485. See sources cited supra note 483.
486. I am someone who strongly supports heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation and
gender identity discrimination, and who has written as much in the past. See, e.g., Eyer, supra
note 26, at 7–11. However, I think it serves neither those groups who still remain unprotected,
nor those who will have protections under the new regime, to strip away the potential of
rational basis review. See generally supra note 23 (describing my prior work detailing the
continued importance of meaningful rational basis review to those both within and outside of
the protected classes).
487. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
488. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
489. See id. at 2692–96 (citing rational basis precedents, and not specifying that any
heightened scrutiny doctrine was applicable); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–36 (applying rational
basis review explicitly); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
the majority did not apply strict scrutiny and appeared to apply rational basis review).
490. See, e.g., COHEN & VARAT, supra note 74, at 654–55; SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra
note 15, at 751.
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rational basis review.491 The history of protected class rational basis
review—and its potential today—suggest that we ought to question such
developments, insofar as we value the potential to interrogate
discrimination, even in its less obvious or intentional forms.
Similarly, when considered against the backdrop of the protected
class rational basis review, we may view with greater concern many
contemporary scholarly efforts to bring order to the chaotic terrain of
the Court’s rational basis tradition. In particular, the scholarly turn
towards defining the LGBT rights cases as exclusively based on “animus
doctrine”—and defining animus as the gatekeeping criteria to the new
heightened scrutiny,492 “rational basis with ‘bite’ ”493—appears more

491. See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 887–902 (10th
ed. 2012); SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 745–67.
492. To be clear, much of this is thoughtful scholarship that I admire, and, as described
more fully later, see infra note 494, I understand there may be costs to not pursuing the
systematization of rational basis doctrine. However, I would suggest that the problems that
have arisen from the reification of “special” categories of review, to which gatekeeping
criteria are applied, counsel caution in pursuing a similar approach with regard to the one
remaining arena in which essentially any party can make claims. For recent prominent works
developing the theory of “animus,” see generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT
INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017) (providing a book-length treatment on the
subject of animus, and developing a theory of where and how animus applies); Dale
Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2013)
(describing the “concept of animus” and suggesting that Windsor built upon this principle,
and is defensible as an application of it); Pollvogt, supra note 442 (articulating a theory of
animus doctrine, and concluding that “the doctrine of unconstitutional animus gives life to the
strong anti-caste mandate of the federal Equal Protection Clause”).
493. Not all scholars agree that animus should trigger “rational basis with ‘bite’ ” as
opposed to absolute invalidation. See, e.g., Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer
v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 492–95 (1998). However,
as Pollvogt observes, “[p]erhaps the most mainstream theory of animus is that it is nothing
more than a trigger for the mythical creature of ‘heightened rational basis review.’ ” Pollvogt,
supra note 442, at 929. However, most of the prominent recent works to discuss animus do
situate animus as the explanation for the LGBT rights cases—and often generally for victories
on rational basis review—and thus strongly imply that it is the exclusive gatekeeper to rational
basis success. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 491, at 3–4; Carpenter, supra note 491, at 248–84;
Pollvogt, supra note 442, at 898–900. As such, animus is situated as a gatekeeping criteria to
meaningful review (whether that meaningful review is complete invalidation, or simply
“rational basis with bite”). Finally, I should observe that several recent scholars of animus
have embraced objective conceptions of animus that potentially offer expansive possibilities,
perhaps even for those within the protected classes. See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 491, at 163–
72; Susannah William Pollvogt, Cleburne Not Romer: Objective Versus Subjective Theories of
Animus 8–10 (June 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), ssrn.com/abstract=2615027 [https://
perma.cc/JPW6-3H8S (staff-uploaded archive)]. It is at least partially my pessimism regarding
the courts’ willingness to embrace a theory that deeply divorces a common sense term from its
every-day meaning, especially in the discrimination context, that drives my concerns about the
animus project. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 491, at 236 (noting that “very few litigants will
successfully use the animus doctrine”). See generally Eyer, supra note 446 (describing research
demonstrating that most observers are unwilling to deviate from their common sense beliefs
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troubling when we remember the historical implications of such
tierification for sex and racial justice claims.494 Although this impulse
towards order is understandable (and indeed has been at times
embraced by this author),495 it is arguably counter-productive insofar as
it is precisely rational basis review’s stature as a
“persistent[ly] . . . confus[ed]”496 area of the doctrine that preserves its
potential for disruptive deployment.497 Especially in light of the
about what discrimination is, and that those beliefs tend to cause individuals to be reluctant to
make findings of discrimination).
494. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 24, at 172–74 (describing the ways that gatekeeping
criteria have been used under the modern tiers to prevent the claims of racial minorities from
gaining traction). See generally Goldberg, supra note 26 (offering an extended critique of the
way that the tiers may be counterproductive to equality efforts); Siegel, supra note 29
(describing extensively the ways that racial justice causes have suffered under the current
tiered framework).
495. See generally Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1 (addressing the potential
of the modern constitutional moment for those outside the protected classes, and attempting
to identify common characteristics of the successful rational basis cases in the Supreme
Court). From a progressive perspective, there are two major potential drawbacks to not
systematizing rational basis review in this way. First, lower courts may not systematically
afford robust rational basis review in any context without a regime that better clarifies where
applications of robust rational basis review are appropriate. Id. at 579 n.203 (noting that a
better descriptive account of where the Supreme Court has in fact applied meaningful review
might help courts to consistently apply such review in similar cases). Second, an untethered
rational basis review is potentially open to all comers, including corporate challengers of
progressive economic legislation (although such challenges have in fact rarely succeeded). See,
e.g., Visiting Homemaker Serv. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. HUD-L-1332-03, 2004 WL
369869, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 2, 2004) (invalidating living wage law applicable
to county contractors on inter alia equal protection rational basis grounds), rev’d, 883 A.2d
1074, 1081 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). I acknowledge the reality of these concerns, but
ultimately have come to believe that it poses greater risks to marginalized and historically
disadvantaged groups to impose rigid gatekeeping requirements on the exclusive remaining
form of equal protection argumentation that allows status quo-disrupting arguments, than the
risks posed by the unbounded alternative.
496. Schmidt, supra note 462, at 575.
497. Arguably, rational basis review is one of the few true “disruptive technologies”
available to social movement actors in the contemporary constitutional litigation regime. For
social movements working on behalf of those currently outside the upper tiers, this is most
obviously true, as the “test” for “protected classes” has not for many years—and arguably has
never—operated as a true entry-point for more rigorous scrutiny of discrimination against
new entrants. See, e.g., Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads, supra note 1, at 554–63; Yoshino,
supra note 54, at 757. See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (making this argument
extensively). However, this is also true for those within the protected classes, who are today
constrained by rules that render resort to heightened scrutiny largely unavailable and/or
inefficacious as a means of disrupting contemporary structures of race and gender
subordination. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 457, at 97–139; IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, DOG
WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVESTED RACISM AND
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 41–46 (2014). Rational basis review, in contrast, has a
sufficiently varied case law that a diversity of results can be reached by a lower court judge in
many cases—a feature that has often been critiqued, but is arguably beneficial to those
seeking to make claims disruptive of the contemporary legal and societal status quo. See, e.g.,
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increasingly expansive approaches to rational basis review that the
Court’s LGBT rights cases have inspired in the lower courts (approaches
that are far from limited to “animus” based applications), we ought to
proceed with caution in imposing a framework on the Court’s muddled
jurisprudence that at least one leading proponent has acknowledged will
benefit “very few litigants[.]”498
Finally, for those who are teachers and keepers of the canon, the
reality of protected class rational basis review—historically and today—
counsels a serious reevaluation of how we think, write, and talk about
how equal protection protects.499 We build the very barriers that we
decry to the extent that we construct heightened scrutiny—and its rigid
requirements for entry—as the exclusive method for challenging race
and gender injustice. Heightened scrutiny—and the findings of
intentional race or sex discrimination it entails—is one pathway to
change for race and gender justice, and arguably still an important one.
But sometimes it is from the bottom up, by excavating the crumbling
foundations and laying them bare, that race and gender injustice are
exposed. Meaningful rational basis review offers such an opportunity to
interrogate and expose the thin underpinnings of race and gender
injustice today; it is one we should take up, and advance.
CONCLUSION
It is unsurprising and perhaps inevitable that constitutional law “on
the books”—the constitutional law described by our treatises, our
casebooks, our canonical accounts—bears only faint resemblance to the
vast messy expanse of constitutional law’s possibilities.500 To the extent
we strive toward a coherent account of the law, it is precisely the craft of
Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 29, at 285, 340–41 (observing that the rational basis test
“has enough slack in the rope to allow lower courts to experiment and respond adequately to
new problems” and generally offering a positive account of the benefits of an “open-ended
and vague” approach to rational basis review); cf. Schmidt, supra note 462, at 617–24 (making
a similar observation about the possible values of persistent doctrinal confusion in certain
other areas of constitutional law).
498. Carpenter, supra note 491, at 236; see also cases cited supra note 31. See generally
Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1 (extensively discussing this issue and describing the variety of
ways that the courts have approached meaningful rational basis review, which have not been
limited to an animus model).
499. Cf. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113–14, 1119 (1997) (developing the
“preservation-through-transformation” theory of how status regimes reproduce themselves
following legal reform).
500. See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 458 (describing extensively ways that our
constitutional canon, as described in casebooks, and taught to new law students, offers an
incomplete and problematic account of constitutional law); Eyer, The Canon, supra note 1
(same, with respect to rational basis review specifically).
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categorization and omission, of limitation and simplification to which we
inevitably aspire.
But we ought not to confuse this simplified account with reality.
Today, a canonical account would teach that racial minorities and
women must prove that the laws burdening them were adopted because
of invidious intent—and, by inverse implication, that laws that “merely”
impose racial and gender harms are constitutional.501 But the history of
protected class rational basis review suggests that this syllogism is false,
or at least incomplete; that when meaningful rational basis review is
applied, many racially and gender-impactful laws will fall.502
Today, we are again poised at the cusp of an era of rich possibilities
for robust rational basis review—and with it, rich possibilities for
renewed race and gender justice claims. Such a rational basis approach
does not sit comfortably within the contemporary canon—which situates
race and gender justice as exclusively the concern of, and delimited by—
the jurisprudence of the heightened tiers.503 This Article suggests that to
the extent this conflict is irremediable, it is the canon itself that we ought
to reimagine and ultimately revise.

501. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
502. See generally supra Parts II–III (describing successful race and gender justice claims
brought on rational basis review).
503. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
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